language used instruction in Illinois

1973Moreover, the court stated in People v. Iverson (1973), 9 Ill.App.3d 706, 709 , 292 N.E.2d 908 , 911: “The test which we apply to the issue before us is whether, upon examination of all the facts, the language used in the instruction coerced or interfered with the deliberation of the jurors to the prejudice of the defendant.

1973Moreover, the court stated in People v. Iverson (1973), 9 Ill.App.3d 706, 709 , 292 N.E.2d 908 , 911: “The test which we apply to the issue before us is whether, upon examination of all the facts, the language used in the instruction coerced or interfered with the deliberation of the jurors to the prejudice of the defendant.

1973(People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 ; People v. Golub (1929), 333 Ill. 554, 561 ; People v. Richards (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 430, 438 .) The time when the instruction is given, whether as a part of the original series, • or after a deadlock is found to exist, is a circumstance to be considered in the determination of the coercive effect of the language used 2 As we have previously noted, the evidence factor weighs heavily against the defendant.

1972In People v. Richards, 95 Ill.App.2d 430 , a true “Allen charge” was given to a jury which the foreman had stated “was hopelessly deadlocked.” In addition to the language used in the instruction now being considered the instruction in Richards also stated: “If a much larger number of jurors favor conviction, a dissenting juror should consider the reasonableness of his doubt when it makes no impression upon the minds of other jurors, equally intelligent and impartial, and who have heard the same evidence.

2022VC&M, Ltd. v. Andrews, 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 30 . ¶ 27 IV.

2016VC&M Ltd., 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 30 ; Hollywood Boulevard, 2014 IL App (2d) 131165, ¶ 19 .

2006Sproat, 357 Ill.

2006Sproat, 357 Ill.App.3d at 881 , 294 Ill.Dec. 431 , 830 N.E.2d 843 .

1973(People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 ; People v. Golub (1929), 333 Ill. 554, 561 ; People v. Richards (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 430, 438 .) The time when the instruction is given, whether as a part of the original series, • or after a deadlock is found to exist, is a circumstance to be considered in the determination of the coercive effect of the language used 2 As we have previously noted, the evidence factor weighs heavily against the defendant.

1973(People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 , 289 N.E.2d 601 ; People v. Golub (1929), 333 Ill. 554 , 165 N.E. 196 ; People v. Richards (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 430 , 237 N.E.2d 848 .) The time when the instruction is given, whether as a part of the original series, or after a deadlock is found to exist, is a circumstance to be considered in the determination of the coercive effect of the language used.” As in Iverson, the comments to which Kent objects were given in the trial judge’s original voir dire panel instructions and not to break a deadlocked jury.

1973(People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 ; People v. Golub (1929), 333 Ill. 554, 561 ; People v. Richards (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 430, 438 .) The time when the instruction is given, whether as a part of the original series, • or after a deadlock is found to exist, is a circumstance to be considered in the determination of the coercive effect of the language used 2 As we have previously noted, the evidence factor weighs heavily against the defendant.

1973(People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 , 289 N.E.2d 601 ; People v. Golub (1929), 333 Ill. 554 , 165 N.E. 196 ; People v. Richards (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 430 , 237 N.E.2d 848 .) The time when the instruction is given, whether as a part of the original series, or after a deadlock is found to exist, is a circumstance to be considered in the determination of the coercive effect of the language used.” As in Iverson, the comments to which Kent objects were given in the trial judge’s original voir dire panel instructions and not to break a deadlocked jury.

2018Giving the language used in the rule its plain and ordinary meaning, we disagree. ¶ 41 Defendants point to Woodsmoke Ranch Ass'n v. Steinmetz , 252 Ill.

2018App. 3d 78 , 191 Ill.Dec. 266 , 623 N.E.2d 856 (1993), but their reliance thereon is flawed for several reasons.

2016VC&M Ltd., 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 30 ; Hollywood Boulevard, 2014 IL App (2d) 131165, ¶ 19 .

2013Id.

2012Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177 .

2006As stated, the majority initially informs the bench and bar that the jury instruction given in this matter is a correct restatement of the theory of proximate cause and the core concept of foreseeability, declaring that the language used in the instruction is "tantamount to a definition of the legal-cause component of proximate cause, and therefore coextensive with foreseeability." 222 Ill.2d 406 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 935 , 856 N.E.2d at 1086 .

2006As stated, the majority initially informs the bench and bar that the jury instruction given in this matter is a correct restatement of the theory of proximate cause and the core concept of foreseeability, declaring that the language used in the instruction is "tantamount to a definition of the legal-cause component of proximate cause, and therefore coextensive with foreseeability." 222 Ill.2d 406 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 935 , 856 N.E.2d at 1086 .

1993Hester, 131 Ill. 2d at 100 .

1992The court in Plantinga made the following statements with respect to the Prim instructions: “The trial court has great latitude as to when a Prim instruction should be given. [Citation.] The test is whether, upon examination of all the facts, the language used in the instruction coerced or interfered with the deliberation of the jurors to the prejudice of the defendant or hastened the verdict. [Citation.] There is less danger of coercion when the instruction is given to a jury which has not reached a deadlock.” Plantinga, 132 Ill.

