suit standard in Tennessee

1975Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140 , 129 S.E.2d 828 ; O’Brien v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 3 Cir., 372 F.2d 335 .” At another point in the Opinion it was stated: “In Schleif v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 218 Tenn. 489 , 404 S.W.2d 490 (1966), in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Weldon White, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a suit under the standard uninsured motorist automobile policy is an action ex contrac-tu rather than one ex delicto, even though the insured under the terms of the contract must show that he is entitled to recover damages from the owner or o

1975Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140 , 129 S.E.2d 828 ; O’Brien v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 3 Cir., 372 F.2d 335 .” At another point in the Opinion it was stated: “In Schleif v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 218 Tenn. 489 , 404 S.W.2d 490 (1966), in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Weldon White, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a suit under the standard uninsured motorist automobile policy is an action ex contrac-tu rather than one ex delicto, even though the insured under the terms of the contract must show that he is entitled to recover damages from the owner or o

1990Marchica, 237 P.2d at 731 .

1982In Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40 , 148 S.W. 543 (1912), the Supreme Court held that a detective who had assisted the District Attorney in preparing a case “would fall within the same exceptions which protect the officers of a corporation.” The Supreme Court held in Lenoir Car Company v. Smith, 100 Tenn. 127 , 42 S.W. 879 (1897), “that the officer of a corporation, charged with the duty of looking after its interest in a pending trial, falls within the spirit of the Act in question.” The act “in question” was T.C.A. § 24-1-204 which excludes parties to a suit from the rule of sequestration of w

1982In Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40 , 148 S.W. 543 (1912), the Supreme Court held that a detective who had assisted the District Attorney in preparing a case “would fall within the same exceptions which protect the officers of a corporation.” The Supreme Court held in Lenoir Car Company v. Smith, 100 Tenn. 127 , 42 S.W. 879 (1897), “that the officer of a corporation, charged with the duty of looking after its interest in a pending trial, falls within the spirit of the Act in question.” The act “in question” was T.C.A. § 24-1-204 which excludes parties to a suit from the rule of sequestration of w

1982In Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40 , 148 S.W. 543 (1912), the Supreme Court held that a detective who had assisted the District Attorney in preparing a case “would fall within the same exceptions which protect the officers of a corporation.” The Supreme Court held in Lenoir Car Company v. Smith, 100 Tenn. 127 , 42 S.W. 879 (1897), “that the officer of a corporation, charged with the duty of looking after its interest in a pending trial, falls within the spirit of the Act in question.” The act “in question” was T.C.A. § 24-1-204 which excludes parties to a suit from the rule of sequestration of w

1982Also see Chamberlain v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company, 593 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn.1980).

1980What we decide is, that it is essential to the jurisdiction of the Court, in such a case, that there shall be an allegation that the effect of the ordinance, claimed to be illegal, will be to require of complainant the payment of a tax, to increase his tax burdens, or otherwise inflict an injury not common to the body of the citizens. 108 Tenn. at 221 , 65 S.W. at 420.

1976This Rule was issued on December 18, 1975, with an accompanying opinion in the cause styled Petition of Tennessee Bar Association, 532 S.W.2d 224 (Tenn.1975).

1975Co., 225 Tenn. 306 , 468 S.W.2d 727 , among other things, it was said: “It is fundamental that the legal liability of one person to another can be ascertained only in an action brought against such person by the other in a court of competent jurisdiction. .

1975Co., 225 Tenn. 306 , 468 S.W.2d 727 , among other things, it was said: “It is fundamental that the legal liability of one person to another can be ascertained only in an action brought against such person by the other in a court of competent jurisdiction. .

1975Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140 , 129 S.E.2d 828 ; O’Brien v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 3 Cir., 372 F.2d 335 .” At another point in the Opinion it was stated: “In Schleif v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 218 Tenn. 489 , 404 S.W.2d 490 (1966), in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Weldon White, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a suit under the standard uninsured motorist automobile policy is an action ex contrac-tu rather than one ex delicto, even though the insured under the terms of the contract must show that he is entitled to recover damages from the owner or o

1975Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140 , 129 S.E.2d 828 ; O’Brien v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 3 Cir., 372 F.2d 335 .” At another point in the Opinion it was stated: “In Schleif v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 218 Tenn. 489 , 404 S.W.2d 490 (1966), in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Weldon White, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a suit under the standard uninsured motorist automobile policy is an action ex contrac-tu rather than one ex delicto, even though the insured under the terms of the contract must show that he is entitled to recover damages from the owner or o

1975Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140 , 129 S.E.2d 828 ; O’Brien v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 3 Cir., 372 F.2d 335 .” At another point in the Opinion it was stated: “In Schleif v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 218 Tenn. 489 , 404 S.W.2d 490 (1966), in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Weldon White, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a suit under the standard uninsured motorist automobile policy is an action ex contrac-tu rather than one ex delicto, even though the insured under the terms of the contract must show that he is entitled to recover damages from the owner or o

1964Defendant cites the case of Ashworth v. Carnation Company, 190 Tenn. 274 , 229 S.W.2d 337 .

1964Defendant cites the case of Ashworth v. Carnation Company, 190 Tenn. 274 , 229 S.W.2d 337 .

1957Metcalf v. Eastman, 190 Tenn. 206 , 288 S.W.2d 490 .

1952If the thing complained of is an injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsit is the same as if the action were in form ex delicto.” The Court said further: ‘ ‘ The object of the suit at bar being to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, the limitation in tort actions is applicable.” The Court approved the foregoing, and then said: “The conclusion reached, as heretofore stated, that the language of the one-year statute, ‘all actions for * * * injuries to the person,’has application whenever the action is one by which it is sought to recover

1952If the thing complained of is an injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsit is the same as if the action were in form ex delicto.” The Court said further: ‘ ‘ The object of the suit at bar being to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, the limitation in tort actions is applicable.” The Court approved the foregoing, and then said: “The conclusion reached, as heretofore stated, that the language of the one-year statute, ‘all actions for * * * injuries to the person,’has application whenever the action is one by which it is sought to recover

1952If the thing complained of is an injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsit is the same as if the action were in form ex delicto.” The Court said further: ‘ ‘ The object of the suit at bar being to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, the limitation in tort actions is applicable.” The Court approved the foregoing, and then said: “The conclusion reached, as heretofore stated, that the language of the one-year statute, ‘all actions for * * * injuries to the person,’has application whenever the action is one by which it is sought to recover

1952If the thing complained of is an injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsit is the same as if the action were in form ex delicto.” The Court said further: ‘ ‘ The object of the suit at bar being to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, the limitation in tort actions is applicable.” The Court approved the foregoing, and then said: “The conclusion reached, as heretofore stated, that the language of the one-year statute, ‘all actions for * * * injuries to the person,’has application whenever the action is one by which it is sought to recover

1928The basis of the suit is the rule of law announced in Winchester Milling Company v. Bank of Winchester, 120 Tenn., 225 , and other cases, that a collecting bank, taking for collection checks payable at a distance, is guilty of negligence in sending such checks direct to the bank upon which they are drawn.

1919It is said in the brief of counsel for defendants that the question involved in the suit at bar was decided in accordance with the contention of defendants by this court in the case of Tate et al. v. Greenlee, reported in 141 Tenn., 103 , 207 S. W. 716 .

1914So in Corcoran v. Chesapeake Co., 94 U. S., 741 , 24 L.

1914So in Corcoran v. Chesapeake Co., 94 U. S., 741 , 24 L.