29 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1918–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc.green2 sentences2015“Under the plain language of the statute, the demand requirement is a condition precedent to the institution of any and all derivative actions.” Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. 2000Stat. § 55-7-42 “has eliminated the futility exception to the demand requirement.” Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. | 2 | 6 |
Allen v. Ferreragreen2 sentences2015Allen & Brock Const. Co., Inc. v. Ferrera, 141 N.C.App. 284 , 288, 540 S.E.2d 761 , 765 (2000) (noting that section 55-7-40(b) allowed for a futility exception to the demand requirement where the directors in control of the corporation were alleged of wrongdoing). 2013See Allen v. Ferrera 141 N.C. | 2 | 3 |
Green v. Condragreen2 sentences2011G.S. 55-7-42. 57 Id. [47] "A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this demand requirement constitutes an insurmountable bar to recovery." Green v. Condra, 2009 NCBC 21, ¶ 89 (internal quotations omitted). [48] As noted above, it is a well-established rule in North Carolina "that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their stock." Barger, 346 N.C. at 658 . [49] The theory behind the Barger rule is that "a shareholder cannot individually recover the lost value o 2011G.S. 55-7-42. [23] "A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this demand requirement constitutes an insurmountable bar to recovery." Green v. Condra, 2009 NCBC 21, ¶ 89 (internal quotations omitted). [24] "The form of the demand is not specified, except to require that it be in writing; but to serve its purpose it should set forth the facts of share ownership and describe the redress demanded with enough particularity to allow the corporation either to correct the problem, if any, without a lawsuit or to bring its own direct action." ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW, § 17.03[1] (7th ed. 2009 | 2 | 2 |
Dunn v. Ceccarelligreen2 sentences2000Gen.Stat. § 55-7-42 "has eliminated the futility exception to the demand requirement." Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc., ___ N.C.App. ____, 537 S.E.2d 248 (2000); accord Dunn v. Ceccarelli, 227 Ga.App. 505 , 489 S.E.2d 563 (1997) (considering OCGA § 14-2-742, a statute virtually identical to N.C. 2000Gen.Stat. § 55-7-42 "has eliminated the futility exception to the demand requirement." Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc., ___ N.C.App. ____, 537 S.E.2d 248 (2000); accord Dunn v. Ceccarelli, 227 Ga.App. 505 , 489 S.E.2d 563 (1997) (considering OCGA § 14-2-742, a statute virtually identical to N.C. | 2 | 2 |
Allen Ex Rel. Allen & Brock v. Ferreragreen2 sentences2015App. at 289 , 540 S.E.2d at 765 (affirming dismissal at 12(b)(6) stage for failure to comply with the demand requirement). {30} Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s derivative claim must be dismissed because it is contained in an unverified Complaint. 2015Allen & Brock Const. Co., Inc. v. Ferrera, 141 N.C.App. 284 , 288, 540 S.E.2d 761 , 765 (2000) (noting that section 55-7-40(b) allowed for a futility exception to the demand requirement where the directors in control of the corporation were alleged of wrongdoing). | 1 | 3 |
Orman v. Cullmangreen2 sentences2026Orman, 794 A.2d at 30 ; (see also ECF No. 32 at 18–19). 2025Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 30 (Del. | 1 | 2 |
Aronson v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2005Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 1987Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289 , 349 S.E. 2d 41 (1986), reh'g allowed, 318 N.C. 703 , 351 S.E. 2d 738 (1987); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. | 1 | 2 |
Bridges v. Oatesgreen1 sentence2017App. 459 , 467−68, 605 S.E.2d 685, 691 (2004) (quoting Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Rowe v. Franklin Countygreen2 sentences2014Id. (citing Rowe v. Franklin Cnty., 318 N.C. 344, 349 , 349 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1986)). {46} The Court concludes that Norman and Allen collectively make clear that, at least for derivative actions governed by the Business Corporation Act, (1) the demand requirement must be strictly construed, allowing for no futility exception, and (2) any response adequate to constitute a corporate rejection that excuses the further running of the ninety-day waiting period must be made by those with authority to act on behalf of the corporation. {47} Considering the virtually identical demand requirements in the L 2014Id. (citing Rowe v. Franklin Cnty., 318 N.C. 344, 349 , 349 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1986)). {46} The Court concludes that Norman and Allen collectively make clear that, at least for derivative actions governed by the Business Corporation Act, (1) the demand requirement must be strictly construed, allowing for no futility exception, and (2) any response adequate to constitute a corporate rejection that excuses the further running of the ninety-day waiting period must be made by those with authority to act on behalf of the corporation. {47} Considering the virtually identical demand requirements in the L | 1 | 1 |
Garlock v. Hilliardgreen2 sentences2011This court has noted that "[i]n determining whether the demand requirement has been met the Court must compare the derivative claims asserted in a complaint against the specific demands a plaintiff has made prior to filing suit." Garlock v. Hilliard, 2000 NCBC 11, ¶ 14 (N.C. 2011This court has noted that "[i]n determining whether the demand requirement has been met the Court must compare the derivative claims asserted in a complaint against the specific demands a plaintiff has made prior to filing suit." Garlock v. Hilliard, 2000 NCBC 11, ¶ 14 (N.C. | 1 | 1 |
