suit claim in Alabama

2002(Stabler's brief, p. 14.) In support of his argument, he cites Diemert , supra, where this Court, overruling Eason v. City of Huntsville , 347 So.2d 1321 (Ala. 1977), and Ex parte City of Huntsville , 456 So.2d 72 (Ala. 1984), held that if a suit on a claim against a city is commenced within the six-month period prescribed § 11-47-23 , Ala. Code 1975, it is a sufficient presentment of a claim under § 11-47-192 , Ala. Code 1975. 474 So.2d at 666 .

1985"On the other hand, we have a case citing proper authority which holds: `[T]he filing of suit within the six-month period following the incident made the basis of the action does not constitute a compliance with the notice provisions of the statute.' Eason v. City of Huntsville , 347 So.2d 1321 (Ala. 1977).

1993Hughes v. Martin, 533 So.2d 188 (Ala.1988); Robinson v. Holley, 549 So.2d 1 (Ala.1989).

1990In that case, we said: “In order for a judgment in the prior suit to bar a subsequent suit: (1) the question or fact must have been litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the final judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, must be of such a relationship to the parties in the subsequent action as to entitle them to the benefits and/or burdens of the prior litigation; and (4) the same cause of action must be involved in both lawsuits.” 533 So.2d at 190 , citing Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103 (5t

1990In that case, we said: “In order for a judgment in the prior suit to bar a subsequent suit: (1) the question or fact must have been litigated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the final judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, must be of such a relationship to the parties in the subsequent action as to entitle them to the benefits and/or burdens of the prior litigation; and (4) the same cause of action must be involved in both lawsuits.” 533 So.2d at 190 , citing Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103 (5t

1989Stevenson v. International Paper Co. , 516 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975); Hughes v. Martin , 533 So.2d 188 (Ala. 1988); Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham , 364 So.2d 1190 (Ala. 1978).

1989Anders v. Sandlin, 191 Ala. 158 , 67 So. 684 (1914).’ ” Certainly the purchasers’ chronic failure to comply with the payment schedule was a circumstance which the trial court properly considered in failing to apply the principle of equitable estoppel.

1989Anders v. Sandlin, 191 Ala. 158 , 67 So. 684 (1914).’ ” Certainly the purchasers’ chronic failure to comply with the payment schedule was a circumstance which the trial court properly considered in failing to apply the principle of equitable estoppel.

1992Franklin County v. Hester, 224 Ala. 460 , 140 So. 744 (1932), as follows: “ ‘The purpose of this suit is to test the constitutionality of the Act of July 22, 1931.

1992Franklin County v. Hester, 224 Ala. 460 , 140 So. 744 (1932), as follows: “ ‘The purpose of this suit is to test the constitutionality of the Act of July 22, 1931.

1978Fricke v. City of Guntersville , 257 Ala. 442 , 59 So.2d 590 (1952); Howell v. City of Dothan , 234 Ala. 158 , 174 So. 624 (1937); Town of Linden v. American-La France Foamite Industries , 232 Ala. 167 , 167 So. 548 (1936).

1978Fricke v. City of Guntersville , 257 Ala. 442 , 59 So.2d 590 (1952); Howell v. City of Dothan , 234 Ala. 158 , 174 So. 624 (1937); Town of Linden v. American-La France Foamite Industries , 232 Ala. 167 , 167 So. 548 (1936).

2002(Stabler's brief, p. 14.) In support of his argument, he cites Diemert , supra, where this Court, overruling Eason v. City of Huntsville , 347 So.2d 1321 (Ala. 1977), and Ex parte City of Huntsville , 456 So.2d 72 (Ala. 1984), held that if a suit on a claim against a city is commenced within the six-month period prescribed § 11-47-23 , Ala. Code 1975, it is a sufficient presentment of a claim under § 11-47-192 , Ala. Code 1975. 474 So.2d at 666 .

1993Hughes v. Martin, 533 So.2d 188 (Ala.1988); Robinson v. Holley, 549 So.2d 1 (Ala.1989).

1989Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103 (5th Cir.1975); Hughes v. Martin, 533 So.2d 188 (Ala. 1988); Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190 (Ala. 1978).

1989Stevenson v. International Paper Co. , 516 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975); Hughes v. Martin , 533 So.2d 188 (Ala. 1988); Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham , 364 So.2d 1190 (Ala. 1978).

