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22 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Withers v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.green2 sentences2007Corp., 567 So.2d 253, 256-57 (Ala.1990) (reversing a summary judgment on, among other things, a trespass claim in favor of the gas company where the gas company used land outside the temporary 20-foot easement to which it was entitled). 2007Corp., 567 So.2d 253, 256-57 (Ala.1990) (reversing a summary judgment on, among other things, a trespass claim in favor of the gas company where the gas company used land outside the temporary 20-foot easement to which it was entitled). | 2 | 3 |
Ussery v. Darrowgreen2 sentences2007“At this point we must discuss the defense of laches, asserted both by APCo and Lightwave as an independent ground upon which to affirm the summary judgment in their favor. ‘To establish the application of the doctrine of laches, [a defendant] ha[s] to show that [the plaintiff] delayed in asserting his right or claim, that his delay was unex-cusable, and that his delay caused the [defendant] undue prejudice.’ Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 929 (Ala.1989). ‘For the doctrine of laches to bar a claim it must be said that “from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conject 2007“At this point we must discuss the defense of laches, asserted both by APCo and Lightwave as an independent ground upon which to affirm the summary judgment in their favor. ‘To establish the application of the doctrine of laches, [a defendant] ha[s] to show that [the plaintiff] delayed in asserting his right or claim, that his delay was unex-cusable, and that his delay caused the [defendant] undue prejudice.’ Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 929 (Ala.1989). ‘For the doctrine of laches to bar a claim it must be said that “from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conject | 2 | 2 |
Salter v. Hamitergreen2 sentences2007"At this point we must discuss the defense of laches, asserted both by APCo and Lightwave as an independent ground upon which to affirm the summary judgment in their favor. `To establish the application of the doctrine of laches, [a defendant] ha[s] to show that [the plaintiff] delayed in asserting his right or claim, that his delay was unexcusable, and that his delay caused the [defendant] undue prejudice.' Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 929 (Ala.1989). `For the doctrine of laches to bar a claim it must be said that "from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conjectu 2007“At this point we must discuss the defense of laches, asserted both by APCo and Lightwave as an independent ground upon which to affirm the summary judgment in their favor. ‘To establish the application of the doctrine of laches, [a defendant] ha[s] to show that [the plaintiff] delayed in asserting his right or claim, that his delay was unex-cusable, and that his delay caused the [defendant] undue prejudice.’ Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 929 (Ala.1989). ‘For the doctrine of laches to bar a claim it must be said that “from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conject | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Grubbsgreen2 sentences2007"At this point we must discuss the defense of laches, asserted both by APCo and Lightwave as an independent ground upon which to affirm the summary judgment in their favor. `To establish the application of the doctrine of laches, [a defendant] ha[s] to show that [the plaintiff] delayed in asserting his right or claim, that his delay was unexcusable, and that his delay caused the [defendant] undue prejudice.' Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 929 (Ala.1989). `For the doctrine of laches to bar a claim it must be said that "from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conjectu 2007“At this point we must discuss the defense of laches, asserted both by APCo and Lightwave as an independent ground upon which to affirm the summary judgment in their favor. ‘To establish the application of the doctrine of laches, [a defendant] ha[s] to show that [the plaintiff] delayed in asserting his right or claim, that his delay was unex-cusable, and that his delay caused the [defendant] undue prejudice.’ Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 929 (Ala.1989). ‘For the doctrine of laches to bar a claim it must be said that “from delay, any conclusion the court may arrive at must at best be conject | 2 | 2 |
W.T. Ratliff Co., Inc. v. Henleygreen2 sentences1999Thus, when Ratliff placed the sand and gravel on its own leased property with knowledge to a substantial certainty that such action could lead to trespass when it rained, the element of intent was satisfied.” 405 So.2d at 145-46 (citations omitted). 1996Ratliff Co. v. Henley, 405 So.2d 141, 146 (Ala.1981) (emphasis original). | 2 | 2 |
Granade v. United States Lumber & Cotton Co.green1 sentence2016He bases this assertion on Granade v. United States Lumber & Cotton Co., 224 Ala, 185, 189, 139 So. 409, 412 (1931) (opinion on original submission), in which our. supreme court, considering a trespass claim, based on the cutting of timber,- explained that, “[i]n the matter of damages for injury to the land by destruction of the trees and by trespass,- the damage is not measured by the value of the timber or property severed, but by the injury to the land by reason of its severance — the difference between the value of the land immediately before and after the trespass.” We are not convinced t | 1 | 1 |
Hingle v. Ganngreen1 sentence2011However, in Hingle v. Gann, 368 So.2d 22, 24 (Ala.1979), the supreme court treated a judgment that established a boundary line but did not expressly rule on the parties’ trespass claims as impliedly denying those trespass claims. | 1 | 1 |
Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc.green2 sentences2010Finally, the homeowners asked the trial court to instruct the jury using the following quote from Borland in which this Court quoted Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 293 Ala. 56, 59 , 300 So.2d 94, 97 (1974), quoting in turn the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965), stating: “ ‘ “In order that there may be a trespass under the rule stated in this Section, it is not necessary that the foreign matter should be thrown directly and immediately upon the other’s land. 2010Finally, the homeowners asked the trial court to instruct the jury using the following quote from Borland in which this Court quoted Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 293 Ala. 56, 59 , 300 So.2d 94, 97 (1974), quoting in turn the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965), stating: “ ‘ “In order that there may be a trespass under the rule stated in this Section, it is not necessary that the foreign matter should be thrown directly and immediately upon the other’s land. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Essarygreen1 sentence2007Burrell v. Essary, supra. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals held: "Burrell's testimony regarding the circumstances of the collision conflicted with Essary's testimony and tended to prove a set of circumstances from which a jury could draw a `reasonable inference' that Essary knew that the vehicle driven by Burrell was close to the intersection when he accelerated into the intersection despite being aware that his doing so would likely or probably result in injury to the plaintiffs." 992 So.2d at 5. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Taylorgreen1 sentence2006See Ex parte Taylor , supra, and Smitherman , supra. Consequently, the trial court erred (1) in entering a JML in favor of the Chamblesses on the boundary-line claims; (2) in entering a JML in favor of the Chamblesses on Hyatt's trespass claim; (3) in determining Hyatt's adverse-possession claim instead of allowing the jury to determine it; and (4) in determining the Chamblesses' quiet-title claim instead of allowing the jury to determine it. | 1 | 1 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smithermangreen1 sentence2006See Ex parte Taylor , supra, and Smitherman , supra. Consequently, the trial court erred (1) in entering a JML in favor of the Chamblesses on the boundary-line claims; (2) in entering a JML in favor of the Chamblesses on Hyatt's trespass claim; (3) in determining Hyatt's adverse-possession claim instead of allowing the jury to determine it; and (4) in determining the Chamblesses' quiet-title claim instead of allowing the jury to determine it. | 1 | 1 |
La Pointe Outdoor Advertising v. Florida Dept. of Transp.green1 sentence1999Williams , 382 So.2d at 1349 (Torbert, C.J., concurring specially). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Lowerygreen1 sentence1989The appellant has correctly pointed out that much of the evidence admitted to prove the claims other than the trespass claim would also have been admissible to show that the trespass was “wanton,” which, in the context of a trespass action, has been said to refer to “an invasion of the plaintiffs property with knowledge of the violation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Stewart v. Lowery, 484 So.2d 1055, 1060 (Ala.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Lipscomb v. Tuckergreen2 sentences1983See Lipscomb v. Tucker , 294 Ala. 246 , 314 So.2d 840 (1975) (mere delay is not sufficient for the defense of laches, but special facts which make the delay culpable must appear). 1983See Lipscomb v. Tucker , 294 Ala. 246 , 314 So.2d 840 (1975) (mere delay is not sufficient for the defense of laches, but special facts which make the delay culpable must appear). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burrell v. Essary
green
2 sentences2011Burrell v. Essary, [ 992 So.2d 1 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) ]. 2007Burrell v. Essary , supra. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals held: "Burrell's testimony regarding the circumstances of the collision conflicted with Essary's testimony and tended to prove a set of circumstances from which a jury could draw a `reasonable inference' that Essary knew that the vehicle driven by Burrell was close to the intersection when he accelerated into the intersection despite being aware that his doing so would likely or probably result in injury to the plaintiffs." 992 So.2d at 5 . | 2 | 2007–2011 |
Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2010It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter.” ’ ” 369 So.2d at 527 . 1980In support of the trespass claim, appellant relies heavily upon Borland v. Sanders Lead Company, Inc. , 369 So.2d 523 (Ala. 1979). | 2 | 1980–2010 |
Beiersdoerfer v. HILB, ROGAL AND HAMILTON
green
1 sentence2016That is, Kulakowski’s only argument on appeal is that the proper measure of damages is that for trespass to real property; but, because the jury was charged on conversion, and because Kulakowski failed to timely object, the conversion charge became law of the case, see Beiersdoerfer, 953 So.2d at 1209-10 , and we cannot hold the trial court in error for failing to instruct the jury on the measure of damages applicable to a trespass claim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Stone v. Haley
green
1 sentence2011The absence from the trial court’s judgment of an express ruling regarding the trespass claim and the ALAA counterclaim raises an issue regarding this court’s jurisdiction because, “[o]rdinarily, only a final judgment will support an appeal” and “[a]n order that does not dispose of all claims or determine the rights and liabilities of all the parties to an action is generally not final.” Stone, 812 So.2d at 1246 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Jackson v. City of Auburn
green
1 sentence2007Nor does APCo’s attempt to apportion its prescriptive easement insulate Light-wave from either the trespass claim or the conspiracy claim against Light-wave .... 971 So.2d at 709 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Easterling v. Awtrey Building Corp.
