trespass claim in Indiana

2005Initially, we note that in a trespass claim a plaintiff must prove that "he was in possession of the land and that `the defendant entered the land without right.'" Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Runge, 717 N.E.2d 216, 227 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Lever Bros.

2005Initially, we note that in a trespass claim a plaintiff must prove that "he was in possession of the land and that 'the defendant entered the land without right'" Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Runge, 717 N.E.2d 216, 227 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Lever Bros.

2023Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2815 | July 25, 2023 Page 11 of 16 [18] In addition, this Court has held: It is settled law that “in a trespass claim a plaintiff must prove that he was in possession of the land and that the defendant entered the land without right.” Aberdeen Apts. v. Cary Campbell Realty All., Inc., 820 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

2016It is settled law that “in a trespass claim a plaintiff must prove that he was in possession of the land and that the defendant entered the land without right.” Aberdeen Apts. v. Cary Campbell Realty All., Inc., 820 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

2023Even so, this does not show that Captain Hensley, or any other VPD officer was “an operator, a manager, an adult employee, or a security agent employed by a store.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-12(a). [12] We have held before that “‘a police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when [he] refuses to do so.’” Glispie, 955 N.E.2d at 823 (quoting Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying Indiana law)); see also Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police

2011See Hope Lutheran Church, 460 N.E.2d at 1248 . “[A] police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when [he] refuses to do so.” Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir.2006) (opining on the meaning of Indiana law), corrected by, 2006 U.S.App.

2014KB Home Indiana Inc. v. Rockville TBD Corp., 928 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).

2014See KB Home Ind., Inc. v. Rockville TBD Corp., 928 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (plaintiff had no claim for trespass because it did not own the property when the damage occurred). 7 R&M and the Trust assert that they should be allowed to bring a trespass claim against Twin Lakes under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

2025A plaintiff successfully establishes a trespass claim by proof of two elements: (1) “that he possessed the land when the alleged trespass occurred[;]” and (2) “that the trespassing defendant entered the land without a legal right to do so.” Samples v. Wilson, 12 N.E.3d 946, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

2023Even so, this does not show that Captain Hensley, or any other VPD officer was “an operator, a manager, an adult employee, or a security agent employed by a store.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-12(a). [12] We have held before that “‘a police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when [he] refuses to do so.’” Glispie, 955 N.E.2d at 823 (quoting Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying Indiana law)); see also Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police

2020See Ali, 53 N.E.3d at 434 . [20] Accordingly, if Williams were to have a trespass claim, it would run against Porter County Animal Control, not Guzman.

2019See Ehler v. LVDVD, L.C. , 319 S.W.3d 817 , 824 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) ("Permitting the [plaintiffs] to avoid the application of [the Texas RTFA] by pleading a nuisance action as a trespass would eviscerate the statute and deny [the defendants] the protection intended by the Legislature when it passed the Right to Farm Act.").

2016See Frink v. State, 2016 WL 1158614 *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2016) (concluding the lack of contractual interest was “reasonably apparent” under the circumstances where defendant had been informed numerous times that she was not to be on school property and reminded of the trespass warning). [15] Bozzo also argues that the State failed to prove that Officer Dunning, who issued the written trespass warning, and Officer Evans, who arrested him for trespass, were agents of IU.

2011See Hope Lutheran Church, 460 N.E.2d at 1248 . “[A] police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when [he] refuses to do so.” Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir.2006) (opining on the meaning of Indiana law), corrected by, 2006 U.S.App.

2005Co. v. Langdoc, 655 N.E.2d 577, 581-82 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)).

2005Co. v. Langdoc, 655 N.E.2d 577, 581-82 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)).

1999See Getche, 701 N.E.2d at 874 (“Where material facts conflict, or undisputed facts lead to conflicting material inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate ....