language used instruction in California

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ] ; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator’s devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister.

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ] ; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator’s devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister.

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ]; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator's devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister. [21] If

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ] ; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator’s devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister.

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ]; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator's devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister. [21] If

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ] ; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator’s devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister.

1955(Savage v. Burnham, 17 N.Y. 561 ; Hornberger v. Miller, 28 App.Div. 199 [ 50 N.Y.S. 1085 ]; Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 8 [ 34 A. 758 ].) But assuming, however, that the language used in the clause in question is capable of two different legal meanings resulting from the testator's devising his estate to the four children of his late sister, followed by other words of express devise to each of the children by name and in equal proportions, still this mention of them by name and a devise to them in equal shares will control the description of them as children of his deceased sister. [21] If

1955If words, which, standing alone, would be effectual to create a class, are followed by equally operative words of devise to devisees by name and in definite proportions, the law infers from the designation by name and mention of the share each is to take, that the devisees are to take individually and as tenants in common and that the descriptive portion of the clause (children of a deceased sister) is intended merely as matter of identification.” Estate of Sullivan, supra, 31 Cal.App.2d 527 at 529: ‘1 The rule or presumption is that the gift is not one to a class where the will designates the

1975In re Perry (9th Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 84 (cert, den., sub. nom.

1966The language used in the instruction was apparently taken from Baker v. Gawthorne, 82 Cal.App.2d 496 , wherein the court said, at page 500 [ 186 P.2d 981 ]: “Before a person accuses another in a judicial proceeding of having committed an unlawful, a base or immoral act, it is his duty not only to make a full and fair disclosure of ‘all the facts within his knowledge tending to prove or disprove the criminal charge,’ but it is also incumbent upon him to find out all of the pertinent facts known to his own agents and such facts as are readily ascertainable and to acquaint his attorney with them.

1966The language used in the instruction was apparently taken from Baker v. Gawthorne, 82 Cal.App.2d 496 , wherein the court said, at page 500 [ 186 P.2d 981 ]: “Before a person accuses another in a judicial proceeding of having committed an unlawful, a base or immoral act, it is his duty not only to make a full and fair disclosure of ‘all the facts within his knowledge tending to prove or disprove the criminal charge,’ but it is also incumbent upon him to find out all of the pertinent facts known to his own agents and such facts as are readily ascertainable and to acquaint his attorney with them.

1957We are, however, in view of the fact that the grave error which brought forth that form of verdict has been fully disclosed in our decision in People v. Green (1956), supra, ante, pp. 209, 224, bound to recognize four facts which shadow the practice of reading this instruction and providing an accompanying form of silent verdict: (1) Such practice is a remnant of the admittedly mistaken holding of this court in People v. Welch (1874), supra, 49 Cal. 174, 185 , that “The jury need not declare that death shall be inflicted—in cases where they cannot agree on imprisonment—since, if the verdict is

1957We are, however, in view of the fact that the grave error which brought forth that form of verdict has been fully disclosed in our decision in People v. Green (1956), supra, ante, pp. 209, 224, bound to recognize four facts which shadow the practice of reading this instruction and providing an accompanying form of silent verdict: (1) Such practice is a remnant of the admittedly mistaken holding of this court in People v. Welch (1874), supra, 49 Cal. 174, 185 , that "The jury need not declare that death shall be inflicted — in cases where they cannot agree on imprisonment — since, if the verdic

1943If there could be any doubt as to the validity of the instruction it was amply cured by other related instructions given. ’ ’ (See, also, Butcher v. Thornhill, 14 Cal.App.2d 149 [ 58 P.2d 179 ]; Schatte v. Maurice, 116 Cal.App. 161 [ 2 P.2d 489 ].), *165 And in Angelo v. Esau, 34 Cal.App.2d 130 [ 93 P.2d 205 ], the court considered a criticism directed particularly at the first sentence of the instruction saying that it was a “plausible contention” that said sentence was tantamount to telling the jury that a driver must “at all times and under all circumstances avoid a collision of his car wit

1943If there could be any doubt as to the validity of the instruction it was amply cured by other related instructions given. ’ ’ (See, also, Butcher v. Thornhill, 14 Cal.App.2d 149 [ 58 P.2d 179 ]; Schatte v. Maurice, 116 Cal.App. 161 [ 2 P.2d 489 ].), *165 And in Angelo v. Esau, 34 Cal.App.2d 130 [ 93 P.2d 205 ], the court considered a criticism directed particularly at the first sentence of the instruction saying that it was a “plausible contention” that said sentence was tantamount to telling the jury that a driver must “at all times and under all circumstances avoid a collision of his car wit

1943If there could be any doubt as to the validity of the instruction it was amply cured by other related instructions given. ’ ’ (See, also, Butcher v. Thornhill, 14 Cal.App.2d 149 [ 58 P.2d 179 ]; Schatte v. Maurice, 116 Cal.App. 161 [ 2 P.2d 489 ].), *165 And in Angelo v. Esau, 34 Cal.App.2d 130 [ 93 P.2d 205 ], the court considered a criticism directed particularly at the first sentence of the instruction saying that it was a “plausible contention” that said sentence was tantamount to telling the jury that a driver must “at all times and under all circumstances avoid a collision of his car wit

