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12 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2017See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (”[I]f delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver [of the right to speedy trial] may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside.”); Carroll v. State, 251 So.2d 866, 871 (Fla. 1971) ("If [the accused] elects to proceed through prohibition, an automatic stay is instituted once the rule has been issued, thereby subjecting the accused to a tolling of time while his petition is pending.”). 2017See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) (“[I]f delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver [of the right to speedy trial] may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside.”); Carroll v. State, 251 So. 2d 866, 871 (Fla. 1971) (“If [the accused] elects to proceed through prohibition, an automatic stay is instituted once the rule has been issued, thereby subjecting the accused to a tolling of time while his petition is pending.”). | 1 | 2 |
CAUCUS OF BLACK STATE LEGISLATORS v. Crosbygreen1 sentence2022See § 713.585(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added) (“Upon the filing of a demand for hearing, a hearing shall be held before the proposed or scheduled date of sale of the vehicle.”); § 713.585(7), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added) (“At a hearing on a complaint relating to the requirements of this section, the court shall issue an order determining: (a) [w]hether the vehicle is subject to a valid lien . . . and (f) [t]he reasonableness of storages charges.”); see also Fla. Caucus of Black State Legislators, Inc. v. Crosby, 877 So. 2d 861, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (observing “shall” is obligatory, rather | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Shakespeare Foundation, Inc.green1 sentence2018Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2013). 3 We hold that the demand requirement in Paragraph A is a condition precedent to suit. | 1 | 1 |
Rooks v. Shadergreen1 sentence2018“A contract of guaranty may be absolute or it may be conditional.” Rooks v. Shader, 384 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (”[I]f delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver [of the right to speedy trial] may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside.”); Carroll v. State, 251 So.2d 866, 871 (Fla. 1971) ("If [the accused] elects to proceed through prohibition, an automatic stay is instituted once the rule has been issued, thereby subjecting the accused to a tolling of time while his petition is pending.”). 2017See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972) (“[I]f delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver [of the right to speedy trial] may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside.”); Carroll v. State, 251 So. 2d 866, 871 (Fla. 1971) (“If [the accused] elects to proceed through prohibition, an automatic stay is instituted once the rule has been issued, thereby subjecting the accused to a tolling of time while his petition is pending.”). | 1 | 1 |
Stanley M. Grossman v. Edward C. Johnson, 3rdgreen1 sentence2017In Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 125 (1st Cir. 1982), for example, the court rejected the claim that a failure to allege the pre-suit demand required by a rule of civil procedure could be cured after suit was filed, reasoning that the rule does not provide for a post-suit demand, and observing that the purpose of the demand requirement is “to alert the director before suit is instituted” so that the directors have “the opportunity to occupy their normal status.” See also Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that trial court should have per | 1 | 1 |
Shlensky v. Dorseygreen1 sentence2017In Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 125 (1st Cir. 1982), for example, the court rejected the claim that a failure to allege the pre-suit demand required by a rule of civil procedure could be cured after suit was filed, reasoning that the rule does not provide for a post-suit demand, and observing that the purpose of the demand requirement is “to alert the director before suit is instituted” so that the directors have “the opportunity to occupy their normal status.” See also Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that trial court should have per | 1 | 1 |
Shorter v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Birchfieldgreen2 sentences2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). 2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). | 1 | 1 |
B.W. v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See B.W. v. State, 855 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(holding that once speedy trial has been waived, the child must file a demand under rule 8.090(g) to once again awaken his speedy trial rights). 2004See B.W. v. State, 855 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(holding that once speedy trial has been waived, the child must file a demand under rule 8.090(g) to once again awaken his speedy trial rights). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Caulfieldgreen1 sentence2008But see Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313 (holding that a similar Minnesota statute violates the Confrontation Clause because it does not give the defendant adequate notice that failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement waives the right to confrontation). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Las Vegas v. Walsh
green
2 sentences2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). 2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Brooks v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). 2008See State v. Cunningham, 903 *532 So.2d 1110 (La.2005); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899 , 124 P.3d 203 (2005); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 155 , 638 S.E.2d 131 (2006); cf. State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624 , 157 P.3d 216, 219-20 (2007) (holding Oregon's statute requiring the defendant to subpoena the lab technician unconstitutional, but stating a demand requirement would be constitutional). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
McIntyre v. State
green
1 sentence1980This representation by a most able defense attorney may not rise to the level of a demand for an instruction on a nonexistent criminal offense such as occurred in McIntyre v. State, 380 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), but it comes close. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
City of Punta Gorda v. PUB. EMP. RELATIONS COMM'N
green
1 sentence1979We agree with our sister court in City of Punta Gorda v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 358 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) that Section 120.57 is applicable to a ruling on a party's objections to an election. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Pierce
green
1 sentence1973Nevertheless, the prosecution argues that even if Wolfson knew or should have known of the fund misappropriation by King, the rule in force in Florida is the demand rule recognized in State v. Pierce, supra: "... | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Bay County Florida v. State
neutral
2 sentences1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim. 1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Blanchard v. Stribling
green
2 sentences1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim. 1964In Bay County v. State, et al., 157 Fla. 47 , 24 So.2d 714, 715 , and the case of Blanchard et al. v. Stribling et al., 157 Fla. 10 , 24 So.2d 713 , decided by the Supreme Court in 1946, it was held that a judgment by default only admits, for purpose of the action, the legality of the demand or claim in suit and does not make allegations in the declaration or complaint evidence in an action on a different claim. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Cromwell v. County of Sac
green
1 sentence1946We find the applicable law to be as follows: “A judgment by default only admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or claim in suit; it does not make the allegations of the declaration or complaint evidence in an action upon a different claim.” Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Griffith v. Henderson
neutral
1 sentence1915Griffith v. Henderson, 55 Fla. 625 , 45 South. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.