language used instruction in Idaho

1964Quoting from the recent case of O'Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96 , 326 P.2d 376 (1958) Justice Smith used the following language: "This Court in Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Co., 61 Idaho 642, 650 , 105 P.2d 1076, 1079 , stated the rule to be: "`Generally it is negligence as a matter of law, or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped within the distance within which objects can be seen ahead of the automobile.

1964Quoting from the recent case of O'Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96 , 326 P.2d 376 (1958) Justice Smith used the following language: "This Court in Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Co., 61 Idaho 642, 650 , 105 P.2d 1076, 1079 , stated the rule to be: "`Generally it is negligence as a matter of law, or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped within the distance within which objects can be seen ahead of the automobile.

1964Quoting from the recent case of O'Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96 , 326 P.2d 376 (1958) Justice Smith used the following language: "This Court in Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Co., 61 Idaho 642, 650 , 105 P.2d 1076, 1079 , stated the rule to be: "`Generally it is negligence as a matter of law, or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped within the distance within which objects can be seen ahead of the automobile.

1964Quoting from the recent case of O'Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96 , 326 P.2d 376 (1958) Justice Smith used the following language: "This Court in Maier v. Minidoka County Motor Co., 61 Idaho 642, 650 , 105 P.2d 1076, 1079 , stated the rule to be: "`Generally it is negligence as a matter of law, or at least strong evidence of negligence, for a motorist to operate his automobile on a highway at such a speed that the automobile cannot be stopped within the distance within which objects can be seen ahead of the automobile.

1955In Kelly v. Troy Laundry, 46 Idaho 214 , 267 P. 222 , and in Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193 , 270 P.2d 420 , this court quoted with approval from George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414 , 150 P. 73 , language substantially the same as the language used in the instruction given by the trial court except that the instruction uses the words “is evidence of negligence” while the George v. McManus case uses the words “is sufficient evidence of negligence.” [ 27 Cal. App. 414 , 150 P. 74 ] The court’s instruction, while not technically correct, was given in reference to the lights required to be placed on

1955In Kelly v. Troy Laundry, 46 Idaho 214 , 267 P. 222 , and in Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193 , 270 P.2d 420 , this court quoted with approval from George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414 , 150 P. 73 , language substantially the same as the language used in the instruction given by the trial court except that the instruction uses the words “is evidence of negligence” while the George v. McManus case uses the words “is sufficient evidence of negligence.” [ 27 Cal. App. 414 , 150 P. 74 ] The court’s instruction, while not technically correct, was given in reference to the lights required to be placed on

1955In Kelly v. Troy Laundry, 46 Idaho 214 , 267 P. 222 , and in Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193 , 270 P.2d 420 , this court quoted with approval from George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414 , 150 P. 73 , language substantially the same as the language used in the instruction given by the trial court except that the instruction uses the words “is evidence of negligence” while the George v. McManus case uses the words “is sufficient evidence of negligence.” [ 27 Cal. App. 414 , 150 P. 74 ] The court’s instruction, while not technically correct, was given in reference to the lights required to be placed on

1955In Kelly v. Troy Laundry, 46 Idaho 214 , 267 P. 222 , and in Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193 , 270 P.2d 420 , this court quoted with approval from George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414 , 150 P. 73 , language substantially the same as the language used in the instruction given by the trial court except that the instruction uses the words “is evidence of negligence” while the George v. McManus case uses the words “is sufficient evidence of negligence.” [ 27 Cal. App. 414 , 150 P. 74 ] The court’s instruction, while not technically correct, was given in reference to the lights required to be placed on

1955In Kelly v. Troy Laundry, 46 Idaho 214 , 267 P. 222 , and in Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193 , 270 P.2d 420 , this court quoted with approval from George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414 , 150 P. 73 , language substantially the same as the language used in the instruction given by the trial court except that the instruction uses the words “is evidence of negligence” while the George v. McManus case uses the words “is sufficient evidence of negligence.” [ 27 Cal. App. 414 , 150 P. 74 ] The court’s instruction, while not technically correct, was given in reference to the lights required to be placed on

1955In Kelly v. Troy Laundry, 46 Idaho 214 , 267 P. 222 , and in Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193 , 270 P.2d 420 , this court quoted with approval from George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414 , 150 P. 73 , language substantially the same as the language used in the instruction given by the trial court except that the instruction uses the words “is evidence of negligence” while the George v. McManus case uses the words “is sufficient evidence of negligence.” [ 27 Cal. App. 414 , 150 P. 74 ] The court’s instruction, while not technically correct, was given in reference to the lights required to be placed on

1933In the instruction complained of in the instant case, the word “defendant” was not used to indicate to whom the same was applicable, but instead the court used, “an interested party.” The language used in the instruction is general and the article “ an ” is equivalent to ‘ ‘ any. ’ ’ (Kaufman v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. 152 , 46 Pac. 904 .) Consequently, the instruction, as given, had reference to any interested party, and did not mention any particular individual.

1933In the instruction complained of in the instant case, the word “defendant” was not used to indicate to whom the same was applicable, but instead the court used, “an interested party.” The language used in the instruction is general and the article “ an ” is equivalent to ‘ ‘ any. ’ ’ (Kaufman v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. 152 , 46 Pac. 904 .) Consequently, the instruction, as given, had reference to any interested party, and did not mention any particular individual.

1921(State v. Biagas, 105 La. 503 , 29 So. 971 .) The language used being unambiguous, and clearly expressing this intent, there is no occasion for construction of the statute, and arguments based upon the desirability or undesirability of the result are not entitled to consideration.

1898The language used in the instruction complained of was probably founded upon a remark of Mr. Justice Blaoic, in State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19 , ( 3 S. W. 219 ), in which he says : “Where the killing has been under such circumstances that there is doubt as to whether the act was done from malice or from a sense of real danger, testimony of the turbulent character of the deceased may be received, and should be admitted, as tending to show and explain the motive that prompted the act.” It is the duty of the jury, in criminal actions, to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant, in view of which it mu