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13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1924–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Warner v. Pollockgreen2 sentences2025“The rule does not require that a party state any grounds for the demand for a hearing, nor are any restrictions placed upon one’s right to a de novo hearing.” Id. at 749 . 2000Warner v. Pollock, 434 Pa.Super. 551 , 644 A.2d 747, 750 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
Drain v. Covenant Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2004In Drain , the court held that the demand rule from Cuker did not apply because the case was originally filed before Cuker was decided, and the court declined to apply the holding in Cuker retroactively. 551 Pa. at 582 , 712 A.2d at 279 . . 2004In Drain , the court held that the demand rule from Cuker did not apply because the case was originally filed before Cuker was decided, and the court declined to apply the holding in Cuker retroactively. 551 Pa. at 582 , 712 A.2d at 279 . . | 1 | 2 |
Maleski v. Corporate Life Insurancegreen1 sentence2019Co., 641 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citing 15 Pa.C.S. § 1721 (providing that all powers . . . vested by law in a business corporation shall be exercised by or under the authority of . . . a board of directors”); see also Red Vision Systems, Inc. v. National Real 19 The Court summarized the relevant provisions: “Sections 7.02 (standing), 7.03 (the demand rule), 7.04 (procedure in derivative action), 7.05 (board authority in derivative action), 7.06 (judicial stay of derivative action), 7.07, 7.08, and 7.09 (dismissal of derivative action), 7.10 (standard of judicial review), and 7.13 (judici | 1 | 1 |
Red Vision Systems, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services, L.P.green1 sentence2019Co., 641 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citing 15 Pa.C.S. § 1721 (providing that all powers . . . vested by law in a business corporation shall be exercised by or under the authority of . . . a board of directors”); see also Red Vision Systems, Inc. v. National Real 19 The Court summarized the relevant provisions: “Sections 7.02 (standing), 7.03 (the demand rule), 7.04 (procedure in derivative action), 7.05 (board authority in derivative action), 7.06 (judicial stay of derivative action), 7.07, 7.08, and 7.09 (dismissal of derivative action), 7.10 (standard of judicial review), and 7.13 (judici | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Browngreen1 sentence1984Pennsylvania has long recognized an exception to the demand requirement where, under the facts presented, such a request would be “vain and useless.” Wilson v. Brown, 269 Pa. 225, 227 , 112 A. 1,2 (1920). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co.green1 sentence1984See also Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa. 335, 337 , 172 A.678, 679 (1934); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa. Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 , 863 n.4 (1979) (Price, J., concurring); Hess v. M. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dillongreen1 sentence1971If a prosecutor fails to do so, the defendant cannot be held to have waived his constitutional right to a speedy trial.’ United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541, 543 (1960).” Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at 49-50 , 90 S. Ct. at 1574-75 (footnote and citations omitted). 7 These shortcomings of the demand rule are most disturbing, but we need not face them in this case, for it is self-evident that such a rule cannot be applicable to one who is unaware of the pending charges against him. | 1 | 1 |
Dickey v. Floridagreen2 sentences1971If a prosecutor fails to do so, the defendant cannot be held to have waived his constitutional right to a speedy trial.’ United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541, 543 (1960).” Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at 49-50 , 90 S. Ct. at 1574-75 (footnote and citations omitted). 7 These shortcomings of the demand rule are most disturbing, but we need not face them in this case, for it is self-evident that such a rule cannot be applicable to one who is unaware of the pending charges against him. 1971If a prosecutor fails to do so, the defendant cannot be held to have waived his constitutional right to a speedy trial.’ United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541, 543 (1960).” Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at 49-50 , 90 S. Ct. at 1574-75 (footnote and citations omitted). 7 These shortcomings of the demand rule are most disturbing, but we need not face them in this case, for it is self-evident that such a rule cannot be applicable to one who is unaware of the pending charges against him. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub
green
1 sentence2019Co., 641 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citing 15 Pa.C.S. § 1721 (providing that all powers . . . vested by law in a business corporation shall be exercised by or under the authority of . . . a board of directors”); see also Red Vision Systems, Inc. v. National Real 19 The Court summarized the relevant provisions: “Sections 7.02 (standing), 7.03 (the demand rule), 7.04 (procedure in derivative action), 7.05 (board authority in derivative action), 7.06 (judicial stay of derivative action), 7.07, 7.08, and 7.09 (dismissal of derivative action), 7.10 (standard of judicial review), and 7.13 (judici | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Levin v. Schiffman
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., Cooper v. Rucci, 2008 WL 942710 (W.D.Pa.2008) (unpublished memorandum) (applying Section 7.01(d) to excuse the demand requirement for a derivative action that was filed on behalf of a closely held corporation); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (same); Top Quality Mfg., Inc. v. Sinkow, 2004 WL 2554615 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (unpublished memorandum) (same); Levin v. Schiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 152 (Pa.Com.Pl.2001) (same). 2014See, e.g., Cooper v. Rucci, 2008 WL 942710 (W.D.Pa.2008) (unpublished memorandum) (applying Section 7.01(d) to excuse the demand requirement for a derivative action that was filed on behalf of a closely held corporation); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (same); Top Quality Mfg., Inc. v. Sinkow, 2004 WL 2554615 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (unpublished memorandum) (same); Levin v. Schiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 152 (Pa.Com.Pl.2001) (same). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
