trespass claim in Ohio

2022As this court has held, “[t]o prevail on a claim of trespass, the claimant must prove he had possession of the subject premises at the time of the trespass.” Northfield Park Assocs. v. NE Ohio Harness, 36 Ohio App.3d 14, 18 , 521 N.E.2d 466 (8th Dist.1987).

2022As this court has held, “[t]o prevail on a claim of trespass, the claimant must prove he had possession of the subject premises at the time of the trespass.” Northfield Park Assocs. v. NE Ohio Harness, 36 Ohio App.3d 14, 18 , 521 N.E.2d 466 (8th Dist.1987).

2014Using wiretaps attached to telephone wires on public streets therefore was not a search, because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.” Id. at 464 . {¶ 25} And applying the trespass doctrine in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), the court upheld the police use of a detectaphone to eavesdrop on conversations through the wall of an adjoining 8 January Term, 2014 office without trespassing on private property.

2014Using wiretaps attached to telephone wires on public streets therefore was not a search, because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.” Id. at 464 . {¶ 25} And applying the trespass doctrine in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), the court upheld the police use of a detectaphone to eavesdrop on conversations through the wall of an adjoining office without trespassing on private property.

2014Using wiretaps attached to telephone wires on public streets therefore was not a search, because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.” Id. at 464 . {¶ 25} And applying the trespass doctrine in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), the court upheld the police use of a detectaphone to eavesdrop on conversations through the wall of an adjoining office without trespassing on private property.

2014Using wiretaps attached to telephone wires on public streets therefore was not a search, because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.” Id. at 464 . {¶ 25} And applying the trespass doctrine in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), the court upheld the police use of a detectaphone to eavesdrop on conversations through the wall of an adjoining office without trespassing on private property.

2014Thus, as the court later explained in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), “well into the 20th century, [the court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” {¶ 26} But over the next 25 years, the court’s cases “increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts” and came to “recognize[ ] that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). {¶ 27} The court revisited

2014Thus, as the court later explained in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), “well into the 20th century, [the court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” {¶ 26} But over the next 25 years, the court’s cases “increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts” and came to “recognize[ ] that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). {¶ 27} The court revisited

2014Thus, as the court later explained in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), “well into the 20th century, [the court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” {¶ 26} But over the next 25 years, the court’s cases “increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts” and came to “recognize[ ] that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). {¶ 27} The court revisited

2014Thus, as the court later explained in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), “well into the 20th century, [the court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” {¶ 26} But over the next 25 years, the court’s cases “increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts” and came to “recognize[ ] that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). {¶ 27} The court revisited

2014Thus, as the court later explained in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), “well into the 20th century, [the court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” {¶ 26} But over the next 25 years, the court’s cases “increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts” and came to “recognize[ ] that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). {¶ 27} The court revisited

2014Thus, as the court later explained in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), “well into the 20th century, [the court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” {¶ 26} But over the next 25 years, the court’s cases “increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts” and came to “recognize[ ] that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). {¶ 27} The court revisited

2018Portage No. 2014-P-0064, 2015-Ohio-4428 , 2015 WL 6449136 , this court rejected the argument that an award of attorney's fees was proper for a Trespass claim, holding that, "since punitive damages were not warranted, an award of attorney's fees also would not be permissible." Id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 49} Based on the foregoing, we find that there were no grounds for an award of attorney's fees in this matter.

2018Portage No. 2014-P-0064, 2015-Ohio-4428 , 2015 WL 6449136 , this court rejected the argument that an award of attorney's fees was proper for a Trespass claim, holding that, "since punitive damages were not warranted, an award of attorney's fees also would not be permissible." Id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 49} Based on the foregoing, we find that there were no grounds for an award of attorney's fees in this matter.

2016Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 716 , 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993) (defining trespass as “(1) an unauthorized intentional act, and (2) entry upon land in the possession of another”). {¶23} R&R argues that the trial court erred in determining that a trespass requires an intentional act.

2016Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 716 , 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993) (defining trespass as “(1) an unauthorized intentional act, and (2) entry upon land in the possession of another”). {¶23} R&R argues that the trial court erred in determining that a trespass requires an intentional act.

2025It “‘refers to a greater amount of credible evidence and relates to persuasion.’” Snapp v. Castlebrook Builders, Inc., 2014-Ohio-163, ¶ 85 (3d Dist.), quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19 .

2011In Conway v. Calbert (1997), 119 Ohio Richland County, Case No. 2011-CA-0017 4 App. 3d 288, 695 N.E. 2d 271 , the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District quoted 3 Restatement of the Law 2d Torts (1965) 419, Section 427B: “One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer knows or has reason to know to be likely to involve a trespass upon the lands of another or the creation of the public or private nuisance is subject to liability for harm resulting to others from such trespass or nuisance.” Conway at page 293-294.

2011Henkle v. Henkle (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 735 . {¶9} Generally, political subdivisions are immune from civil liability “for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary 1 Bath Township’s argument here also briefly references the Nixes and the Ellers’ trespass claim.

2011Second, to the extent that any claimed error was committed by the trial court allowing the jury to consider whether trespass was committed, the Wojciks failed to object and in fact invited the error by submitting jury instructions on trespass, arguing the existence of trespass in closing arguments, and failing to object to the trespass instruction given to the jury by the judge. {¶6} The Wojciks cite Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1 , for the proposition that the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority on remand.

2008Cos. v. Marshall , 81 Ohio St.3d 467 , 469 , 1998-Ohio-329 , appellants have failed to demonstrate how those documents were relevant to the trespass claim against Dominion, the only claim against Dominion which the trial *Page 13 court addressed on the merits.

2008The appellants argue that use of prescription, adverse possession, and similar doctrines cannot be used to obtain land for sewage disposal, citing in support Mansfield v. Balliett (1902), 65 Ohio St. 451 , 63 N.E. 86 , and Morris v. Andros , 158 Ohio App.3d 396 , 2004-Ohio-4446 , 815 N.E.2d 1147 .

2008The appellants argue that use of prescription, adverse possession, and similar doctrines cannot be used to obtain land for sewage disposal, citing in support Mansfield v. Balliett (1902), 65 Ohio St. 451 , 63 N.E. 86 , and Morris v. Andros , 158 Ohio App.3d 396 , 2004-Ohio-4446 , 815 N.E.2d 1147 .

2008Cos. v. Marshall , 81 Ohio St.3d 467 , 469 , 1998-Ohio-329 , appellants have failed to demonstrate how those documents were relevant to the trespass claim against Dominion, the only claim against Dominion which the trial *Page 13 court addressed on the merits.

2008Credit Assn. v. Hedges (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 207 , 210 , 621 N.E.2d 1360 at fn. 2; Kouns v. Pemberton (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 499 , 501 , 617 N.E.2d 701 . {¶ 9} In the case sub judice, our review of the record reveals that the trespass claim asserted in appellees' counterclaim has not been resolved and, thus, remained pending.

2008Credit Assn. v. Hedges (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 207 , 210 , 621 N.E.2d 1360 at fn. 2; Kouns v. Pemberton (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 499 , 501 , 617 N.E.2d 701 . {¶ 9} In the case sub judice, our review of the record reveals that the trespass claim asserted in appellees' counterclaim has not been resolved and, thus, remained pending.

2007Id. {¶ 37} In order to prevail on a claim of civil conversion, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "the defendant wrongfully exercised dominion and control over property in exclusion of or inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights." New Rocky Valley Farms, Inc. v. Pollock (June 23, 1999), Carroll App. No. 681, at *2, citing Joyce v. General Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93 , 96 .