In Re E.F. Hutton Banking Practices Litigationgreen1 sentence2006F. Hutton Banking Practices Litig., 634 F. Supp. 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (apply Delaware law) (stating that “[s]uch a rule would eviscerate the rationale for ever making a demand and would strip [the demand requirement] of all meaning”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Pozen S'holders Litig.green2 sentences2006App. at 183 , 611 S.E.2d at 881 (“Under Delaware law, a plaintiff may not bring a derivative claim in the right of a limited partnership unless the general partner has refused to do so, or any demand that the general partner do so would be futile.”). {29} This Court recently discussed the demand requirement (in the corporate context) in In re Pozen S’holders Litig., 2005 NCBC 7 (N.C. 2006The demand requirement] is not satisfied by conclusory statements or mere notice pleading.’” Pozen, 2005 NCBC 7, at ¶ 45 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Cabaniss v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.green1 sentence2006App. at 183 , 611 S.E.2d at 881 (“Under Delaware law, a plaintiff may not bring a derivative claim in the right of a limited partnership unless the general partner has refused to do so, or any demand that the general partner do so would be futile.”). {29} This Court recently discussed the demand requirement (in the corporate context) in In re Pozen S’holders Litig., 2005 NCBC 7 (N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Grobow v. Perotgreen1 sentence2005What the pleader must set forth are particularized factual statements that are essential to the claim.” Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 ; accord Grabow v. Perot , 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) (“[O]nly well- pleaded allegations of fact will be accepted as true; conclusory allegations of fact or law not supported by allegations of specific fact may not be taken as true.”). {46} Under Delaware law, if a plaintiff fails to satisfy this heavy burden, his complaint must be dismissed, irrespective of the strength of his claim on the merits. | 1 | 1 |
Winters v. First Union Corp.green1 sentence2003“Derivative actions are also subject to several procedural protections against litigation agency costs, including: the contemporaneous ownership requirement, posting security for expense statutes, and most importantly, the demand requirement.” North Carolina has elected to eliminate the futility test and require demand under all circumstances and does not require posting security for expenses. [12] Winters v. First Union, 2001 NCBC 8 n.1 (No. 01 CVS 5362, Mecklenburg Super Ct. July 13, 2002) (Tennille, J.). [13] First Union Corp. v. SunTrust, Inc., 2001 NCBC 9 (No. 01 CVS 10075, Mecklenburg Su | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc.green2 sentences1985See generally Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 239 N.C. 437 , 80 S.E. 2d 358 (1954). 1985See generally Hill v. Erwin Mills, Inc., 239 N.C. 437 , 80 S.E. 2d 358 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bridges v. Oates
green
2 sentences2018Bridges v. Oates, 167 N.C. 2017The purpose of the demand requirement is to “allow[] the corporation the opportunity to remedy the alleged problem without resort to judicial action, or, if the problem cannot be remedied without judicial action, to allow the corporation, as the true beneficial party, the opportunity to bring suit first against the alleged wrongdoers.” Bridges v. Oates, 167 N.C. | 3 | 2017–2018 |
Alford v. Shaw
green
2 sentences2017App. 459 , 467−68, 605 S.E.2d 685, 691 (2004) (quoting Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. 2004Alford, 72 N.C. | 3 | 2004–2017 |
Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks
green
2 sentences2015Given our ruling that the POA, and not plaintiffs, has standing to pursue these claims against the third parties because of the POA's actions following plaintiffs' demands, we need not address: (1) whether plaintiffs' derivative claims were rendered moot upon the filing of the POA's intervenor complaint; (2) the Developers' argument that some plaintiffs were not members of the POA at the time of the alleged wrongdoing; or (3) arguments pertaining to the rule in Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 346 N.C. 650 , 488 S.E.2d 215 (1997). 2011G.S. 55-7-42. 57 Id. [47] "A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this demand requirement constitutes an insurmountable bar to recovery." Green v. Condra, 2009 NCBC 21, ¶ 89 (internal quotations omitted). [48] As noted above, it is a well-established rule in North Carolina "that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their stock." Barger, 346 N.C. at 658 . [49] The theory behind the Barger rule is that "a shareholder cannot individually recover the lost value o | 2 | 2011–2015 |
Crouse v. Mineo
green
1 sentence2016App. at 239 , 658 S.E.2d at 37–38 (holding LLC’s initiation of litigation against co-manager to be “a management decision”).1 As such, CDI need 1 The North Carolina Limited Liability Act applies only “to the extent contrary or inconsistent provisions are not made in, or are not otherwise supplanted, varied, disclaimed, or nullified not assert CDISE’s claims against Brown derivatively nor satisfy the demand requirement under N.C. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State Ex Rel. Long v. Ila Corp.
