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7 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Akin v. MacKiegreen2 sentences2022For completeness, we turn to review whether the amended complaint alleged any facts to show that a demand would be “excused.” Tennessee case law provides that “a demand of the agents of a corporation . . . is not necessary if these agents are themselves guilty of the wrongs complained of against the corporation[.]” Boyd, 11 S.W. at 949-50 (emphasis added); see also Akin, 310 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting Peeler v. Luther, 135 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tenn. 1940)) (“[Demand] need not be made where the corporation is under the control of the wrongdoers or of persons who are necessary parties defendant.”) (emph 2006Lewis, 838 S.W.2d at 221 (citing Akin v. Mackie, 310 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tenn. 1958); Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) 108, 131 (Tenn. 1874)). | 3 | 3 |
Boyd v. Simsgreen2 sentences2022For completeness, we turn to review whether the amended complaint alleged any facts to show that a demand would be “excused.” Tennessee case law provides that “a demand of the agents of a corporation . . . is not necessary if these agents are themselves guilty of the wrongs complained of against the corporation[.]” Boyd, 11 S.W. at 949-50 (emphasis added); see also Akin, 310 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting Peeler v. Luther, 135 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tenn. 1940)) (“[Demand] need not be made where the corporation is under the control of the wrongdoers or of persons who are necessary parties defendant.”) (emph 1992Akin v. Mackie, 203 Tenn. 113, 119 , 310 S.W.2d 164, 167 (1958); Boyd v. Sims, 87 Tenn. at 775-76 , 11 S.W. at 949 ; Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) 108, 131 (1874). | 1 | 2 |
Deaderick v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2022For completeness, we turn to review whether the amended complaint alleged any facts to show that a demand would be “excused.” Tennessee case law provides that “a demand of the agents of a corporation . . . is not necessary if these agents are themselves guilty of the wrongs complained of against the corporation[.]” Boyd, 11 S.W. at 949-50 (emphasis added); see also Akin, 310 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting Peeler v. Luther, 135 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tenn. 1940)) (“[Demand] need not be made where the corporation is under the control of the wrongdoers or of persons who are necessary parties defendant.”) (emph | 1 | 1 |
Peeler v. Luthergreen1 sentence2022For completeness, we turn to review whether the amended complaint alleged any facts to show that a demand would be “excused.” Tennessee case law provides that “a demand of the agents of a corporation . . . is not necessary if these agents are themselves guilty of the wrongs complained of against the corporation[.]” Boyd, 11 S.W. at 949-50 (emphasis added); see also Akin, 310 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting Peeler v. Luther, 135 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tenn. 1940)) (“[Demand] need not be made where the corporation is under the control of the wrongdoers or of persons who are necessary parties defendant.”) (emph | 1 | 1 |
Lewis Ex Rel. Citizens Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Boydgreen2 sentences2006See Lewis, 838 S.W.2d at 221 . 2006Lewis, 838 S.W.2d at 221 (citing Akin v. Mackie, 310 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tenn. 1958); Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) 108, 131 (Tenn. 1874)). | 1 | 1 |
Silver v. Allardgreen2 sentences2003Even assuming that the significant relationship test applies, however, the application of Tennessee’s futility exception to the demand requirement is not mandated. “[T]he demand requirement delineates the respective powers of the shareholder and the directors.” Silver v. Allard, 16 F.Supp.2d 966, 968-69 (N.D.Ill.1998). 2003Even assuming that the significant relationship test applies, however, the application of Tennessee’s futility exception to the demand requirement is not mandated. “[T]he demand requirement delineates the respective powers of the shareholder and the directors.” Silver v. Allard, 16 F.Supp.2d 966, 968-69 (N.D.Ill.1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003In Kamen , the Court concluded that the substantive law of the state of incorporation governs the scope of the demand requirement and any exception to the requirement. 6 500 U.S. at 108-09 , 111 S.Ct. 1711 . 2003In Kamen , the Court concluded that the substantive law of the state of incorporation governs the scope of the demand requirement and any exception to the requirement. 6 500 U.S. at 108-09 , 111 S.Ct. 1711 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Burns v. City of Nashville
green
1 sentence2003See Lewis, 838 S.W.2d at 218 (noting that the subject corporation was organized in Tennessee); Burns v. Nashville, 142 Tenn. 541 , 221 S.W. 828 (Tenn.1920) (suit brought against city of Nashville, Tennessee). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
cluster 772015
green
1 sentence2003Kamen has been widely followed, with many courts adhering to Kamen’s holding that “whether the failure to make a demand is excused must be determined under the substantive law of the state of incorporation.” McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 , 815, as amended, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir.2001); see In re Abbott Labs. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
cluster 773335
green
1 sentence2003Kamen has been widely followed, with many courts adhering to Kamen’s holding that “whether the failure to make a demand is excused must be determined under the substantive law of the state of incorporation.” McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 , 815, as amended, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir.2001); see In re Abbott Labs. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Lionel Ortiz
green
1 sentence1997Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066 (D.C. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jon T. Liegakos v. Maryanne Cooke, Warden, Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution
green
1 sentence1997Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066 (D.C. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1992At the same time, they have also recognized that the demand requirement should be excused if making the demand would be an "idle ceremony.” State v. Mitchell, 104 Tenn. at 349 , 58 S.W. at 368 ; Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass’n, 41 Tenn.App. at 676 , 298 S.W.2d at 550 . 1992At the same time, they have also recognized that the demand requirement should be excused if making the demand would be an "idle ceremony.” State v. Mitchell, 104 Tenn. at 349 , 58 S.W. at 368 ; Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass’n, 41 Tenn.App. at 676 , 298 S.W.2d at 550 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n
green
2 sentences1992At the same time, they have also recognized that the demand requirement should be excused if making the demand would be an "idle ceremony.” State v. Mitchell, 104 Tenn. at 349 , 58 S.W. at 368 ; Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass’n, 41 Tenn.App. at 676 , 298 S.W.2d at 550 . 1992At the same time, they have also recognized that the demand requirement should be excused if making the demand would be an "idle ceremony.” State v. Mitchell, 104 Tenn. at 349 , 58 S.W. at 368 ; Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass’n, 41 Tenn.App. at 676 , 298 S.W.2d at 550 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Bishop
green
1 sentence1988See Barker v. Wingo, supra; State v. Bishop, supra. Clearly, a defendant is under no duty to bring himself to trial. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Cromwell v. County of Sac
green
2 sentences1926Fred Johnson, Trustee. (4) The decree in the former suit was based on a judgment pro eonfesso,' and ‘ ‘ a judgment by default only admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or claim in suit; it does not make the allegations of the declaration or complaint evidence, in an action upon a different claim.” Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S., 351 , 24 L. 1926Fred Johnson, Trustee. (4) The decree in the former suit was based on a judgment pro eonfesso,' and ‘ ‘ a judgment by default only admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or claim in suit; it does not make the allegations of the declaration or complaint evidence, in an action upon a different claim.” Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S., 351 , 24 L. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.