1978Fricke v. City of Guntersville , 257 Ala. 442 , 59 So.2d 590 (1952); Howell v. City of Dothan , 234 Ala. 158 , 174 So. 624 (1937); Town of Linden v. American-La France Foamite Industries , 232 Ala. 167 , 167 So. 548 (1936).

1978Fricke v. City of Guntersville , 257 Ala. 442 , 59 So.2d 590 (1952); Howell v. City of Dothan , 234 Ala. 158 , 174 So. 624 (1937); Town of Linden v. American-La France Foamite Industries , 232 Ala. 167 , 167 So. 548 (1936).

1978Fricke v. City of Guntersville , 257 Ala. 442 , 59 So.2d 590 (1952); Howell v. City of Dothan , 234 Ala. 158 , 174 So. 624 (1937); Town of Linden v. American-La France Foamite Industries , 232 Ala. 167 , 167 So. 548 (1936).

1978Fricke v. City of Guntersville , 257 Ala. 442 , 59 So.2d 590 (1952); Howell v. City of Dothan , 234 Ala. 158 , 174 So. 624 (1937); Town of Linden v. American-La France Foamite Industries , 232 Ala. 167 , 167 So. 548 (1936).

1973(No statement by the decedent was offered.) It is unnecessary for this court to decide, however, whether this limitation avoids application of the “Dead Man’s Statute” because it appears that the instant case falls within an exception to the “Dead Man’s Statute.” In Homewood Dairy Products Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 254 Ala. 197 , 48 So.2d 28 (1950), in a suit on a claim growing out of a contract for the sale of milk, plaintiff was permitted to testify as to conversations with the defendant, deceased at the time of the trial, because the conversations were witnessed by a person associated with the

1973(No statement by the decedent was offered.) It is unnecessary for this court to decide, however, whether this limitation avoids application of the “Dead Man’s Statute” because it appears that the instant case falls within an exception to the “Dead Man’s Statute.” In Homewood Dairy Products Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 254 Ala. 197 , 48 So.2d 28 (1950), in a suit on a claim growing out of a contract for the sale of milk, plaintiff was permitted to testify as to conversations with the defendant, deceased at the time of the trial, because the conversations were witnessed by a person associated with the

1971We think the obvious reason is that such a suit would be in violation of Sec. 14 of the Constitution of 1901, and this court has held that Sec. 14 “wholly withdraws from the Legislature, or any other state authority, the power to give consent to a suit against the state,” Dunn Construction Co. v. State Board of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372 , 175 So. 383 , and no individual has authority to waive this immunity.

1971We think the obvious reason is that such a suit would be in violation of Sec. 14 of the Constitution of 1901, and this court has held that Sec. 14 “wholly withdraws from the Legislature, or any other state authority, the power to give consent to a suit against the state,” Dunn Construction Co. v. State Board of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372 , 175 So. 383 , and no individual has authority to waive this immunity.

1971State Tax Commission v. Commercial Realty Co., 236 Ala. 358 , 182 So. 31 .

1971State Tax Commission v. Commercial Realty Co., 236 Ala. 358 , 182 So. 31 .

1966This court said: “ * * * the court was without authority to direct payment to a judgment creditor which was not a party to 'the suit.” ( 277 Ala. at page 322 , 169 So.2d at page 766 .) In the case at bar, suppose the husband should pay the grandfather $11,899.68, would such payment preclude the grandfather from proceeding against the father in a separate suit on a claim for the amount paid or on a 'claim that the amount paid was not all that was díte?

1966This court said: “ * * * the court was without authority to direct payment to a judgment creditor which was not a party to 'the suit.” ( 277 Ala. at page 322 , 169 So.2d at page 766 .) In the case at bar, suppose the husband should pay the grandfather $11,899.68, would such payment preclude the grandfather from proceeding against the father in a separate suit on a claim for the amount paid or on a 'claim that the amount paid was not all that was díte?

1964The objection relates largely to a matter of discretion, and every case must in a measure be governed by what is convenient and equitable under its peculiar facts, subject to the recognized principles of equity jurisprudence. ‘It is, therefore, always proper to exercise this discretion in such a manner as to discourage future litigation and prevent multiplicity of suits, and never so as to do plain violence to the maxim that “courts of equity ‘delight to do justice, and not by halves.’ ” ’ City of Marion v. Underwood, 231 Ala. 225 , 164 So. 296 ; O’Neal v. Cooper, 191 Ala. 182 , 67 So. 689 .”

