suit claim in Colorado

1893In the case of Perrin v. Claflin, 11 Mo. 13 , it is held that “ Where the goods of one are seized under an attachment against another, on an interpleader filed by tbe owner of the goods so taken, if the plaintiff in the attachment defend the interpleader, it will be evidence of his assent to the seizure by the officer, and such subsequent assent will render the plaintiff liable in trespass.” The general doctrine is that “ One who is the owner of property attached to that of another, may either intervene in the suit to claim his property, or he ma}" sue the sheriff or the purchaser without maki

1893In the case of Perrin v. Claflin, 11 Mo. 13 , it is held that “ Where the goods of one are seized under an attachment against another, on an interpleader filed by tbe owner of the goods so taken, if the plaintiff in the attachment defend the interpleader, it will be evidence of his assent to the seizure by the officer, and such subsequent assent will render the plaintiff liable in trespass.” The general doctrine is that “ One who is the owner of property attached to that of another, may either intervene in the suit to claim his property, or he ma}" sue the sheriff or the purchaser without maki

2015The italicized portion of the statute was added in 2009, apparently in response to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 , 126 S.Ct. 1752 , 164 LEd.2d 459 (2006) See Ch. 100, see. 1, § 25.5-4-301(5)(a), 2009 Colo, Sess.

2015The italicized portion of the statute was added in 2009, apparently in response to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 , 126 S.Ct. 1752 , 164 LEd.2d 459 (2006) See Ch. 100, see. 1, § 25.5-4-301(5)(a), 2009 Colo, Sess.

1986This case hinges on whether Butcher was a third-party defendant at trial and, therefore, under the second sentence of C.R.C.P. 47(h), entitled to extra challenges, or whether he was a party to the suit on the defense side and, therefore, under the first sentence of C.R.C.P. 47(h) and Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317 (Colo.1985), not entitled to additional challenges.

1986This case hinges on whether Butcher was a third-party defendant at trial and, therefore, under the second sentence of C.R.C.P. 47(h), entitled to extra challenges, or whether he was a party to the suit on the defense side and, therefore, under the first sentence of C.R.C.P. 47(h) and Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317 (Colo.1985), not entitled to additional challenges.

1982It ruled that such notice was not “notice to a duly authorized attorney in the sense that the bankruptcy statute requires so as to bind the creditor.” See In re Porter, 16 B.R. 229 (1981); see also Wilder v. Baker, 147 Colo. 92 , 362 P.2d 1045 (1961).

1952If the court’s jurisdiction is founded solely on the presence of the thing no personal judgment, even for costs, can be imposed on the owner.” In the case of Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N.C. 700 , 24 S.E. 527 , we find the following: “In proceedings under this class—proceedings in rem—it is not necessary, as in proceedings quasi in rem, to acquire jurisdiction by actual seizure or attachment of the property, but ‘it may be done by the mere bringing of the suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which in law (in such cases) is equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of

1952If the court’s jurisdiction is founded solely on the presence of the thing no personal judgment, even for costs, can be imposed on the owner.” In the case of Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N.C. 700 , 24 S.E. 527 , we find the following: “In proceedings under this class—proceedings in rem—it is not necessary, as in proceedings quasi in rem, to acquire jurisdiction by actual seizure or attachment of the property, but ‘it may be done by the mere bringing of the suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which in law (in such cases) is equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of

1952If the court’s jurisdiction is founded solely on the presence of the thing no personal judgment, even for costs, can be imposed on the owner.” In the case of Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N.C. 700 , 24 S.E. 527 , we find the following: “In proceedings under this class—proceedings in rem—it is not necessary, as in proceedings quasi in rem, to acquire jurisdiction by actual seizure or attachment of the property, but ‘it may be done by the mere bringing of the suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which in law (in such cases) is equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of

1952If the court’s jurisdiction is founded solely on the presence of the thing no personal judgment, even for costs, can be imposed on the owner.” In the case of Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N.C. 700 , 24 S.E. 527 , we find the following: “In proceedings under this class—proceedings in rem—it is not necessary, as in proceedings quasi in rem, to acquire jurisdiction by actual seizure or attachment of the property, but ‘it may be done by the mere bringing of the suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which in law (in such cases) is equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of

1952In Irion v. Bexar County, 26 Tex. Civ.