White v. George
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., Cooper v. Rucci, 2008 WL 942710 (W.D.Pa.2008) (unpublished memorandum) (applying Section 7.01(d) to excuse the demand requirement for a derivative action that was filed on behalf of a closely held corporation); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (same); Top Quality Mfg., Inc. v. Sinkow, 2004 WL 2554615 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (unpublished memorandum) (same); Levin v. Schiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 152 (Pa.Com.Pl.2001) (same). 2014See, e.g., Cooper v. Rucci, 2008 WL 942710 (W.D.Pa.2008) (unpublished memorandum) (applying Section 7.01(d) to excuse the demand requirement for a derivative action that was filed on behalf of a closely held corporation); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (same); Top Quality Mfg., Inc. v. Sinkow, 2004 WL 2554615 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (unpublished memorandum) (same); Levin v. Schiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 152 (Pa.Com.Pl.2001) (same). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Nedler v. Vaisberg
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., Cooper v. Rucci, 2008 WL 942710 (W.D.Pa.2008) (unpublished memorandum) (applying Section 7.01(d) to excuse the demand requirement for a derivative action that was filed on behalf of a closely held corporation); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (same); Top Quality Mfg., Inc. v. Sinkow, 2004 WL 2554615 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (unpublished memorandum) (same); Levin v. Schiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 152 (Pa.Com.Pl.2001) (same). 2014See, e.g., Cooper v. Rucci, 2008 WL 942710 (W.D.Pa.2008) (unpublished memorandum) (applying Section 7.01(d) to excuse the demand requirement for a derivative action that was filed on behalf of a closely held corporation); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same); White v. George, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (same); Top Quality Mfg., Inc. v. Sinkow, 2004 WL 2554615 (Pa.Com.Pl.2004) (unpublished memorandum) (same); Levin v. Schiffman, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 152 (Pa.Com.Pl.2001) (same). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Garber v. Lego
green
2 sentences1998In Garber, 11 F.3d at 1202 , the Third Circuit explained that demand requirements are imperative because the shareholder’s right to act for the corporation is exceptional and only arises on a clear showing of special circumstances. 1998Cuker does not specifically address the purpose of the new demand requirement. *279 In Garber, 11 F.3d at 1202 , the Third Circuit explained that demand requirements are imperative because the shareholder's right to act for the corporation is exceptional and only arises on a clear showing of special circumstances. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hughes v. Murdoch Storage & Transfer Co.
neutral
1 sentence1984Pennsylvania has long recognized an exception to the demand requirement where, under the facts presented, such a request would be “vain and useless.” Wilson v. Brown, 269 Pa. 225, 227 , 112 A. 1,2 (1920). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Cohen v. Industrial Finance Corporation
green
1 sentence1984In determining whether sufficient facts have been set forth here to excuse the demand requirement, we are guided by the observations of the court in Cohen v. Industrial Finance Corporation, 44 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), wherein it was stated: “A realistic view should be taken of the facts pleaded as excusing a demand on directors that they bring suit. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Boyd v. Cooper
green
2 sentences1984See also Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa. 335, 337 , 172 A.678, 679 (1934); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa. Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 , 863 n.4 (1979) (Price, J., concurring); Hess v. M. 1984See also Evans v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa. 335, 337 , 172 A.678, 679 (1934); Boyd v. Cooper, 269 Pa. Super. 594 , 410 A.2d 860 , 863 n.4 (1979) (Price, J., concurring); Hess v. M. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Henley v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1983Henly v. State Civil Service Commission, 39 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 287 , 395 A.2d 330 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Davis v. Miller
green
2 sentences1965It merely asserts that the additional defendant is solely liable to the plaintiff on the latter's cause of action. *559 In Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348 , 123 A. 2d 422 (1956), we held that where both the plaintiff and the defendant had released the additional defendant "from all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, etc." the joinder of the additional defendant was permissible, because if defendant could prove that the additional defendant was, in fact, a joint tortfeasor with him the damages recoverable by plaintiff against defendant would be reduced, pursuant to the Uniform Contributio 1965It merely asserts that the additional defendant is solely liable to the plaintiff on the latter's cause of action. *559 In Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348 , 123 A. 2d 422 (1956), we held that where both the plaintiff and the defendant had released the additional defendant "from all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, etc." the joinder of the additional defendant was permissible, because if defendant could prove that the additional defendant was, in fact, a joint tortfeasor with him the damages recoverable by plaintiff against defendant would be reduced, pursuant to the Uniform Contributio | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Burritt v. Belfy
green
1 sentence1950Burritt v. Belfy, 47 Conn. 323, 325 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Horn v. Lehigh Valley Railroad
green
1 sentence1924Co., 274 Pa. 42 , we hold, inter alia, that: “It is not material in what form the claim appears, as long as it presents a demand or claim for an injury that, on the facts as stated, appears to be compensable.” The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.