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18 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Hornegreen2 sentences2025That test eschews the demand-waiver principle and instead incorporates "the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial [as] one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right." Commonwealth v. Horne, 362 Mass. 738, 742 (1973), quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 528 . d. 1975Commonwealth v. Horne, 362 Mass. 738, 741-743 (1973). | 2 | 2 |
Aronson v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2004Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del.Supr. 1984). 2004Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del.Supr. 1984). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Butlergreen1 sentence2025Barker analysis. "[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Butler, 464 Mass. at 709-710 (2013), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Barker analysis. "[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Butler, 464 Mass. at 709-710 (2013), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Silge v. Merzgreen1 sentence2016Cf. Silge v. Merz, 510 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that generic request for such other and further relief which the court deemed just and proper “is mere boilerplate” and “cannot substitute for the meaningful notice called for by [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 54(c), which anticipates that defendants will look to the demand clause to understand their exposure in the event of default”). | 1 | 1 |
Houle v. Lowgreen1 sentence2011Id.; see also Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810 , 813 n.13 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.green1 sentence2010Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108-09 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Longanecker v. Diamondhead Country Clubgreen1 sentence2010Renz v. Beeman, 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The demand requirement of [the parallel Federal] Rule 23.1 is a condition precedent to the commencement of a shareholder’s derivative action, and as such is subject to the equitable doctrine of waiver”); Longanecker v. Diamondhead Country Club, 760 So. 2d 764, 768-769 (Miss. 2000) (demand requirement under similar State rule subject to waiver). 17 The complaint did allege the futility of making a demand on 330 Scangas LP based on the assertion that the individual defendants controlled 330 Scan-gas, Inc., the general partner of 330 Scangas LP. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Romanogreen1 sentence2010Renz v. Beeman, 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The demand requirement of [the parallel Federal] Rule 23.1 is a condition precedent to the commencement of a shareholder’s derivative action, and as such is subject to the equitable doctrine of waiver”); Longanecker v. Diamondhead Country Club, 760 So. 2d 764, 768-769 (Miss. 2000) (demand requirement under similar State rule subject to waiver). 17 The complaint did allege the futility of making a demand on 330 Scangas LP based on the assertion that the individual defendants controlled 330 Scan-gas, Inc., the general partner of 330 Scangas LP. | 1 | 1 |
Pupecki v. James Madison Corp.green1 sentence2010Nowhere, however, is there an allegation that demand on the members of SRA would have been futile. 18 In that pretrial memorandum, the defendants did allude to demand futility, but only with reference to the derivative claim the plaintiff sought to bring on behalf of 330 Scangas LP. 19 Had the defendants pressed the issue, the plaintiff no doubt would have argued that demand was excused because the evidence showed that a majority *92 of the members of SRA “were alleged wrongdoers or under the control of such wrongdoers.” See Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 218 (1978). 20 On appe | 1 | 1 |
Forsythe v. Sun Life Financial, Inc.green1 sentence2009See Forsythe v. Sun Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100 , 110 n.13 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Seminaris v. Landagreen1 sentence2004See Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del.Ch. 1995); Rales, supra, 634 A.2d at 936 ; Kaufman, supra, 479 A.2d at 287 ; Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 817-18 . | 1 | 1 |
Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyokegreen1 sentence1996See Spring v. Geriatric Authy. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 289 (1985); Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396 , 432 n.42 (1982); Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 198 . | 1 | 1 |
Farley v. Spraguegreen1 sentence1984For purposes of decision we assume that, under the rule of Farley v. Sprague, 374 Mass. 419, 423-426 (1978), the judge was required to accept the veracity of the defendant’s assertion that his first counsel had undertaken to defend the claim and had failed to do so. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2025That test eschews the demand-waiver principle and instead incorporates "the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial [as] one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right." Commonwealth v. Horne, 362 Mass. 738, 742 (1973), quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 528 . d. 1973(P.530.) Thus, Barker v. Wingo, supra, creates a balancing test which treats the defendant’s failure to assert his speedy trial right as one of the many factors to be considered in the “difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (P. 533.) The rationale in the Barker case compels us to deviate from the strict demand-waiver rule we adopted in Commonwealth v. Marsh, supra, where we held that the defendant waived his speedy trial right despite his motion demanding one because of his failure to bring his motion to the trial court’s attention. | 3 | 1973–2025 |
Harhen v. Brown
green
2 sentences2005Thus, the Court will focus on Harhen v. Brown, 431 Mass. 838 (2000), the SJC’s most recent exposition of the demand requirement under Massachusetts Rule 23.1. 2003The Court is then led to Harhen v. Brown, 431 Mass. 838 (2000), the SJC’s recent exposition of the demand requirement under Rule 23.1. | 3 | 2001–2005 |
Johnston v. Box
green
1 sentence2016“As a result, in Massachusetts, there is no longer a futility exception to the demand requirement, even if the board members are not independent and disinterested.” Johnston v. Box, 453 Mass. 569 , 578 n. 15 (2009). 4 If one or more shareholders bring a derivative proceeding on behalf of a corporation after complying with the statutory demand requirement, the corporation may force dismissal of the action—and thereby regain control over the decision whether to pursue or forego the lawsuit—if the corporation can show “that the shareholders or an appropriate group ‘has determined . . . that the m | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Sonus Networks, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Notwithstanding these pleading requirements, “the substantive requirements of the demand rule are governed by the law of the state of incorporation.” Id., citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Kaufman v. Belmont
green
2 sentences2004See Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del.Ch. 1995); Rales, supra, 634 A.2d at 936 ; Kaufman, supra, 479 A.2d at 287 ; Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 817-18 . 2004See Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del.Ch. 1995); Rales, supra, 634 A.2d at 936 ; Kaufman, supra, 479 A.2d at 287 ; Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 817-18 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Rales v. Blasband Ex Rel. Easco Hand Tools, Inc.
red
2 sentences2004See Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del.Ch. 1995); Rales, supra, 634 A.2d at 936 ; Kaufman, supra, 479 A.2d at 287 ; Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 817-18 . 2004See Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Del.Ch. 1995); Rales, supra, 634 A.2d at 936 ; Kaufman, supra, 479 A.2d at 287 ; Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 817-18 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996See Spring v. Geriatric Authy. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 289 (1985); Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396 , 432 n.42 (1982); Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 198 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996See Spring v. Geriatric Authy. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 289 (1985); Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 396 , 432 n.42 (1982); Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. at 198 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Jessie v. Boynton
green
1 sentence1979However, the record amply demonstrates the basis for the court’s ruling (Jessie v. Boynton, 372 Mass. at 295 ), and it was not necessary to resort to matters outside the pleadings in allowing the motion to dismiss. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Commonwealth v. Lauria
green
1 sentence1973Lauria, 359 Mass. 168 , lend strong support to the Commonwealth’s argument that “[i]n order to be effective and negate an implication of waiver, the demand for trial should be made to the court and not merely the district attorney or the clerk’s office.” We established a strict demand-waiver rule in the Marsh case, supra, which, if followed, would warrant a finding that Horne waived his right to a speedy trial by his failure to present his motion for a speedy trial to a judge. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Commonwealth v. Marsh
green
1 sentence1973(P.530.) Thus, Barker v. Wingo, supra, creates a balancing test which treats the defendant’s failure to assert his speedy trial right as one of the many factors to be considered in the “difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (P. 533.) The rationale in the Barker case compels us to deviate from the strict demand-waiver rule we adopted in Commonwealth v. Marsh, supra, where we held that the defendant waived his speedy trial right despite his motion demanding one because of his failure to bring his motion to the trial court’s attention. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.