1964The objection relates largely to a matter of discretion, and every case must in a measure be governed by what is convenient and equitable under its peculiar facts, subject to the recognized principles of equity jurisprudence. ‘It is, therefore, always proper to exercise this discretion in such a manner as to discourage future litigation and prevent multiplicity of suits, and never so as to do plain violence to the maxim that “courts of equity ‘delight to do justice, and not by halves.’ ” ’ City of Marion v. Underwood, 231 Ala. 225 , 164 So. 296 ; O’Neal v. Cooper, 191 Ala. 182 , 67 So. 689 .”

1964The objection relates largely to a matter of discretion, and every case must in a measure be governed by what is convenient and equitable under its peculiar facts, subject to the recognized principles of equity jurisprudence. ‘It is, therefore, always proper to exercise this discretion in such a manner as to discourage future litigation and prevent multiplicity of suits, and never so as to do plain violence to the maxim that “courts of equity ‘delight to do justice, and not by halves.’ ” ’ City of Marion v. Underwood, 231 Ala. 225 , 164 So. 296 ; O’Neal v. Cooper, 191 Ala. 182 , 67 So. 689 .”

1964The objection relates largely to a matter of discretion, and every case must in a measure be governed by what is convenient and equitable under its peculiar facts, subject to the recognized principles of equity jurisprudence. ‘It is, therefore, always proper to exercise this discretion in such a manner as to discourage future litigation and prevent multiplicity of suits, and never so as to do plain violence to the maxim that “courts of equity ‘delight to do justice, and not by halves.’ ” ’ City of Marion v. Underwood, 231 Ala. 225 , 164 So. 296 ; O’Neal v. Cooper, 191 Ala. 182 , 67 So. 689 .”

1955Starr Piano Co. v. Zavelo, 212 Ala. 369 , 102 So. 795 ; Roberts v. Davis, 230 Ala. 272 , 168 So. 718 .

1955Starr Piano Co. v. Zavelo, 212 Ala. 369 , 102 So. 795 ; Roberts v. Davis, 230 Ala. 272 , 168 So. 718 .

1955Starr Piano Co. v. Zavelo, 212 Ala. 369 , 102 So. 795 ; Roberts v. Davis, 230 Ala. 272 , 168 So. 718 .

1955Starr Piano Co. v. Zavelo, 212 Ala. 369 , 102 So. 795 ; Roberts v. Davis, 230 Ala. 272 , 168 So. 718 .

1951The nature of the acts of possession of a person seeking to defeat such a suit on the principle that he is contesting the possession of complainant at the time when the bill is filed is well illustrated in the case of Jordan v. McClure Lumber Co., 170 Ala. 289 , 54 So. 415, 421 .

1951The nature of the acts of possession of a person seeking to defeat such a suit on the principle that he is contesting the possession of complainant at the time when the bill is filed is well illustrated in the case of Jordan v. McClure Lumber Co., 170 Ala. 289 , 54 So. 415, 421 .

1948They are considered as constructively in the treasury.” [ 227 Ala. 64 , 148 So. 607 .] See, also, to the same effect, Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110 (3), 26 So.2d 849 ; Abrasley v. Jefferson County, 241 Ala. 660 , 4 So.2d 153 ; Famed v. Bolding, 221 Ala. 217 , 128 So. 435 ; Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549 (2), 148 So. 116 ; Allgood v. Stallings, 197 Ala. 121 , 72 So. 383 .

1948They are considered as constructively in the treasury.” [ 227 Ala. 64 , 148 So. 607 .] See, also, to the same effect, Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110 (3), 26 So.2d 849 ; Abrasley v. Jefferson County, 241 Ala. 660 , 4 So.2d 153 ; Famed v. Bolding, 221 Ala. 217 , 128 So. 435 ; Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549 (2), 148 So. 116 ; Allgood v. Stallings, 197 Ala. 121 , 72 So. 383 .

1948They are considered as constructively in the treasury.” [ 227 Ala. 64 , 148 So. 607 .] See, also, to the same effect, Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110 (3), 26 So.2d 849 ; Abrasley v. Jefferson County, 241 Ala. 660 , 4 So.2d 153 ; Famed v. Bolding, 221 Ala. 217 , 128 So. 435 ; Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549 (2), 148 So. 116 ; Allgood v. Stallings, 197 Ala. 121 , 72 So. 383 .