1986App. 3d 552 , 472 N.E.2d 1156 .) An examination of the language used in instruction No. 9 reveals that the three alternative mental states listed under the second proposition are joined by the disjunctive “or,” which indicates that each mental state is to be taken separately, and that only one mental state needed to be proved by the State.

1985App. 3d 394 , 461 N.E.2d 605 , aff’d (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 324 .) The test is whether, upon examination of all the facts, the language used in the instruction coerced or interfered with the deliberation of the jurors to the prejudice of the defendant or hastened the verdict.

1985App. 3d 394 , 461 N.E.2d 605 , aff’d (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 324 .) The test is whether, upon examination of all the facts, the language used in the instruction coerced or interfered with the deliberation of the jurors to the prejudice of the defendant or hastened the verdict.

1974(See Hickey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1964), 52 Ill.App.2d 132 , 201 N.E.2d 742 .) Plaintiff posits that “The language used by defense counsel could easily be construed that it would take a number of years for Mr. McMahon to pay off any judgment entered against him in this case.” We disagree.

1974(See Hickey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1964), 52 Ill.App.2d 132 , 201 N.E.2d 742 .) Plaintiff posits that “The language used by defense counsel could easily be construed that it would take a number of years for Mr. McMahon to pay off any judgment entered against him in this case.” We disagree.

1969(See the cases collected in People v. Pearson, 19 Ill2d 609, 169 NE2d 252 (1960).) In the instant case it is our opinion that the language used in the instruction, particularly the phrase “. . . in order to maintain it, it is incumbent on the defendant . . .” speaks in the language of burden of proof and runs counter to the basic notion that the defendant’s guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

1969People v. Fisher, 295 Ill 250, 260, 129 NE 196 (1920); People v. Pearson, supra. We further note that the Illinois pattern instructions in criminal cases which became effective January 1, 1969, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 451, do not contain an alibi instruction and contain a Committee recommendation that no instruction be given on the subject.

1969People v. Fisher, 295 Ill 250, 260, 129 NE 196 (1920); People v. Pearson, supra. We further note that the Illinois pattern instructions in criminal cases which became effective January 1, 1969, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 451, do not contain an alibi instruction and contain a Committee recommendation that no instruction be given on the subject.

1959App. 432 , 24 N.E.2d 55 , supports the language used in the instruction.

1939Co. v. Lewis, supra), and that it was, therefore, not improper to employ the language used in the instruction in connection with the signature to the releases.

1908It is contended that the seventh instruction given on behalf of appellee is erroneous, and counsel say it has been condemned in Keller v. Hansen, 14 Ill.

1905“By suggesting such death on the record” is simply an awkward way of saying, “after” or “on the suggestion of death upon the record.” The Supreme Court in Stoetzell v. Fullerton, 44 Ill. 108 , speaking of the statute of 1845, concerning abatement, which in its language in this regard is the same as that of 1874, says: “The statute of 8 and 9 William III, Chapter 11, as well as our own, was designed to prevent the abatement in any case where the cause of action would survive on the suggestion of the death, which suggestion is a matter of form and may he made by either party.” We are cited by co

1905“By suggesting such death on the record” is simply an awkward way of saying, “after” or “on the suggestion of death upon the record.” The Supreme Court in Stoetzell v. Fullerton, 44 Ill. 108 , speaking of the statute of 1845, concerning abatement, which in its language in this regard is the same as that of 1874, says: “The statute of 8 and 9 William III, Chapter 11, as well as our own, was designed to prevent the abatement in any case where the cause of action would survive on the suggestion of the death, which suggestion is a matter of form and may he made by either party.” We are cited by co

1905“By suggesting such death on the record” is simply an awkward way of saying, “after” or “on the suggestion of death upon the record.” The Supreme Court in Stoetzell v. Fullerton, 44 Ill. 108 , speaking of the statute of 1845, concerning abatement, which in its language in this regard is the same as that of 1874, says: “The statute of 8 and 9 William III, Chapter 11, as well as our own, was designed to prevent the abatement in any case where the cause of action would survive on the suggestion of the death, which suggestion is a matter of form and may he made by either party.” We are cited by co

1902The fourth instruction is criticised because of the use therein of the following language: “Just compensation means the payment of such sum of money as will make the defendant whole, so that, on receipt by the defendant of the compensation and damages awarded, he will not be poorer by reason of his property being taken or damaged.” In Metropolitan West Side Elevated Railway Co. v. Stickney, 150 Ill. 362 , it was held that this language, used in an instruction given in that case, was an accurate statement of the law.

1902The second instruction is criticised for the use of the following language, to-wit: “The court further instructs the jury that, while it is proper for witnesses, in making their estimate of damages to be allowed the defendant, to take into consideration any use to which they believe from the evidence the property in question may be profitably appropriated, yet the jury are not bound to base their verdict upon the supposition that it would be appropriated to a use other than that to which it is now devoted.” The language used in this instruction was used by this court in Snodgrass v. City of Ch

1878For, as the Court says in the city of Freeport v. Isbell, 83 Ill. 440 , “ an instruction should be so prepared as not to be of doubtful or uncertain meaning, otherwise the jury may be misled.” This instruction being liable to the objection there pointed out, and the evidence in the case of such a character as to render the right of recovery against the corporation doubtful, we are of opinion that the case should be submitted to another jury.