trespass claim in Texas

2011See Tex. Woman's Univ. v. The Methodist Hosp., 221 S.W.3d 267, 286 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("To recover damages for trespass to real property, a plaintiff must prove that ... the plaintiff owns or has a lawful right to possess real property....").

2009As relevant here, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Methodist Hospital on the university’s trespass claim because the circumstances did not involve an intent “to commit a trespass that violated TWU’s property rights or would be practically certain to violate TWU’s property rights.” Id. at 286 .

2008See, e.g., Waddy v. City of Houston, 834 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist. 1992, writ denied) (action for trespass by permanent damage to land accrued, for limitations purposes, on discovery of first actionable injury).

2008See, e.g., Waddy v. City of Houston , 834 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 st Dist. 1992, writ denied) (action for trespass by permanent damage to land accrued, for limitations purposes, on discovery of first actionable injury).

2023In Regency Field Services, the Court confirmed that “a trespass claim alleging unauthorized physical entry upon the claimant’s land or other invasion of a possessory property interest generally accrues when the unauthorized entry occurs, even if the entry does not cause a discernable injury or damages.” Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807 , 816 n.18 (Tex. 2021) (citing Lightning Oil, 520 S.W.3d at 49 ; Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 11 n.28).

2022In Cowan, however, the court also discussed the intent required for a trespass claim, explaining that for “the tort of trespass,” “the only relevant intent is that of 1 New 99 also cites N. Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins, 501 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam), and Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Tex. 2017), for the supreme court’s description of trespass as an “unauthorized entry upon the land of another,” without mention of any required intent.

2023In Regency Field Services, the Court confirmed that “a trespass claim alleging unauthorized physical entry upon the claimant’s land or other invasion of a possessory property interest generally accrues when the unauthorized entry occurs, even if the entry does not cause a discernable injury or damages.” Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807 , 816 n.18 (Tex. 2021) (citing Lightning Oil, 520 S.W.3d at 49 ; Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 11 n.28).

2023In Regency Field Services, the Court confirmed that “a trespass claim alleging unauthorized physical entry upon the claimant’s land or other invasion of a possessory property interest generally accrues when the unauthorized entry occurs, even if the entry does not cause a discernable injury or damages.” Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807 , 816 n.18 (Tex. 2021) (citing Lightning Oil, 520 S.W.3d at 49 ; Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 11 n.28).

2023At any rate, “[i]t is well-settled that an individual stakeholder in a legal entity does not 6 L.L.C. v. Harkins, 501 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (“To prove a trespass claim, the plaintiff must show that it owned the property or had a right to exclude others from the property.”).

2022In Cowan, however, the court also discussed the intent required for a trespass claim, explaining that for “the tort of trespass,” “the only relevant intent is that of 1 New 99 also cites N. Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins, 501 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam), and Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Tex. 2017), for the supreme court’s description of trespass as an “unauthorized entry upon the land of another,” without mention of any required intent.

2020See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (concluding that the award of attorney’s fees was improper because “[t]he declaratory judgment simply duplicated the issues litigated under” the plaintiff’s trespass claim).

2019See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (concluding that the award of attorney’s fees was improper because “[t]he declaratory judgment simply duplicated the issues litigated under” the plaintiff’s trespass claim).

2010In that case, this Court concluded that: “[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy.” Id. (quoting Universal Printing Co. v. Premier Victorian Homes, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 283, 296 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).

2010In that case, this Court concluded that: "[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy." Id. (quoting Universal Printing Co. v. Premier Victorian Homes, Inc ., 73 S.W.3d 283, 296 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).

2010Relying on Hageman/Fritz, Byrne, Head & Harrison, L.L.P. v. Luth, 150 S.W.3d 617, 627 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet.), Etan urges that the district court’s declarations add nothing to what is “implicit or expressed” in the final judgment on the Lehmanns’ trespass claim.

2010Relying on Hageman/Fritz, Byrne, Head & Harrison, L.L.P. v. Luth , 150 S.W.3d 617, 627 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, no pet.), Etan urges that the district court's declarations add nothing to what is "implicit or expressed" in the final judgment on the Lehmanns' trespass claim.

2022New 99 argued that there are only three elements of a trespass claim, and intent is not one of them: The Court clearly states the three elements of trespass: “This Court has consistently defined a trespass as encompassing three elements: (1) entry (2) onto the property of another (3) without the property owner’s consent or authorization.” [EPS], 457 S.W.3d at 419 .

2019See FPL Farming, 457 S.W.3d at 418–25 (holding because FPL Farming did not establish that the entry was 66 unauthorized or without its consent, even if a trespass claim existed, it necessarily failed).

2022See id. (citing Barnes, 353 S.W.3d at 764 ; Wilen, 191 S.W.3d at 798 ).

2018The Wests’ traditional MSJ did not address the Scotts’ trespass claim, Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760, 764 (Tex. 2011) (“Trespass to real property is an unauthorized entry upon the land of another, and may occur when one enters—or causes something to enter—another’s property.”) (citations omitted), even though their no-evidence motion in the same document did.

2022See 341 S.W.2d at 149–51.

1987In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Vowell Construction Co., 161 Tex. 432 , 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960), the Texas Supreme Court held that an injury to personal property could be a trespass regardless of negligence.