green
1 sentence2015Ct. Sept. 24, 1998) (“In determining whether the demand requirement has been met the Court must compare the derivative claims asserted in a complaint against the specific demands a plaintiff has made prior to filing suit.”). 513 S.E.2d 812 , 821–22 (1999)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Teague v. Bayer AG Bayer Polymers, LLC
green
1 sentence2014Teague v. Bayer AG, 195 N.C. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ray v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP
neutral
1 sentence2007Ray v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 2006 NCBC 5 (N.C. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Brehm v. Eisner
green
1 sentence2005What the pleader must set forth are particularized factual statements that are essential to the claim.” Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 ; accord Grabow v. Perot , 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) (“[O]nly well- pleaded allegations of fact will be accepted as true; conclusory allegations of fact or law not supported by allegations of specific fact may not be taken as true.”). {46} Under Delaware law, if a plaintiff fails to satisfy this heavy burden, his complaint must be dismissed, irrespective of the strength of his claim on the merits. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Allen v. Pullen
neutral
1 sentence1987Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289 , 349 S.E. 2d 41 (1986), reh'g allowed, 318 N.C. 703 , 351 S.E. 2d 738 (1987); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Alford v. Shaw
neutral
1 sentence1987Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289 , 349 S.E. 2d 41 (1986), reh'g allowed, 318 N.C. 703 , 351 S.E. 2d 738 (1987); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Alford v. Shaw
green
2 sentences1987Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289 , 349 S.E. 2d 41 (1986), reh'g allowed, 318 N.C. 703 , 351 S.E. 2d 738 (1987); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. 1987Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289 , 349 S.E. 2d 41 (1986), reh'g allowed, 318 N.C. 703 , 351 S.E. 2d 738 (1987); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
J. T. McTeer Clothing Co. v. Hay
neutral
2 sentences1978Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. ‘But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ This distinction was recognized and approved in Clothing Co. v. Hay, 163 N.C. 495 , 79 S.E. 955 (1913); Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N.C. 199 , 83 S.E. 17 (1914).” *626 Th 1978Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. ‘But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ This distinction was recognized and approved in Clothing Co. v. Hay, 163 N.C. 495 , 79 S.E. 955 (1913); Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N.C. 199 , 83 S.E. 17 (1914).” *626 Th | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Ferebee v. . Sawyer
green
2 sentences1978Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. ‘But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ This distinction was recognized and approved in Clothing Co. v. Hay, 163 N.C. 495 , 79 S.E. 955 (1913); Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N.C. 199 , 83 S.E. 17 (1914).” *626 Th 1978Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. ‘But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ This distinction was recognized and approved in Clothing Co. v. Hay, 163 N.C. 495 , 79 S.E. 955 (1913); Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N.C. 199 , 83 S.E. 17 (1914).” *626 Th | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1978Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. ‘But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ This distinction was recognized and approved in Clothing Co. v. Hay, 163 N.C. 495 , 79 S.E. 955 (1913); Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N.C. 199 , 83 S.E. 17 (1914).” *626 Th 1978Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever. ‘But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.’ This distinction was recognized and approved in Clothing Co. v. Hay, 163 N.C. 495 , 79 S.E. 955 (1913); Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N.C. 199 , 83 S.E. 17 (1914).” *626 Th | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Rose v. Fremont Warehouse & Improvement Co. neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Cromwell v. County of Sac green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.