demand requirement in Illinois

2004Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 404 .

2004Henrich, 186 Ill.2d at 404 , 238 Ill.Dec. 576 , 712 N.E.2d 298 .

2011Blue Island limited its holding to the facts, finding that "[u]nder these facts and the law as stated in Chapin and Winkelman we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's traverse as to the constitutional issues involved in the delay." Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 412 , 274 N.E.2d 56 . ¶ 53 We note that Blue Island seemed to assume that there was no constitutional problem with a long delay where the landowner shared complicity in the delay.

2011Blue Island limited its holding to the facts, finding that "[u]nder these facts and the law as stated in Chapin and Winkelman we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's traverse as to the constitutional issues involved in the delay." Blue Island, 49 Ill.2d at 412 , 274 N.E.2d 56 . ¶ 53 We note that Blue Island seemed to assume that there was no constitutional problem with a long delay where the landowner shared complicity in the delay.

2006Consequently we see no basis in the argument that the demand for a hearing should start the running of the 30-day period.” Bridges, 83 Ill.

2006Consequently we see no basis in the argument that the demand for a hearing should start the running of the 30-day period." Bridges, 83 Ill.

1999This court has agreed with the view that “ ‘an exemption from a demand or an immunity from prosecution in a suit is as valuable to the one party as the right to the demand or to prosecute the suit is to the other.’ ” Blodgett, 155 Ill. at 449 , quoting Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 630 , 29 L.

1999This court has agreed with the view that "`an exemption from a demand or an immunity from prosecution in a suit is as valuable to the one party as the right to the demand or to prosecute the suit is to the other.'" Blodgett, 155 Ill. at 449 , 40 N.E. 1025 , quoting Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 209, 214 , 29 L.Ed. 483, 487 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.).

1967People v. Cox, 22 Ill2d, 534, 177 NE2d 211 .

1964People v. Cox, 22 Ill2d 534, 177 NE2d 211 .

2021We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff has failed to allege with particularity facts showing that the demand requirement was excused. ¶ 41 That said, even if we were to find that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that demand would have been futile, we still conclude that she failed to state a claim that the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duty. ¶ 42 To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must allege the following: “(1) that a fiduciary duty exists; (2) that the fiduciary duty was breached; and (3) that such breach proximately caused the injury of which

2018App. 3d 898 , 208 Ill.Dec. 586 , 649 N.E.2d 946 (1995), we held that the insurer's refusal to defend its insured was vexatious and unreasonable because the insurer refused the insured's demand for a defense and failed to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its rights and obligations, choosing instead to wait until the insured was forced to institute a declaratory judgment action.

2018App. 3d 898 , 208 Ill.Dec. 586 , 649 N.E.2d 946 (1995), we held that the insurer's refusal to defend its insured was vexatious and unreasonable because the insurer refused the insured's demand for a defense and failed to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its rights and obligations, choosing instead to wait until the insured was forced to institute a declaratory judgment action.

2012Braddock, 906 A.2d at 784 . ¶ 19 B.

2012However, to preserve the balance of control, the shareholder must first demonstrate as a precondition to bringing suit that he made a demand on the corporation to pursue the action and that the demand had been refused or that the demand was “ ‘excused by extraordinary conditions.’ ” Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96 (quoting Ross, 396 U.S. at 534 ). ¶ 17 The demand requirement is not merely a matter of procedure.

2012Rales, 634 A.2d at 936 .

1996As with the Code of Criminal Procedure's similar "speedy-trial" provisions, the 120-day period begins to run when either *1170 party makes a formal demand for trial ( Moore, 99 Ill.App.3d at 667 , 54 Ill.Dec. 917 , 425 N.E.2d 1134 ) by making an affirmative statement in the record indicating the trial demand.

1996As with the Code of Criminal Procedure's similar "speedy-trial" provisions, the 120-day period begins to run when either *1170 party makes a formal demand for trial ( Moore, 99 Ill.App.3d at 667 , 54 Ill.Dec. 917 , 425 N.E.2d 1134 ) by making an affirmative statement in the record indicating the trial demand.

1995Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64 , 82 L.

1995Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64 , 82 L.

1995The plaintiffs rely on Brown v. Tenney (1988), 155 Ill.

1995(See Karris, 72 Ill.

1994The defendants also argued at the motion hearing that the King rationale was applied to an out-of-custody defendant in People v. Howard (1990), 205 Ill.

1990(Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply System (1987), 109 Wash. 2d 107, 153 , 744 P.2d 1032 , 1063.) Thus, a trial court’s determination of whether demand is excused will only be reversed for a manifest abuse of discretion.

1990(Brown, 125 Ill. 2d at 361 , 532 N.E.2d at 235-36 .) The demand requirement is intended to allow the corporation an opportunity to take over a suit brought on its behalf.

1990(Brown, 125 Ill. 2d at 361 , 532 N.E.2d at 235-36 .) The demand requirement is intended to allow the corporation an opportunity to take over a suit brought on its behalf.

1985Konstantelos v. Duncan Traffic Equipment Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 344 , 447 N.E.2d 789 .) The Konstantelos court explained as follows: “If the demand requirement did not exist for *** taxpayer suits, overofficious citizens could frustrate the orderly administration of governmental responsibilities, and such citizens would be encouraged to substitute their discretion for that of those to whom the law has confided that discretion.” 95 Ill. 2d 344, 354 , 447 N.E.2d 789 .

1985Konstantelos v. Duncan Traffic Equipment Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 344 , 447 N.E.2d 789 .) The Konstantelos court explained as follows: “If the demand requirement did not exist for *** taxpayer suits, overofficious citizens could frustrate the orderly administration of governmental responsibilities, and such citizens would be encouraged to substitute their discretion for that of those to whom the law has confided that discretion.” 95 Ill. 2d 344, 354 , 447 N.E.2d 789 .

1984(People v. Jones (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 162 , 417 N.E.2d 1301 .) Based on our review of relevant material, we conclude that notice to the State without filing with the court does not satisfy the statute’s demand requirement.

1984(People v. Jones (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 162 , 417 N.E.2d 1301 .) Based on our review of relevant material, we conclude that notice to the State without filing with the court does not satisfy the statute’s demand requirement.

1981(See People v. Toney (1978), 58 Ill.

1977In Agurs the court concluded that a general request such as the defendant made in this case “really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made.” ( 427 U.S. 97, 106 , 49 L.

1977Ed. 2d 342, 351 , 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 .) The defendant’s demand did not therefore satisfy the demand requirement.

1972The criteria applied in this case appear to equate with the American Bar Association recommended Standard, supra. In People v. Cagle, 41 Ill.2d 528 , 244 N.E.2d 200 , it was held that defendant had been denied due process when the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence (a confession of an alleged accomplice and a police report) requested by the defendant.

1972The criteria applied in this case appear to equate with the American Bar Association recommended Standard, supra. In People v. Cagle, 41 Ill.2d 528 , 244 N.E.2d 200 , it was held that defendant had been denied due process when the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence (a confession of an alleged accomplice and a police report) requested by the defendant.