7 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1867–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence2020Therefore, under our state constitution, a defendant’s speedy trial “demand is effectively made for him.” Id. at 184 , 102 N.E.3d. at 207; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 524 & n.21 (citing Zehrlaut in recognizing Indiana as one of eight states to reject a demand rule). | 1 | 1 |
Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc.green2 sentences2015Retroactive Application [15] The Commission asserts indemnity agreements cannot be retroactively applied, citing Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751, 759 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (“the date of the negligent act causing injury is the date for deciding when an indemnitee should be held responsible to defend or indemnify after a demand or claim is made”). 2015Retroactive Application [15] The Commission asserts indemnity agreements cannot be retroactively applied, citing Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“the date of the negligent act causing injury is the date for deciding when an indemnitee should be held responsible to defend or indemnify after a demand or claim is made”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zehrlaut v. State
green
1 sentence2020Therefore, under our state constitution, a defendant’s speedy trial “demand is effectively made for him.” Id. at 184 , 102 N.E.3d. at 207; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 524 & n.21 (citing Zehrlaut in recognizing Indiana as one of eight states to reject a demand rule). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Creech v. LaPorte Production Credit Ass'n
green
2 sentences1983Therefore, the case at bar is distinguishable from Creech v. LaPorte, (1981) Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 1008 , where we upheld a demand clause because the note in question provided no other specific time for payment, A note which is payable on demand, but which also provides for monthly installment payments, can properly be construed as an installment note. 1983Therefore, the case at bar is distinguishable from Creech v. LaPorte, (1981) Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 1008 , where we upheld a demand clause because the note in question provided no other specific time for payment, A note which is payable on demand, but which also provides for monthly installment payments, can properly be construed as an installment note. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Corbin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Mullins Enterprises, Inc.
green
1 sentence1983Corbin Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Mullins Enterprises, Inc., (1982) Ky.App., 641 S.W.2d 760 ; 11 Am.Jur.2d Bills and Notes § 168. 6 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Stewart
green
2 sentences1982Co. v. Stewart (1919) 248 U.S. 446 , 39 S.Ct. 139 , 63 L.Ed. 350 it was held that where the bill of lading contained a provision that a demand or claim for a loss must be made in writing within ten days, the carrier did not waive such a written notice merely because it had full knowledge of the injuries sustained. 1982Co. v. Stewart (1919) 248 U.S. 446 , 39 S.Ct. 139 , 63 L.Ed. 350 it was held that where the bill of lading contained a provision that a demand or claim for a loss must be made in writing within ten days, the carrier did not waive such a written notice merely because it had full knowledge of the injuries sustained. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
City of Evansville v. Maddox
green
2 sentences1958City of Evansville v. Maddox (1940), 217 Ind. 39 , 25 N. E. 2d 321 ; State ex rel. 1958City of Evansville v. Maddox (1940), 217 Ind. 39 , 25 N. E. 2d 321 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Latta v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences1941The settlement of any claim for the recovery of such insurance between the administrator of the insured and the appellant was governed by the provisions of § 6-912, Burns’ 1933, which read as follows: “Where any debtor of a deceased person shall be unable to pay the whole or any part of the demand or claim of such person, or is insolvent or in doubtful circumstances, or where any legal or equitable defense is alleged against such debt or claim, the executor or administrator, with the approbation of the proper circuit court, or judge thereof in vacation, may compound with such debtor, and give 1941The settlement of any claim for the recovery of such insurance between the administrator of the insured and the appellant was governed by the provisions of § 6-912, Burns’ 1933, which read as follows: “Where any debtor of a deceased person shall be unable to pay the whole or any part of the demand or claim of such person, or is insolvent or in doubtful circumstances, or where any legal or equitable defense is alleged against such debt or claim, the executor or administrator, with the approbation of the proper circuit court, or judge thereof in vacation, may compound with such debtor, and give | 1 | 1941–1941 |
McCleary v. Chipman
neutral
2 sentences1941The settlement of any claim for the recovery of such insurance between the administrator of the insured and the appellant was governed by the provisions of § 6-912, Burns’ 1933, which read as follows: “Where any debtor of a deceased person shall be unable to pay the whole or any part of the demand or claim of such person, or is insolvent or in doubtful circumstances, or where any legal or equitable defense is alleged against such debt or claim, the executor or administrator, with the approbation of the proper circuit court, or judge thereof in vacation, may compound with such debtor, and give 1941The settlement of any claim for the recovery of such insurance between the administrator of the insured and the appellant was governed by the provisions of § 6-912, Burns’ 1933, which read as follows: “Where any debtor of a deceased person shall be unable to pay the whole or any part of the demand or claim of such person, or is insolvent or in doubtful circumstances, or where any legal or equitable defense is alleged against such debt or claim, the executor or administrator, with the approbation of the proper circuit court, or judge thereof in vacation, may compound with such debtor, and give | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Ellwood v. Monk
neutral
1 sentence1867In Ellwood v. Monk, 5 Wend. 235 , the defendant, Jacob Monk, in consideration of property delivered to him by Johannes Monk, undertook and promised to pay and discharge, among the claims of other creditors, the demand and claim of the said Ellwood against the said Johannes. | 1 | 1867–1867 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.