trespass claim in Colorado

2008See Hoery, 64 P.3d at 218 ; Sanderson v. Heath Mesa Homeowners Ass'n, 183 P.3d 679, 682 (Colo.App.2008).

2007The damages recoverable on a trespass claim depend in part on whether the claim alleges a "continuing trespass"-that is, a property invasion in which the offending party fails to remove continuing harmful physical conditions that are wrongfully placed on the land of another-or a "permanent trespass," which refers to a property invasion such as an irrigation ditch or a railway line that "will and should continue indefinitely because defendants, with lawful authority, constructed a socially beneficial structure intended to be permanent." Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 218-20 (Colo. 2003).

2012The Slovek principles thus apply to the damages here, which resulted from Allied's negligence. 23 We conclude that the jury instruction given is consistent with the supreme court's definition of "use value." Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1314 ; see also Hawley, 160 P.3d at 426 (jury was properly instructed that damages in a trespass claim may include discomfort and annoyance to the property's occupant).

2008When Heath Mesa's attorney asked whether the ruptures in the pipeline were responsible for fifty percent of the instability in the hillside, Griepentrog responded, "More than likely, at least that if not more on a short term basis." We additionally note that "[dlam-ages available on a trespass claim [may] include not only diminution of market value, costs of restoration, and loss of use of the property, but also discomfort and annoyance to the property owner as the occupant." Hawley v. Mowatt, 160 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo.App.2007); CJI-Civ. 4th 18:4.

2025“A landowner who sets in motion 28 a force which, in the usual course of events, will damage property of another is guilty of a trespass on such property.” Id.; see also Miller v. Carnation Co., 516 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. App. 1973) (a failure to remove chicken manure from chicken houses, resulting in the multiplication of flies that intruded onto a neighbor’s property, was sufficient to establish trespass). ¶ 67 The Thurber’s trespass claim was premised on two theories.

2007In Colorado, "[al landowner who sets in motion a force which, in the usual course of events, will damage property of another is guilty of a trespass on such property." - Hoery, supra, 64 P.3d at 217 (quoting Miller, supra, 33 Colo.App. at 68 , 516 P.2d at 664 ).

2012The Slovek principles thus apply to the damages here, which resulted from Allied's negligence. 23 We conclude that the jury instruction given is consistent with the supreme court's definition of "use value." Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1314 ; see also Hawley, 160 P.3d at 426 (jury was properly instructed that damages in a trespass claim may include discomfort and annoyance to the property's occupant).

2007See Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek, supra, 723 P.2d at 1317 ; Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 554 (Colo.App.2006); Webster v. Boone, 992 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo.App.1999).

2024See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norris , 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 (10th Cir. 2001) (permitting an award of statutory attorney fees when the claim that authorizes the fees was the catalyst for the sued party’s compliance). ¶ 14 With respect to the trespass claim, the court must det ermine whether the claim was based on the covenants or simply a comm on law theory of trespass.

2022Following the logical flow of the numbered lines, “knowingly” and “unlawfully” necessarily apply to the fifth element, “entered or remained in a dwelling of another,” even if the fifth element was not offset and even if “entered” and “dwelling of another” were not separated. 30 ¶ 66 The trespass instruction in this case is unlike the theft instructions in Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 664 (Colo. 2005), and People v. Bornman, 953 P.2d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 1997), on which Cline relies.

2022Following the logical flow of the numbered lines, “knowingly” and “unlawfully” necessarily apply to the fifth element, “entered or remained in a dwelling of another,” even if the fifth element was not offset and even if “entered” and “dwelling of another” were not separated. 30 ¶ 66 The trespass instruction in this case is unlike the theft instructions in Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 664 (Colo. 2005), and People v. Bornman, 953 P.2d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 1997), on which Cline relies.

2013See Gifford v. City of Colorado Springs, 815 P.2d 1008 , 1012 (Colo.App.1991) ; see also Peterson v. Conlan, 18 N.D. 205 , 119 N.W. 367 , 369 (1909) (plaintiff not entitled to recover under theory that trespassing bull injured him where the plaintiff did not own, and was not entitled to possession of the property on which the animal was trespassing at the time of injury). ¶ 11 Thus, a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries sustained from trespass must show either actual or constructive possession of the land.

2013See Gifford v. City of Colorado Springs, 815 P.2d 1008 , 1012 (Colo.App.1991) ; see also Peterson v. Conlan, 18 N.D. 205 , 119 N.W. 367 , 369 (1909) (plaintiff not entitled to recover under theory that trespassing bull injured him where the plaintiff did not own, and was not entitled to possession of the property on which the animal was trespassing at the time of injury). ¶ 11 Thus, a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries sustained from trespass must show either actual or constructive possession of the land.

2013See Gifford v. City of Colorado Springs, 815 P.2d 1008 , 1012 (Colo.App.1991) ; see also Peterson v. Conlan, 18 N.D. 205 , 119 N.W. 367 , 369 (1909) (plaintiff not entitled to recover under theory that trespassing bull injured him where the plaintiff did not own, and was not entitled to possession of the property on which the animal was trespassing at the time of injury). ¶ 11 Thus, a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries sustained from trespass must show either actual or constructive possession of the land.

2010Cf. Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1005 (Colo.2008) ("the CGIA is less concerned with what the plaintiff is arguing and more concerned with what the plaintiff could argue").

2010Cf. Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1005 (Colo. 2008) ("the CGIA is less concerned with what the plaintiff is arguing and more concerned with what the plaintiff could argue").

2008See Hoery, 64 P.3d at 218 ; Sanderson v. Heath Mesa Homeowners Ass'n, 183 P.3d 679, 682 (Colo.App.2008).

2008Alternatively, PSCo argues that, unlike in Sanderson, its pipelines do not effect a "continuing" trespass on the property because of the explanation in Hoery that "not every trespass ... that continues is necessarily regarded as" a continuing trespass. 64 P.3d at 219 . "'[Wlhere the property invasion will and should continue indefinitely because defendants, with lawful authority, constructed a socially beneficial structure intended to be permanent," the property owner cannot sustain an action for a continuous trespass." Sanderson, 183 P.3d at 682 (quoting Hoery, 64 P.3d at 220 ).

2007See Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek, supra, 723 P.2d at 1317 ; Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 554 (Colo.App.2006); Webster v. Boone, 992 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo.App.1999).

2007See Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek, supra, 723 P.2d at 1317 ; Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 554 (Colo.App.2006); Webster v. Boone, 992 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo.App.1999).