trespass warning in Florida

2021We have certainly held that “[a] detention for the purpose of issuing a trespass warning on behalf of a private owner—absent other circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—is a consensual encounter.” Gestewitz v. State, 34 So. 3d 832, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Rodriguez, 29 So. 3d at 310 ).

2016Moreover, "a police officer—under the trespass statute—may issue a trespass warning for unauthorized entrance into a structure, but does not have the legal authority to conduct an investigatory stop or arrest for trespass unless the owner or his agent first warned the potential trespasser." Gestewitz v. State, 34 So. 3d 832, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

2009See Rodriguez v. State, — So.3d - (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that property owners and lessees can give officers authority to issue such warnings); J.M.C. v. State, 962 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Klein, J., concurring specially) (stating that property owner had a right to ask defendant to leave his property, the defendant had the right as well as the duty to do so, and the officer’s agreement to convey the trespass warning did not convert it into a legal duty); B.M., 553 So.2d at 715 (holding that officer is authorized by the property owner to issue trespass warnings).

2009See Rodriguez v. State, ___ So.3d ___ (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that property owners and lessees can give officers authority to issue such warnings); J.M.C. v. State, 962 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Klein, J., concurring specially) (stating that property owner had a right to ask defendant to leave his property, the defendant had the right as well as the duty to do so, and the officer's agreement to convey the trespass warning did not convert it into a legal duty); B.M., 553 So.2d at 715 (holding that officer is authorized by the property owner to issue trespass warnings). *1260 The o

2013See also Gestewitz v. State, 34 So.3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“A detention for the purpose of issuing a trespass warning on behalf of a private owner — absent other circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity — -is a consensual encounter.”); Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“We do not agree that an officer’s bare suspicion that a person is trespassing, even when coupled with an agreement between the property owner and the police for officers to stop and investigate persons whom the officers do not recognize as residents, is sufficien

2010See Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667, 672-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“Accordingly, we conclude that a stop merely to issue a trespass warning is not a Terry stop, but rather a consensual encounter.” (footnote omitted)).

2009See Rodriguez v. State, — So.3d - (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that property owners and lessees can give officers authority to issue such warnings); J.M.C. v. State, 962 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Klein, J., concurring specially) (stating that property owner had a right to ask defendant to leave his property, the defendant had the right as well as the duty to do so, and the officer’s agreement to convey the trespass warning did not convert it into a legal duty); B.M., 553 So.2d at 715 (holding that officer is authorized by the property owner to issue trespass warnings).

2009See Rodriguez v. State, ___ So.3d ___ (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that property owners and lessees can give officers authority to issue such warnings); J.M.C. v. State, 962 So.2d 960, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (Klein, J., concurring specially) (stating that property owner had a right to ask defendant to leave his property, the defendant had the right as well as the duty to do so, and the officer's agreement to convey the trespass warning did not convert it into a legal duty); B.M., 553 So.2d at 715 (holding that officer is authorized by the property owner to issue trespass warnings). *1260 The o

2021We have certainly held that “[a] detention for the purpose of issuing a trespass warning on behalf of a private owner—absent other circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—is a consensual encounter.” Gestewitz v. State, 34 So. 3d 832, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Rodriguez, 29 So. 3d at 310 ).

2010See Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667, 672-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“Accordingly, we conclude that a stop merely to issue a trespass warning is not a Terry stop, but rather a consensual encounter.” (footnote omitted)).

2007Even if we are to assume that a detention is proper to issue a trespass warning as contemplated by the opinion in Rivers v. Dillards Department Store, 698 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), it still must be "reasonable under the circumstances." What was reasonable for the *968 officer, under these circumstances, was to simply tell appellant to leave the property and that he is not allowed on the property in the future.

2007Even if we are to assume that a detention is proper to issue a trespass warning as contemplated by the opinion in Rivers v. Dillards Department Store, 698 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), it still must be “reasonable under the circumstances.” What was reasonable for the officer, under these circumstances, was to simply tell appellant to leave the property and that he is not allowed on the property in the future.

