7 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1922–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Prince Street Elevator Co.green2 sentences1993It states: To constitute an “accord and satisfaction” in law dependent upon an offer of the payment of money, it is necessary that the money be offered in full satisfaction of the demand or claim of the creditor, and be accompanied by such acts or declarations as amount to a condition that if the money be accepted it is to be in full satisfaction and to be of such character that the creditor is bound so to understand such offer. 41 N.M. at 337 , 68 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added). 1 To the extent that the majority opinion relies on Los Atrevidos and Miller as suggesting that there is no accord an 1993It states: To constitute an “accord and satisfaction” in law dependent upon an offer of the payment of money, it is necessary that the money be offered in full satisfaction of the demand or claim of the creditor, and be accompanied by such acts or declarations as amount to a condition that if the money be accepted it is to be in full satisfaction and to be of such character that the creditor is bound so to understand such offer. 41 N.M. at 337 , 68 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added). 1 To the extent that the majority opinion relies on Los Atrevidos and Miller as suggesting that there is no accord an | 2 | 2 |
Valley Improvement Association, Inc. v. United States Fidelity And Guaranty Corporationgreen1 sentence1999Corp., 129 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 1997), no New Mexico court has yet had occasion to rule whether an insurer has a duty to conduct its own investigation in response to a demand for a defense from its insured. | 1 | 1 |
Rcm Securities Fund, Inc. v. Stantongreen1 sentence1993In RCM Securities Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1329 (2d Cir.1991), the federal appeals court stated that the federal rule equivalent of SCRA 1-023.1, “is only a procedural requirement empowering federal courts to determine from the pleadings whether the demand requirement has been met.” If White’s complaint was defective under Section 53-ll-47(A)(3) and SCRA 1-023.1, why was it not dealt with by a motion to dismiss or a motion for a more definite statement? | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1980See State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App. 1975). 1980See State v. Chavez, 88 N.M. 451 , 541 P.2d 631 (Ct.App. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters & International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces
green
2 sentences1999In reviewing a substantial evidence claim, “[t]he question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached .” Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces, 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12 , 123 N.M. 329 , 940 P.2d 177 . {32} As discussed above, an insurer’s duty to defend in New Mexico is based on the facts which it knew or would have known if it had conducted a reasonable investigation at the time the demand for a defense was made. 1999In reviewing a substantial evidence claim, “[t]he question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached .” Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces, 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12 , 123 N.M. 329 , 940 P.2d 177 . {32} As discussed above, an insurer’s duty to defend in New Mexico is based on the facts which it knew or would have known if it had conducted a reasonable investigation at the time the demand for a defense was made. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1999Id. {29} Thus, we conclude that the better reasoned cases indicate that an insurance company presented with a demand for a defense from its insured “must act reasonably under the circumstances to conduct a timely investigation and fair evaluation of its duty to defend.” UJI 13-1703. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Callanan v. Sun Lakes Homeowners' Ass'n 1, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993The Arizona court in Callanan v. Sun Lakes Homeowners’ Ass’n No. 1, 134 Ariz. 332 , 656 P.2d 621 (Ct.App.1982), held that the trial court is entitled to consider plaintiffs’ failure to comply with presuit demand requirements in determining the presence of “reasonable cause.” Although we believe the demand requirement is crucial to the derivative action, in our view, relying on it alone as the reason for awarding attorney’s fees was an abuse of discretion here. 1993The Arizona court in Callanan v. Sun Lakes Homeowners’ Ass’n No. 1, 134 Ariz. 332 , 656 P.2d 621 (Ct.App.1982), held that the trial court is entitled to consider plaintiffs’ failure to comply with presuit demand requirements in determining the presence of “reasonable cause.” Although we believe the demand requirement is crucial to the derivative action, in our view, relying on it alone as the reason for awarding attorney’s fees was an abuse of discretion here. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Fuller v. . Kemp
green
2 sentences1937In Kingsville Preserving Co. v. Frank, 87 Ill.App. 586 , it was held: “To constitute an accord and satisfaction of a claim unliquidated and in dispute, it is necessary that the money should be offered in satisfaction of the claim, and the offer accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if the money is accepted it is to be in satisfaction, and such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that if he takes it he takes it subject to such condition.” In the case of Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N.Y. 231 , 33 N.E. 1034, 1035 , 20 L.R.A. 785 , the c 1937In Kingsville Preserving Co. v. Frank, 87 Ill.App. 586 , it was held: “To constitute an accord and satisfaction of a claim unliquidated and in dispute, it is necessary that the money should be offered in satisfaction of the claim, and the offer accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if the money is accepted it is to be in satisfaction, and such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that if he takes it he takes it subject to such condition.” In the case of Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N.Y. 231 , 33 N.E. 1034, 1035 , 20 L.R.A. 785 , the c | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Kingsville Preserving Co. v. Frank
neutral
1 sentence1937In Kingsville Preserving Co. v. Frank, 87 Ill.App. 586 , it was held: “To constitute an accord and satisfaction of a claim unliquidated and in dispute, it is necessary that the money should be offered in satisfaction of the claim, and the offer accompanied with such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that if the money is accepted it is to be in satisfaction, and such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that if he takes it he takes it subject to such condition.” In the case of Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N.Y. 231 , 33 N.E. 1034, 1035 , 20 L.R.A. 785 , the c | 1 | 1937–1937 |
First Nat. Bank v. Town of Tome
neutral
1 sentence1922Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.” See, also, First National Bank v. Tome, 23 N. M. 255, at page 268, 167 Pac. 733 ; City of Socorro v. Cook, 24 N. M. 202, at page 209, 173 Pac. 682 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
City of Socorro v. Cook
green
1 sentence1922Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.” See, also, First National Bank v. Tome, 23 N. M. 255, at page 268, 167 Pac. 733 ; City of Socorro v. Cook, 24 N. M. 202, at page 209, 173 Pac. 682 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.