11 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Clemensgreen1 sentence2025Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 381-82 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1 |
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2016See id. (explaining that the pertinent inquiry is whether the person or persons claiming invitee status entered the business establishment with a purpose to benefit the landowner in some way); see also UFCW v. Wal-Mart, 430 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex.Ct.App.2014) (UFCW demonstrators were trespassing because they “used Wal-Mart property on a venture for their own purposes.”). 16 Like in Sears , Walmart sought to enjoin the Union from demonstrating on its private property (or, in the instance of the public nuisance, in a location blocking ingress and egress to and from its private property). | 1 | 1 |
Howard County Board of Education v. Cheynegreen1 sentence2016See id. (explaining that the pertinent inquiry is whether the person or persons claiming invitee status entered the business establishment with a purpose to benefit the landowner in some way); see also UFCW v. Wal-Mart, 430 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex.Ct.App.2014) (UFCW demonstrators were trespassing because they “used Wal-Mart property on a venture for their own purposes.”). 16 Like in Sears , Walmart sought to enjoin the Union from demonstrating on its private property (or, in the instance of the public nuisance, in a location blocking ingress and egress to and from its private property). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014See Brown, v. Smith, 173 Md.App. 459 , 484 & n. 10, 920 A.2d 18 (2007) (a trespass violation entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages, whereas an injury to the property itself would entitle the plaintiff to compensatory damages). 2014See Brown, v. Smith, 173 Md.App. 459 , 484 & n. 10, 920 A.2d 18 (2007) (a trespass violation entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages, whereas an injury to the property itself would entitle the plaintiff to compensatory damages). | 1 | 1 |
Oliver v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 , 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (“The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate.”). 2001See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 , 104 S.Ct. 1735 , 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (“The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences2016In determining then whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred, we apply the court’s factual findings to the test pronounced in Katz, supra. Rather than limit the constitutional appraisal to a trespass analysis, 13 the Katz test requires a two-fold showing: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as *381 ‘reasonable.’” 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). 14 Even under the more flexible Katz test, however, rapid advancements in technology make ascertain 2016In determining then whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred, we apply the court’s factual findings to the test pronounced in Katz, supra. Rather than limit the constitutional appraisal to a trespass analysis, 13 the Katz test requires a two-fold showing: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as *381 ‘reasonable.’” 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). 14 Even under the more flexible Katz test, however, rapid advancements in technology make ascertain | 3 | 2000–2016 |
United States v. Mendenhall
green
1 sentence2025It reiterated, however, that a “verbal command itself” cannot constitute a search “if it does not result in a trespass or a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Schuman v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Under common law, a trespass claim is generally “an intentional or negligent intrusion upon or to the possesso ry interest in property of another.” Schuman v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 212 Md.App. 451, 475 , 69 A.3d 512 , 526 cert. denied sub nom. 2016Under common law, a trespass claim is generally “an intentional or negligent intrusion upon or to the possesso ry interest in property of another.” Schuman v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 212 Md.App. 451, 475 , 69 A.3d 512 , 526 cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters
green
2 sentences2016In that circumstance, state court adjudication of the trespass claim would “create no realistic risk of interference with the [NLRB’s] primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” Id. at 198 , 98 S.Ct. 1745 . 2016In that circumstance, state court adjudication of the trespass claim would “create no realistic risk of interference with the [NLRB’s] primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” Id. at 198 , 98 S.Ct. 1745 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Espina v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2016Espina, 442 Md. at 325 , 112 A.3d at 450 . 2016Espina, 442 Md. at 325 , 112 A.3d at 450 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Everhart v. State
green
2 sentences2001In Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459 , 337 A.2d 100 (1975), while noting that, in Katz , the Supreme Court had rejected the trespass doctrine as a predicate to invocation of Fourth Amendment protection, this Court stated: Thus, although it might seem more nearly constitutionally accurate that inquiry be made as to whether the place ... where the search and seizure was made from the plastic bag was within an area where [the defendant] had a reasonably ‘legitimate expectation of privacy,’ it would seem, a fortiori, that if there was an intrusion geographically within the curtilage it would be withi 2001In Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459 , 337 A.2d 100 (1975), while noting that, in Katz , the Supreme Court had rejected the trespass doctrine as a predicate to invocation of Fourth Amendment protection, this Court stated: Thus, although it might seem more nearly constitutionally accurate that inquiry be made as to whether the place ... where the search and seizure was made from the plastic bag was within an area where [the defendant] had a reasonably ‘legitimate expectation of privacy,’ it would seem, a fortiori, that if there was an intrusion geographically within the curtilage it would be withi | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Causby
green
2 sentences1987It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of *397 it.” [328 U.S.] at 261 [, 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 ] (footnote omitted). 1987It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of *397 it.” [328 U.S.] at 261 [, 66 S.Ct. 1062 , 90 L.Ed. 1206 ] (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
green
2 sentences1987Recently, in Loretto, supra, 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 , the Court explained the taking in Causby by what we might call a trespass analysis, saying: In United States v. Causby ... the Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a landowner’s property constituted a taking, comparing such overflights to the quintessential form of a taking: “If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. 1987Recently, in Loretto, supra, 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 , the Court explained the taking in Causby by what we might call a trespass analysis, saying: In United States v. Causby ... the Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a landowner’s property constituted a taking, comparing such overflights to the quintessential form of a taking: “If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Olmstead v. United States
red
1 sentence1972In Katz , the Court also repudiated the trespass requirement previously enunciated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 as no longer necessary to invoke Fourth Amendment protection. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Goldman v. United States
red
1 sentence1972In Katz , the Court also repudiated the trespass requirement previously enunciated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 as no longer necessary to invoke Fourth Amendment protection. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Pindell v. Rubenstein
green
2 sentences1970In some it was ignored; in others deemed inapplicable.” The only Maryland case cited by him is Pindell v. Rubenstein, 139 Md. 567 , 115 A. 859 (1921). 1970In some it was ignored; in others deemed inapplicable.” The only Maryland case cited by him is Pindell v. Rubenstein, 139 Md. 567 , 115 A. 859 (1921). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Blondell v. Consolidated Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1936In Spelling on Injunctions (2nd Ed-.) sec. 14 (1893), it is said: “An injunction lies to prevent threatened trespasses, though the damage be susceptible of compensation, where otherwise there is a probability of the wrong being often repeated. * * *” Pomeroy, in his work on Equitable Remedies (section 496) page 4338 et seq., after stating the minority view, *177 that equity will not intervene to prevent repeated trespasses by a single defendant, states that: “The jurisdiction of equity to restrain continuous or repeated trespasses rests on the ground of avoiding a repetition of similar actions 1936In Spelling on Injunctions (2nd Ed-.) sec. 14 (1893), it is said: “An injunction lies to prevent threatened trespasses, though the damage be susceptible of compensation, where otherwise there is a probability of the wrong being often repeated. * * *” Pomeroy, in his work on Equitable Remedies (section 496) page 4338 et seq., after stating the minority view, *177 that equity will not intervene to prevent repeated trespasses by a single defendant, states that: “The jurisdiction of equity to restrain continuous or repeated trespasses rests on the ground of avoiding a repetition of similar actions | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.