2007In L.K.B. v. State, 697 So.2d 191 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), an officer was attempting to obtain identification from a juvenile in order to complete a trespass warning, and the issue raised was whether the officer was performing a legal duty.

2007In L.K.B. v. State, 697 So.2d 191 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), an officer was attempting to obtain identification from a juvenile in order to complete a trespass warning, and the issue raised was whether the officer was performing a legal duty.

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer “hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person’s freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries,” Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop ‘when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounte

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer "hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person's freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries," Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop 'when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the enco

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer “hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person’s freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries,” Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop ‘when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounte

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer "hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person's freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries," Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop 'when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the enco

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So.3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer “hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person’s freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries,” Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop ‘when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounte

2016However, that stop is a consensual encounter, Rodriguez v. State, 29 So. 3d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), that does not become an unauthorized detention under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer "hinder[s] or restrict[s] the person's freedom to leave or freedom to refuse to answer inquiries," Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1993); see also A.L. v. State, 133 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("A consensual encounter becomes a Terry stop 'when an officer makes an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the enco

2013See also Gestewitz v. State, 34 So.3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“A detention for the purpose of issuing a trespass warning on behalf of a private owner — absent other circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity — -is a consensual encounter.”); Slydell v. State, 792 So.2d 667, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“We do not agree that an officer’s bare suspicion that a person is trespassing, even when coupled with an agreement between the property owner and the police for officers to stop and investigate persons whom the officers do not recognize as residents, is sufficien

2013“Mere presence on the property is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of trespass and a reasonable suspicion of trespass must be based upon something more than ‘a mere hunch or guess.’ ” D.T. v. State, 87 So.3d 1235,1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation omitted). “[A] police officer — under the trespass statute — may issue a trespass warning for unauthorized entrance into a structure, but does not have the legal authority to conduct an investigatory stop or arrest for trespass unless the owner or his agent first warned the potential trespasser.” Gestewitz v. State, 34 So.3d 832, 8

2012Absent this showing, the deputy was not in the “lawful execution of [a] legal duty” and there was no basis for the obstruction charge. “‘Common understanding’ dictates that the phrase ‘other authorized person’ is to be read in light of the preceding phrase ‘owner of the premises.’ ” State v. Dye, 346 So.2d 538, 541-42 (Fla.1977).

2012See Baker v. State, 813 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding police lacked probable cause to arrest for trespass where property owner placed “no trespassing” sign in lawn of the middle unit of the three duplexes he owned; police saw appellant on lawn of adjoining property; and there was no evidence of prior trespass warning to appellant or that property was “posted” within the meaning of the statute as “no trespassing” signs were not placed at each corner and along the boundary line); Smith v. State, 778 So.2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding police lacked probable cause to arrest appellant

2010See § 810.08(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); 1 S.N.J. v. State, 17 So.3d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (stating that Florida’s criminal trespass statute “requires that notice be given before a person can be guilty of trespassing on property,” and that individuals “c[an] be legally detained for trespassing only if they were first warned to *835 leave the property”); see also Rodriguez, 29 So.3d at 310 .

2010See Henig v. State, 820 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Piccioni v. State, 833 So.2d 247, 248-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2010See Henig v. State, 820 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Piccioni v. State, 833 So.2d 247, 248-49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2008The appellants contend that "the City's failure to remove the waste after the Appellants withdrew consent constitutes a continuing tort for trespass" and that "the statute of limitations does not bar recovery until four years after the continuing trespass ceases." The appellants also argue that it is undisputed that they "withdrew any consent on March 9, 1998, less than four years before any complaint was filed." "The continuing torts doctrine is recognized under our state law." Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal, 641 So.2d 445, 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

2005Accord Augustus v. State, 773 So.2d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)(pat-down search conducted by a police officer who was preparing to write a trespass warning was unconstitutional because the search was undertaken only for generalized safety concerns); C.Q. v. State, 801 So.2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); M.A.H. v. State, 559 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

2005See M.F. v. State, 864 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

1993In Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla.1981), the court expressly held that in order to establish an employer’s vicarious liability for an employee’s willful and wanton misconduct, the plaintiff must prove some independent fault on the part of the employer which foreseeably contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.