10 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Foxgreen2 sentences2016The demand requirement “affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment[.]” Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 533 (1984). “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure.’ ” Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96–97. 2016The demand requirement “affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment[.]” Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 533 (1984). “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure.’ ” Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96–97. | 3 | 3 |
Orrock Ex Rel. Micron Technology, Inc. v. Appletongreen2 sentences2026The demand requirement affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment[.] [T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of substance, not procedure. 7 Orrock, 147 Idaho at 618 , 213 P.3d at 403 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2026The demand requirement affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment[.] [T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of substance, not procedure. 7 Orrock, 147 Idaho at 618 , 213 P.3d at 403 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 2 | 4 |
John B. Kugler v. Ron Nelsongreen2 sentences2026Kugler v. Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 415 , 374 P.3d 571, 578 (2016); Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 , 213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009). 2026Kugler v. Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 415 , 374 P.3d 571, 578 (2016); Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 , 213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.green2 sentences2016The demand requirement “affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment[.]” Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 533 [ 104 S.Ct. 831, 836-37 , 78 L.Ed.2d 645, 653 ] (1984). “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure.’” Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96-97 [ 111 S.Ct. at 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 164 ]. 2016The demand requirement “affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment[.]” Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 533 [ 104 S.Ct. 831, 836-37 , 78 L.Ed.2d 645, 653 ] (1984). “[T]he function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure.’” Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96-97 [ 111 S.Ct. at 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 164 ]. | 1 | 2 |
Ross v. Bernhardgreen2 sentences2016Servs., Inc.], 500 U.S. [90, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d 152, 163-64 (1991)] (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 [ 90 S.Ct. 733, 736 , 24 L.Ed.2d 729, 734 ] (1970)). 2016Servs., Inc.], 500 U.S. [90, 95–96 (1991)] (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 , (1970)). | 1 | 2 |
Druffel v. State, Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2002“Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed.” Druffel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856 , 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). 2002“Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed.” Druffel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856 , 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2024“The demand-waiver doctrine provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 525 . 2024“The demand-waiver doctrine provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 525 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716 , 117 P.3d 130 (2005). 2007Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716 , 117 P.3d 130 (2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lawless v. Davis
green
1 sentence1998A “common sense appraisal of what the legislature intended,” id. at 176, 560 P.2d at 498 , leads to the conclusion that I.C. §§ 45-615 and 45-617 are the exclusive code sections under which an employee can recover attorney fees when the employee brings a claim for wages and treble damages. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.