1943If there could be any doubt as to the validity of the instruction it was amply cured by other related instructions given. ’ ’ (See, also, Butcher v. Thornhill, 14 Cal.App.2d 149 [ 58 P.2d 179 ]; Schatte v. Maurice, 116 Cal.App. 161 [ 2 P.2d 489 ].), *165 And in Angelo v. Esau, 34 Cal.App.2d 130 [ 93 P.2d 205 ], the court considered a criticism directed particularly at the first sentence of the instruction saying that it was a “plausible contention” that said sentence was tantamount to telling the jury that a driver must “at all times and under all circumstances avoid a collision of his car wit

1943If there could be any doubt as to the validity of the instruction it was amply cured by other related instructions given. ’ ’ (See, also, Butcher v. Thornhill, 14 Cal.App.2d 149 [ 58 P.2d 179 ]; Schatte v. Maurice, 116 Cal.App. 161 [ 2 P.2d 489 ].), *165 And in Angelo v. Esau, 34 Cal.App.2d 130 [ 93 P.2d 205 ], the court considered a criticism directed particularly at the first sentence of the instruction saying that it was a “plausible contention” that said sentence was tantamount to telling the jury that a driver must “at all times and under all circumstances avoid a collision of his car wit

1943If there could be any doubt as to the validity of the instruction it was amply cured by other related instructions given. ’ ’ (See, also, Butcher v. Thornhill, 14 Cal.App.2d 149 [ 58 P.2d 179 ]; Schatte v. Maurice, 116 Cal.App. 161 [ 2 P.2d 489 ].), *165 And in Angelo v. Esau, 34 Cal.App.2d 130 [ 93 P.2d 205 ], the court considered a criticism directed particularly at the first sentence of the instruction saying that it was a “plausible contention” that said sentence was tantamount to telling the jury that a driver must “at all times and under all circumstances avoid a collision of his car wit

1937The language used in that instruction was taken from the opinion which was rendered in the case of People v. Rallo, 119 Cal. App. 393 [ 6 Pac. (2d) 516 ], It was used in that case to illustrate the competency of certain evidence and to distinguish between the offenses of failing to stop a machine and render assistance to one who has been struck and injured or killed, and the crime of manslaughter which might grow out of similar circumstances.

1937The language used in that instruction was taken from the opinion which was rendered in the case of People v. Rallo, 119 Cal. App. 393 [ 6 Pac. (2d) 516 ], It was used in that case to illustrate the competency of certain evidence and to distinguish between the offenses of failing to stop a machine and render assistance to one who has been struck and injured or killed, and the crime of manslaughter which might grow out of similar circumstances.

1935Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139 [ 138 Pac. 712 ]; Barrett v. Harmon, 115 Cal. App. 283 [ 1 Pac. (2d) 458 ].) It is true that the language used in the instruction is taken from a statement of the court in the case of Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256 , at page 260 [ 240 Pac. 16 ], but the statement there made is predicated on the case of Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 [ 179 Cal. 203 , 15 A. L.

1935Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139 [ 138 Pac. 712 ]; Barrett v. Harmon, 115 Cal. App. 283 [ 1 Pac. (2d) 458 ].) It is true that the language used in the instruction is taken from a statement of the court in the case of Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256 , at page 260 [ 240 Pac. 16 ], but the statement there made is predicated on the case of Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 [ 179 Cal. 203 , 15 A. L.

1935Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139 [ 138 Pac. 712 ]; Barrett v. Harmon, 115 Cal. App. 283 [ 1 Pac. (2d) 458 ].) It is true that the language used in the instruction is taken from a statement of the court in the case of Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256 , at page 260 [ 240 Pac. 16 ], but the statement there made is predicated on the case of Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 [ 179 Cal. 203 , 15 A. L.

1935Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139 [ 138 Pac. 712 ]; Barrett v. Harmon, 115 Cal. App. 283 [ 1 Pac. (2d) 458 ].) It is true that the language used in the instruction is taken from a statement of the court in the case of Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256 , at page 260 [ 240 Pac. 16 ], but the statement there made is predicated on the case of Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 [ 179 Cal. 203 , 15 A. L.

1935Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139 [ 138 Pac. 712 ]; Barrett v. Harmon, 115 Cal. App. 283 [ 1 Pac. (2d) 458 ].) It is true that the language used in the instruction is taken from a statement of the court in the case of Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256 , at page 260 [ 240 Pac. 16 ], but the statement there made is predicated on the case of Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 [ 179 Cal. 203 , 15 A. L.

1935Stone Co., 167 Cal. 126, 139 [ 138 Pac. 712 ]; Barrett v. Harmon, 115 Cal. App. 283 [ 1 Pac. (2d) 458 ].) It is true that the language used in the instruction is taken from a statement of the court in the case of Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256 , at page 260 [ 240 Pac. 16 ], but the statement there made is predicated on the case of Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 [ 179 Cal. 203 , 15 A. L.

1915The trial court instructed the jury on the subject of circumstantial evidence in the language used in an instruction approved in People v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142 , and again in People v. Urquidas, 96 Cal. 239 , [ 31 Pac. 52 ].

1915The trial court instructed the jury on the subject of circumstantial evidence in the language used in an instruction approved in People v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142 , and again in People v. Urquidas, 96 Cal. 239 , [ 31 Pac. 52 ].

1915The trial court instructed the jury on the subject of circumstantial evidence in the language used in an instruction approved in People v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142 , and again in People v. Urquidas, 96 Cal. 239 , [ 31 Pac. 52 ].