green
1 sentence2004Corp., 770 So.2d 606 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Goldman v. United States
red
2 sentences2003The parties have ultimately agreed 1 that the standard to be applied in determining whether the recording should have been admitted is the trespass standard that was in effect in 1964 2 when the recording was made. 3 Goldman v. United States , 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), addressed the trespass standard, and its facts are quite similar to the facts of this case. 2003The parties have ultimately agreed 1 that the standard to be applied in determining whether the recording should have been admitted is the trespass standard that was in effect in 1964 2 when the recording was made. 3 Goldman v. United States , 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), addressed the trespass standard, and its facts are quite similar to the facts of this case. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
On Lee v. United States
green
2 sentences2003In On Lee v. United States , 343 U.S. 747 , 72 S.Ct. 967 , 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952), the Supreme Court again addressed the trespass standard and further explained its decision in Goldman as follows: "Petitioner, On Lee, had a laundry in Hoboken. 2003In On Lee v. United States , 343 U.S. 747 , 72 S.Ct. 967 , 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952), the Supreme Court again addressed the trespass standard and further explained its decision in Goldman as follows: "Petitioner, On Lee, had a laundry in Hoboken. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Taylor v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1998"It is a well established rule that, with limited exceptions, an appeal will lie only from a final judgment which determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved." Taylor v. Taylor , 398 So.2d 267 , 269 (Ala. 1981). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Roundtree v. Brantley
green
1 sentence1997For example, in Roundtree v. Brantley , 34 Ala. 544 (1859), the defendant riparian owner dug a ditch that was alleged to have caused water diverted from a stream to overflow onto an adjacent tract and destroy crops growing on the tract; the defendant's digging of a ditch was held not to be an immediate violation of the plaintiff's rights that would support a trespass claim. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Shelby Contracting Co. v. Pizitz
green
2 sentences1995Because of our holding with respect to the lot owners' motion for summary judgment, and because the lot owners' "interest" in the disputed property does not rise to the level of an estate, we further hold that the lot owners' "contingent expectancy, dependent upon an event which may never occur" ( Shelby Contracting Co. v. Pizitz , 285 Ala. at 309 , 231 So.2d at 750 ), is not a sufficient interest to support a trespass claim. 1995Because of our holding with respect to the lot owners' motion for summary judgment, and because the lot owners' "interest" in the disputed property does not rise to the level of an estate, we further hold that the lot owners' "contingent expectancy, dependent upon an event which may never occur" ( Shelby Contracting Co. v. Pizitz , 285 Ala. at 309 , 231 So.2d at 750 ), is not a sufficient interest to support a trespass claim. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
FIRST NAT. BANK OF PULASKI v. Thomas
green
1 sentence1991Punitive damages in a trespass claim are awarded only where the trespass is accompanied by "rudeness, wantonness, recklessness, or an insulting manner, or accompanied by circumstances of fraud and malice, oppression, aggravation, or gross negligence." First National Bank of Pulaski, Tenn. v. Thomas , 453 So.2d 1313 , 1320 (Ala. 1984). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bekins Van Lines v. Beal
green
2 sentences1989Bekins Van Lines v. Beal, 418 So.2d 81 (Ala.1982).” (Emphasis added.) The appellant in Bekins Van Lines v. Beal, 418 So.2d 81 (Ala.1982), cited by the trial judge to support the granting of a new trial, raised the following grounds in support of his motion for new trial: “1. 1989Bekins Van Lines v. Beal, 418 So.2d 81 (Ala.1982).” (Emphasis added.) The appellant in Bekins Van Lines v. Beal, 418 So.2d 81 (Ala.1982), cited by the trial judge to support the granting of a new trial, raised the following grounds in support of his motion for new trial: “1. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
MARTIN ET UX v. Reynolds Metals Co.
green
2 sentences1979It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in entry of foreign matters.'" Rushing further cited with approval the case of Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. , 221 Or. 86 , 342 P.2d 790 , cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 , 80 S.Ct. 672 , 4 L.Ed.2d 739 (1959). 1979It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in entry of foreign matters.'" Rushing further cited with approval the case of Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. , 221 Or. 86 , 342 P.2d 790 , cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 , 80 S.Ct. 672 , 4 L.Ed.2d 739 (1959). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Albaugh v. District of Columbia green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin
green
1 sentence1979It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in entry of foreign matters.'" Rushing further cited with approval the case of Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. , 221 Or. 86 , 342 P.2d 790 , cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 , 80 S.Ct. 672 , 4 L.Ed.2d 739 (1959). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Muryn v. New York Central Railroad
green
1 sentence1979It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in entry of foreign matters.'" Rushing further cited with approval the case of Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. , 221 Or. 86 , 342 P.2d 790 , cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 , 80 S.Ct. 672 , 4 L.Ed.2d 739 (1959). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.