trespass claim in Oregon

2025Id. at 564-65 .

2025Id. at 564-65 .

1988State v. Ohling, 70 Or App 249 , 688 P2d 1384 , rev den 298 Or 334 (1984).

1988State v. Ohling, 70 Or.

2021PLAINTIFF’S TRESPASS CLAIM We turn to plaintiff’s second assignment of error, which asserts that the trial court erred when it denied plain- tiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s Cite as 311 Or App 348 (2021) 375 trespass claim6 and when it granted defendant’s summary judgment motion on the trespass claim.

2021Although the troopers may have relied on ORS 133.055(2)(a) in their decision to proceed to the Box prop- erty that night, there is no evidence in the record that the Cite as 311 Or App 348 (2021) 383 troopers relied on that statute in entering the particular areas of the property, which is the conduct that forms the basis of the trespass claim.

2020On appeal, defendants assert that, because an easement is not a possessory interest in land, plaintiffs do not have a legal basis for a trespass claim, relying on Rogers v. Donovan, 261 Or 124 , 125 n 1, 492 P2d 768 (1972) (“Trespass lies only for an interference with a possessory interest in land. 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts s 1.2 (1956).

2020On appeal, defendants assert that, because an easement is not a possessory interest in land, plaintiffs do not have a legal basis for a trespass claim, relying on Rogers v. Donovan, 261 Or 124 , 125 n 1, 492 P2d 768 (1972) (“Trespass lies only for an interference with a possessory interest in land. 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts s 1.2 (1956).

2003The state argues that (1) the officers’ approach to the back door of the residence was not a trespass under the analysis of State v. Somfleth, 168 Or App 414 , 8 P3d 221 (2000); and (2) even if the police approached and entered defendant’s residence unlawfully, defendant’s subsequent consent to search was not the result of the exploitation of any prior illegality.

2003The state argues that (1) the officers’ approach to the back door of the residence was not a trespass under the analysis of State v. Somfleth, 168 Or App 414 , 8 P3d 221 (2000); and (2) even if the police approached and entered defendant’s residence unlawfully, defendant’s subsequent consent to search was not the result of the exploitation of any prior illegality.

2000Id. at 30 , 660 P.2d 175 .

2000Id. at 30 , 660 P.2d 175 .

1998Id. at 926 .

1993Under Huffman and Wright Logging v. Wade, 109 Or App 37, 42 , 817 P2d 1334 (1991), rev allowed 312 Or 676 (1992), a trespass claim can support punitive damages if the claim focuses on harm stemming from a physical trespass, and not on the content of the speech or expressive conduct that accompanied it.

1993Under Huffman and Wright Logging v. Wade, 109 Or App 37, 42 , 817 P2d 1334 (1991), rev allowed 312 Or 676 (1992), a trespass claim can support punitive damages if the claim focuses on harm stemming from a physical trespass, and not on the content of the speech or expressive conduct that accompanied it.

1992We said in Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 705 , 613 P2d 63 (1980), in discussing intentional trespass: “Intentional is used in this context to mean that the acts setting in motion the invasion were done with knowledge that a trespass would result and not that the acts were done for the specific purpose of causing a trespass or injury.” We added, in Gymnastics USA v. McDougal, 92 Or App 453 , 457 n 4, 758 P2d 881 , rev den 307 Or 77 (1988): “Intentional trespass results in liability without proof of further fault, if damage occurs.

1992We said in Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 705 , 613 P2d 63 (1980), in discussing intentional trespass: “Intentional is used in this context to mean that the acts setting in motion the invasion were done with knowledge that a trespass would result and not that the acts were done for the specific purpose of causing a trespass or injury.” We added, in Gymnastics USA v. McDougal, 92 Or App 453 , 457 n 4, 758 P2d 881 , rev den 307 Or 77 (1988): “Intentional trespass results in liability without proof of further fault, if damage occurs.

1992We said in Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 705 , 613 P2d 63 (1980), in discussing intentional trespass: “Intentional is used in this context to mean that the acts setting in motion the invasion were done with knowledge that a trespass would result and not that the acts were done for the specific purpose of causing a trespass or injury.” We added, in Gymnastics USA v. McDougal, 92 Or App 453 , 457 n 4, 758 P2d 881 , rev den 307 Or 77 (1988): “Intentional trespass results in liability without proof of further fault, if damage occurs.

1992We said in Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or App 701, 705 , 613 P2d 63 (1980), in discussing intentional trespass: “Intentional is used in this context to mean that the acts setting in motion the invasion were done with knowledge that a trespass would result and not that the acts were done for the specific purpose of causing a trespass or injury.” We added, in Gymnastics USA v. McDougal, 92 Or App 453 , 457 n 4, 758 P2d 881 , rev den 307 Or 77 (1988): “Intentional trespass results in liability without proof of further fault, if damage occurs.

1989ORS 30.670. [14] In Chapman v. Dean, 58 Or. 475, 479 , 115 P. 154 (1911), Justice Burnett, using the following forceful reasoning, discussed the remedy afforded a complainant in equity: "* * * where the trespass is continued, made up of successive acts, each comparatively unimportant in itself, and the threat and intention to continue is manifest, equity will enjoin the same, for the reason that each separate trespass forms a separate cause of action, and it would be idle to require the plaintiff to bring a distinct action for each one of the small trespasses.

1989ORS 30.670. [14] In Chapman v. Dean, 58 Or. 475, 479 , 115 P. 154 (1911), Justice Burnett, using the following forceful reasoning, discussed the remedy afforded a complainant in equity: "* * * where the trespass is continued, made up of successive acts, each comparatively unimportant in itself, and the threat and intention to continue is manifest, equity will enjoin the same, for the reason that each separate trespass forms a separate cause of action, and it would be idle to require the plaintiff to bring a distinct action for each one of the small trespasses.

1985See State v. Louis, 296 Or 57, 60 , 672 P2d 708 (1983) (application of Article I, section 9, to a person’s house does not depend on showing an expectation of privacy; the purpose of Katz is to extend protection beyond what the Fourth Amendment literally protects, not to qualify unquestioned constitutional protections); State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279, 288-89 , 422 P2d 450 (1966) (Article I, section 9, protects property rights as well as privacy interests); State v. Ohling, supra, 70 Or App at 252 n 4.

1985See State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57, 60 , 672 P.2d 708 (1983) (application of Article I, section 9, to a person's house does not depend on showing an expectation of privacy; the purpose of Katz is to extend protection beyond what the Fourth Amendment literally protects, not to qualify unquestioned constitutional protections); State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 288-89 , 422 P.2d 250 (1966) (Article I, section 9, protects property rights as well as privacy interests); State v. Ohling, supra, 70 Or.

1973In the recent case of Washington v. Heid, 264 Or 179 , 504 P2d 745 (1972) we considered the difference between an accord and satisfaction, in which a new liability is accepted in full payment of a prior claim, and an executory accord.

1973In the recent case of Washington v. Heid, 264 Or 179 , 504 P2d 745 (1972) we considered the difference between an accord and satisfaction, in which a new liability is accepted in full payment of a prior claim, and an executory accord.