suit bar in West Virginia

2014DHHR v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759 , 466 S.E.2d 827 (1995) (same); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 184 W.Va. 82, 89 , 399 S.E.2d 664, 671 (1990) (“It is clear that delay itself in bringing the suit will not bar laches”); Maynard v. Board of Educ., 178 W.Va. 53, 60 , 357 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1987) (“[T]he controlling element of the equitable defense of laches is prejudice, rather than the amount of time which has elapsed without asserting a known right or claim”); Syl.

2014DHHR v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759 , 466 S.E.2d 827 (1995) (same); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 184 W.Va. 82, 89 , 399 S.E.2d 664, 671 (1990) (“It is clear that delay itself in bringing the suit will not bar laches”); Maynard v. Board of Educ., 178 W.Va. 53, 60 , 357 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1987) (“[T]he controlling element of the equitable defense of laches is prejudice, rather than the amount of time which has elapsed without asserting a known right or claim”); Syl.

1994Syllabus Point 1 of In re McIntosh's Estate, 144 W.Va. 583 , 109 S.E.2d 153 (1959), states the doctrine of res judicata: "`An adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is final and conclusive, not only as to the matters actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated as incident thereto and coming within the legitimate purview of the subject-matter of the action.

1994Syllabus Point 1 of In re McIntosh's Estate, 144 W.Va. 583 , 109 S.E.2d 153 (1959), states the doctrine of res judicata: "`An adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is final and conclusive, not only as to the matters actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated as incident thereto and coming within the legitimate purview of the subject-matter of the action.

1990Matters pertaining to fiduciary relationships come within the rule.” 5 See also Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276 , 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982); Patrick v. Stark, 62 W.Va. 602 , 59 S.E. 606 (1907). *89 It is clear that delay itself in bringing the suit will not bar laches, as we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Acker v. Martin, 136 W.Va. 503 , 68 S.E.2d 721 (1951): “ ‘Mere delay will not bar relief in equity on the ground of laches.

1990Matters pertaining to fiduciary relationships come within the rule.” 5 See also Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276 , 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982); Patrick v. Stark, 62 W.Va. 602 , 59 S.E. 606 (1907). *89 It is clear that delay itself in bringing the suit will not bar laches, as we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Acker v. Martin, 136 W.Va. 503 , 68 S.E.2d 721 (1951): “ ‘Mere delay will not bar relief in equity on the ground of laches.

1990“Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right.” Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608 [ 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) ], Pt. 2, syl.’ Pt. 2 Syl., Hoglund v. Curtis, 134 W.Va. [735, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950) ]” See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170 , 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Pownall v. Cearfoss, 129 W.Va. 487 , 40 S.E.2d 886 (1946).

1990“Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right.” Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608 [ 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) ], Pt. 2, syl.’ Pt. 2 Syl., Hoglund v. Curtis, 134 W.Va. [735, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950) ]” See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170 , 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Pownall v. Cearfoss, 129 W.Va. 487 , 40 S.E.2d 886 (1946).

1990“Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right.” Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608 [ 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) ], Pt. 2, syl.’ Pt. 2 Syl., Hoglund v. Curtis, 134 W.Va. [735, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950) ]” See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170 , 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Pownall v. Cearfoss, 129 W.Va. 487 , 40 S.E.2d 886 (1946).

1990“Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right.” Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608 [ 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) ], Pt. 2, syl.’ Pt. 2 Syl., Hoglund v. Curtis, 134 W.Va. [735, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950) ]” See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170 , 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Pownall v. Cearfoss, 129 W.Va. 487 , 40 S.E.2d 886 (1946).

1990“Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right.” Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608 [ 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) ], Pt. 2, syl.’ Pt. 2 Syl., Hoglund v. Curtis, 134 W.Va. [735, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950) ]” See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170 , 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Pownall v. Cearfoss, 129 W.Va. 487 , 40 S.E.2d 886 (1946).

1990Matters pertaining to fiduciary relationships come within the rule.” 5 See also Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276 , 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982); Patrick v. Stark, 62 W.Va. 602 , 59 S.E. 606 (1907). *89 It is clear that delay itself in bringing the suit will not bar laches, as we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Acker v. Martin, 136 W.Va. 503 , 68 S.E.2d 721 (1951): “ ‘Mere delay will not bar relief in equity on the ground of laches.

1990Matters pertaining to fiduciary relationships come within the rule.” 5 See also Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276 , 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982); Patrick v. Stark, 62 W.Va. 602 , 59 S.E. 606 (1907). *89 It is clear that delay itself in bringing the suit will not bar laches, as we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Acker v. Martin, 136 W.Va. 503 , 68 S.E.2d 721 (1951): “ ‘Mere delay will not bar relief in equity on the ground of laches.

1990“Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right.” Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608 [ 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) ], Pt. 2, syl.’ Pt. 2 Syl., Hoglund v. Curtis, 134 W.Va. [735, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950) ]” See Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170 , 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955); Pownall v. Cearfoss, 129 W.Va. 487 , 40 S.E.2d 886 (1946).

1988“Whenever the injury is merely personal, whether resulting from breach of contract or from tort, the maxim, ‘Ac-tio personalis moritur cum persona’ prevails.” The object of the suit at bar being to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, the limitation in tort actions is applicable. *363 37 S.E. at 17 . 1 Even if we were to concede for a moment that Mrs. Allen could bring her action under a contract theory, she would still be confounded by the fact that she alleges no damages other than embarrassment and humiliation.

1983In Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 , 82 S.Ct. 519 , 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962), the Court identified the “sole question” in the case as being “whether this federal statute [ 29 U.S.C. § 185 ] operates to divest a state court of jurisdiction over a suit for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization.” Id. at 503 , 82 S.Ct. at 520 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 485 .

1983In Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 , 82 S.Ct. 519 , 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962), the Court identified the “sole question” in the case as being “whether this federal statute [ 29 U.S.C. § 185 ] operates to divest a state court of jurisdiction over a suit for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization.” Id. at 503 , 82 S.Ct. at 520 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 485 .

1983This court set out the proper test for sufficient contact to establish personal jurisdiction in the Syllabus of S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 167 W.Va. 880 , 280 S.E.2d 712 (1981): The standard of jurisdictional due process is that a foreign corporation must have such minimum contact with the state of the forum that the maintenance of an action in the forum does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

1983This court set out the proper test for sufficient contact to establish personal jurisdiction in the Syllabus of S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 167 W.Va. 880 , 280 S.E.2d 712 (1981): The standard of jurisdictional due process is that a foreign corporation must have such minimum contact with the state of the forum that the maintenance of an action in the forum does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

1980See Rakes v. Ferguson, 147 W.Va. 660 , 130 S.E.2d 102 (1963); Cobb v. Cobb, 145 W.Va. 107 , 113 S.E.2d 193 (1960); Stephenson v. Ashburn, 137 W.Va. 141 , 70 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1952). * The statute of frauds does not affect the Dishmans’ suit because our rule is that it is no bar to proof of an equitable mortgage.

1980See Rakes v. Ferguson, 147 W.Va. 660 , 130 S.E.2d 102 (1963); Cobb v. Cobb, 145 W.Va. 107 , 113 S.E.2d 193 (1960); Stephenson v. Ashburn, 137 W.Va. 141 , 70 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1952). * The statute of frauds does not affect the Dishmans’ suit because our rule is that it is no bar to proof of an equitable mortgage.

1946Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, this case, in our opinion, is necessarily controlled by the case of Lynch v. Davis, 79 W.

1939We have held that a person, not interested in the result of a suit, may testify as to statements made by a deceased officer of a corporation (Keatley, Admr. v. Hanna Chevrolet Co., et al., recently decided and not yet reported [ 121 W.

1899Va. 217 , ( 12 S. E. 507 ,) that, even if there were fraud and undue influence, the delay of Mrs. Farnsworth from October 31, 1889, to February 24, 1897, would defeat this suit under the doctrine of laches, and I think that second agreement ratified the deed, and estopped her from attacking it.

1896For any claim outstanding, paid or collected by either partner, would form an item in the account between them, and take the case out of the bar of the statute;”—citing Ruffner v. Hewitt, 7 W.

1885In Simpson v. Edmiston, 23 W.