2015We agree with the court of appeals' dissent “that declaratory relief was improper because the declarations in this case add *625 nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the other remedies sought in the same action.” 308 S.W.3d at 518 (Waldrop, J., dissenting). 2 Accordingly, we grant Etan's petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, TEX.R.APP.

2011We agree with the court of appeals’ dissent “that declaratory relief was improper because the declarations in this case add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment for the other remedies sought in the same action.” 308 S.W.3d at 518 (Waldrop, J., dissenting). 2 Accordingly, we grant Etan’s petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, Tex.R.App.

2015Corp., 292 S.W. 3d at 671 (finding that the declarations about timely notice and designation of a return location were part of the contract claim).

2014Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009); Mungia, 2014 WL 1379201 at *3 . -8- 04-13-00606-CV Here, the Garzas argue that their declaratory judgment claim relates exclusively to the boundary dispute and not the trespass claim.

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne 19 particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant‟s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ohio App. 1995) (approving the trial court‟s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 828 P.2d 103

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2015See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (recognizing that invasion of airborne particulates [in this case pollution from the defendant’s smoke stack] could constitute a trespass under Alabama law provided the invasion causes “substantial damages” to the property); Williams v. Oeder, 103 Ohio App.3d 333 , 659 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1995) (approving the trial court’s finding that under Ohio law a trespass claim may be maintained for entry onto property by airborne pollutants [here dust, noise, and odors], also applying the “substantial damages” rule); Ream v. Keen, 112

2011See Collins, 871 S.W.2d at 932 (appellants must show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion are insufficient to support the summary judgment). 2.

2011See Collins, 871 S.W.2d at 932 (appellants must show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion are insufficient to support the summary judgment). 2.

2011See Villarreal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc., 136 S.W.3d 265, 267-70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).

2011See Villarreal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc., 136 S.W.3d 265, 267-70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).

2009Terrill v. Harbin , 376 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ.

2009Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1964, writ dism’d).

2002See, e.g. , Upjohn Co. , 885 S.W.2d at 542 (holding continued use of injury-producing medication could be continuing tort); Twyman v. Twyman , 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App. -- Austin 1990), rev'd on other grounds , 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (holding negligent infliction of emotional distress is continuing tort) ; Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp ., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ.

2002See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 885 S.W.2d at 542 (holding continued use of injury-producing medication could be continuing tort); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1993) (holding negligent infliction of emotional distress is continuing tort); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (concluding false imprisonment is continuing tort for purposes of tolling statute of limitations).

2002See, e.g. , Upjohn Co. , 885 S.W.2d at 542 (holding continued use of injury-producing medication could be continuing tort); Twyman v. Twyman , 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App. -- Austin 1990), rev'd on other grounds , 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (holding negligent infliction of emotional distress is continuing tort) ; Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp ., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ.

2002See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 885 S.W.2d at 542 (holding continued use of injury-producing medication could be continuing tort); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1993) (holding negligent infliction of emotional distress is continuing tort); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (concluding false imprisonment is continuing tort for purposes of tolling statute of limitations).

2002See, e.g. , Upjohn Co. , 885 S.W.2d at 542 (holding continued use of injury-producing medication could be continuing tort); Twyman v. Twyman , 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App. -- Austin 1990), rev'd on other grounds , 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (holding negligent infliction of emotional distress is continuing tort) ; Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp ., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ.

2002See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 885 S.W.2d at 542 (holding continued use of injury-producing medication could be continuing tort); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1993) (holding negligent infliction of emotional distress is continuing tort); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (concluding false imprisonment is continuing tort for purposes of tolling statute of limitations).

2024Wilen, 191 S.W.3d at 24 798.

2015In sum, there is no evidence of a single element required to prove a trespass claim. 158 Prize Energy Res., L.P. v. Cliff Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 537, 557 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (citing Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)). 159 Maranatha, 833 S.W.2d at 739 (emphasis in original). 53 ii.

2021Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150, 153 (Tex. 2012) (in turn quoting Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 269– 70)).17 And a claim for trespass to non-possessory property rights under a mineral lease (as Swift asserts here) arises when the defendant’s unauthorized conduct first invades or interferes with the claimant’s legal rights “to explore, obtain, produce, and possess the minerals subject to the lease,” because that invasion or interference constitutes the actionable legal injury. 18 Lightning Oil, 520 S.W.3d at 49 .19 17 See also Crosstex, 505 S.W.3d at 600 (confirming definition of

2019Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 292 (Tex. 2004) (“[a]ssuming that entry of photons, particles, or sound waves can constitute trespass,” a trespass claim accrues once “known injury begins”).

2015In sum, the types of cases relied upon by Lightning run the gamut; however, not one of them addresses a trespass claim such as the one alleged here, where the surface owner grants permission to a contiguous mineral owner to use its surface to extract minerals which the contiguous mineral owner has, without 104 421 S.W.3d at 284 . 105 90 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. 2002). 106 Manzie!, 361 S.W.2d at 568 . 35 question, the right to produce.

1999However, there is no trespass without an *28 entry upon land, Railroad Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 (Tex.1962), and there is no summary judgment evidence of an entry upon either property by any ABC employee. 2 We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of ABC’s motion for summary judgment on the Gills’ trespass claim and render judgment in ABC’s favor.

2026Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tex. 2002); cf. [trespass case], In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015) (defamation per se). -6- 04-24-00820-CV business value.