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9 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coker v. Cokergreen2 sentences2015That “group” of like or similar things that are beyond a person’s ability to control consists of the traditional force majeure events specifically described in the clause: “strike, fire, war, civil disturbance, act of god”; 26 See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (noting among other contract-interpretation considerations that we examine entire writing and an ambiguity does not exist unless the meaning is “uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” (emphasis added)). 27 See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1598 (2002) (defining “other” as including “remaining, 2015That "group" of like or similar things that are beyond a person's ability to control consists of the traditional force majeure events specifically described in the clause: "strike, fire, war, civil disturbance, act of god"; 26 See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (noting among other contract-interpretation considerations that we examine entire writing and an ambiguity does not exist unless the meaning is "uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning." (emphasis added)). 27 See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1598 (2002) (defining "other" as including "remaining, | 2 | 2 |
Matter of MAFgreen2 sentences2002See In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448 , 449 & n. 1 (Tex.1998) (explaining history of rule 21.3(f) of the rules of appellate procedure). . 2002See In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448 , 449 & n. 1 (Tex.1998) (explaining history of rule 21.3(f) of the rules of appellate procedure). [5] The trial judge in this case, a visiting judge, questioned the jurors individually from the bench. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Overton v. State
green
1 sentence1990The court of appeals determined that appellant’s motion was a motion to sever, notwithstanding the language used by defense counsel, citing a court of appeals decision in Rice v. State, 646 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1983, pet. ref’d) 5 which was based on the rationale of our decision in Overton, 552 S.W.2d 849 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rice v. State
green
1 sentence1990The court of appeals determined that appellant’s motion was a motion to sever, notwithstanding the language used by defense counsel, citing a court of appeals decision in Rice v. State, 646 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1983, pet. ref’d) 5 which was based on the rationale of our decision in Overton, 552 S.W.2d 849 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Weaver v. First National Bank of Amarillo
green
2 sentences1987Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289 , 60 S.W. 311 (1901); Weaver v. First National Bank of Amarillo, supra. Reformation is allowed because the antecedent intent of the parties controls over the language used to reduce this antecedent intent to writing. 1987Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289 , 60 S.W. 311 (1901); Weaver v. First National Bank of Amarillo, supra . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kelley v. Ward
green
2 sentences1987Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289 , 60 S.W. 311 (1901); Weaver v. First National Bank of Amarillo, supra. Reformation is allowed because the antecedent intent of the parties controls over the language used to reduce this antecedent intent to writing. 1987Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289 , 60 S.W. 311 (1901); Weaver v. First National Bank of Amarillo, supra. Reformation is allowed because the antecedent intent of the parties controls over the language used to reduce this antecedent intent to writing. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Peckham v. California Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
green
1 sentence1961There are cases Honorable Joe Resweber, page 6 (~~-1061) where there is room for a distinction between typewriting and printing, and in these the language used in the rule or statute ordinarily indicates a purpose to differentiate one from the other, but no such purpose Is apparent in the statute in question. . . .' In the case of In Re Sonora Daily 1.08 Calif. 2d 53, 238 P.2d 111 (1951), the court dlscusse~ the word "printed" as was stated in a statute. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Huckaby v. State
neutral
1 sentence1948The language used in the exception filed to the indictment, as well as the authorities cited, indicate that appellant was relying on Huckaby v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Stinson v. Gardner, County Attorney
green
1 sentence1948R. 577 , 78 S. W. 492 . | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Roedenbeck Farms, Inc. v. Broussard
green
1 sentence1945To find that they sought only to correct the error made in the former instrument by the execution of the latter and thus reform the former instrument without creating a new contract is not an unreasonable construction placed on the language employed in expressing the terms of the latter instrument. 53 C.J. 1055, para. 232 ; 36 Tex.Jur. 723, para. 7; Roedenbeck Farms, Inc. v. Broussard, Tex.Civ.App., 124 S.W.2d 929 , and authorities there cited. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones
green
1 sentence1931App.) 29 S.W.(2d) 861 ; Montgomery v. Owen (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Duvall v. Boyer
neutral
1 sentence1931And we concur in the conclu sion reacted by tbe Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in Duvall v. Boyer, 35 S.W.(2d) 181, 184 , to the effect that the language used in exception 29a “ ‘any and all necessary parties thereto’ should be construed to mean ‘all persons whose presence is necessary to the determination of the entire controversy,’ viz., those who are interested in resisting demands of plaintiff immediately or'subsequently and whose rights will be affected thereby.” See, also, Oakland Motor Co. v. Jones (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.