extended rule in Pennsylvania

2017It is this principle that “restrains us from an extended analysis of proportionality save in rare cases.” Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.16, 103 S.Ct. 3001 ); see also Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 626 Pa. 512 , 98 A.3d 1268, 1283 (2014) (recognizing, before conducting a Solem analysis, that “acts passed by the General Assembly are strongly presumed to be constitutional” and “that the legislature has the exclusive power to pronounce which acts are crimes, to define crimes, and to fix the punishment for all crimes”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2017It is this principle that “restrains us from an extended analysis of proportionality save in rare cases.” Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.16, 103 S.Ct. 3001 ); see also Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 626 Pa. 512 , 98 A.3d 1268, 1283 (2014) (recognizing, before conducting a Solem analysis, that “acts passed by the General Assembly are strongly presumed to be constitutional” and “that the legislature has the exclusive power to pronounce which acts are crimes, to define crimes, and to fix the punishment for all crimes”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2015In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 , 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), the Court extended this rule to passengers in a stopped vehicle.

2015In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 , 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), the Court extended this rule to passengers in a stopped vehicle.

2019Pratt , 930 A.2d at 565 .

2016Id.

2015In Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428 (Pa. Super. 2009), this Court extended that rule to encompass circumstances when a statement is filed out of time.

2015Id. at 433 .

1992In light of the facts and of the decisions uncovered by our own research, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the court below: The case before us is one in which the owner of the van had no knowledge of whether he would be reimbursed for operating expenses, contrast Gross, supra; Orcutt, supra; Rykill, supra; State Compensation Ins.

1992While we are aware of the fact that an injunction may not be considered a final order merely *112 because an extended hearing which bore on the merits was held, see Wilkes-Barre Area Education Association v. Wilkes-Barre Area School District, 105 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 165, 523 A.2d 1183 (1987), all things considered, the order in the instant case mandates a permanent injunction.

1991The Griffin Court did not make an extended inquiry into whether reasonable grounds in fact existed in that case because it found that the Wisconsin regulation complied with the fourth amendment and that there were "reasonable grounds" from which the Wisconsin Supreme Court could find that this regulatory standard had been met. 483 U.S. at 880 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 3172 n. 8.

1991The Griffin Court did not make an extended inquiry into whether reasonable grounds in fact existed in that case because it found that the Wisconsin regulation complied with the fourth amendment and that there were "reasonable grounds" from which the Wisconsin Supreme Court could find that this regulatory standard had been met. 483 U.S. at 880 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 3172 n. 8.

1988Finally, the historical overview of the common law of rape and the extended analysis of the interpretation of section 3121(1) and (2) set forth in the Opinion in Support of Affirmance assumes the posture of examining an issue of “first impression.” The interpretation of section 3121(1) and (2) is not, however, an issue of first impression for in Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537 , 510 A.2d 1217 (1986), this Court dealt at length with precisely this issue. 2 In Rhodes , the twenty year old defendant lured the eight year old victim into an abandoned building near a playground and had sexual in

1988Finally, the historical overview of the common law of rape and the extended analysis of the interpretation of section 3121(1) and (2) set forth in the Opinion in Support of Affirmance assumes the posture of examining an issue of “first impression.” The interpretation of section 3121(1) and (2) is not, however, an issue of first impression for in Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537 , 510 A.2d 1217 (1986), this Court dealt at length with precisely this issue. 2 In Rhodes , the twenty year old defendant lured the eight year old victim into an abandoned building near a playground and had sexual in

1987Justice Nix (now Chief Justice), who had been the author of Jones , wrote in dissent in Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978), where the Court extended the rule to “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter, that the enactment of the 1972 Crimes Code afforded an opportunity to reassess the wisdom and utility of the Jones rule and to set it aside.

1987Justice Nix (now Chief Justice), who had been the author of Jones , wrote in dissent in Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495 , 384 A.2d 1197 (1978), where the Court extended the rule to “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter, that the enactment of the 1972 Crimes Code afforded an opportunity to reassess the wisdom and utility of the Jones rule and to set it aside.

1987Appellants incorrectly cite Olbum v. Old Home Manor, Inc., 313 Pa.Super. 99 , 459 A.2d 757 (1983), in support of their argument that the doctrine of supervening frustration applies in the instant matter.

1987Appellants incorrectly cite Olbum v. Old Home Manor, Inc., 313 Pa.Super. 99 , 459 A.2d 757 (1983), in support of their argument that the doctrine of supervening frustration applies in the instant matter.

1980See United States v. 534.28 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Huntington County, 442 F.Supp. 82 (M.D.Pa.1977); Silver v. Television City, Inc., 207 Pa.Super. 150 , 215 A.2d 335 (1965).

1980See United States v. 534.28 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Huntington County, 442 F.Supp. 82 (M.D.Pa.1977); Silver v. Television City, Inc., 207 Pa.Super. 150 , 215 A.2d 335 (1965).

1970Section 1201, subsection 3a, provides as follows: “When authorized by the Board of Adjustment as a special exception, a non-conforming use of a building or land may be changed to another non-conforming use, provided that: “(1) The new non-conforming use shall be a permitted use in the zoning district in which the original non-conforming use is listed as a permitted use.” We axe not xequixed to make an extended analysis of the zoning ordinance in order to determine whether the proposed new nonconforming use is permitted in the zoning district in which the original nonconforming use is listed as

1970Section 1201, subsection 3a, provides as follows: “When authorized by the Board of Adjustment as a special exception, a non-conforming use of a building or land may be changed to another non-conforming use, provided that: “(1) The new non-conforming use shall be a permitted use in the zoning district in which the original non-conforming use is listed as a permitted use.” We axe not xequixed to make an extended analysis of the zoning ordinance in order to determine whether the proposed new nonconforming use is permitted in the zoning district in which the original nonconforming use is listed as

1959There is also an extended analysis, supporting the position of the court below, in Thomas v. McLean Coal Co., 79 Pa. D. & C. 492 .

1953Uhler v. Burke, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 108, 115 , 91 A. 2d 913, 916 , is equally appropriate here: “The present record discloses that ... an extended hearing was held at which relator was given full opportunity to establish his averments; and that the hearing judge in his opinion gave a detailed and comprehensive review of the proceedings which clearly warrant the refusal of a writ of habeas corpus.” Qrder affirmed

1953Uhler v. Burke, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 108, 115 , 91 A. 2d 913, 916 , is equally appropriate here: “The present record discloses that ... an extended hearing was held at which relator was given full opportunity to establish his averments; and that the hearing judge in his opinion gave a detailed and comprehensive review of the proceedings which clearly warrant the refusal of a writ of habeas corpus.” Qrder affirmed

1936To what extent there shall be competition in the intrastate transportation of freight and merchandise by common carrier is largely a matter of policy, which the legislature has committed to the Public Service Commission and the question is, for the most part, an administrative one, that must be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the commission; and its decision, if based on competent and relevant evidence, will not be disturbed by this court unless we are convinced that it is unreasonable or not in conformity with law: Collins v. P. S. C., 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 58 ; Marcus Hook Boro. v

1936To what extent there shall be competition in the intrastate transportation of freight and merchandise by common carrier is largely a matter of policy, which the legislature has committed to the Public Service Commission and the question is, for the most part, an administrative one, that must be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the commission; and its decision, if based on competent and relevant evidence, will not be disturbed by this court unless we are convinced that it is unreasonable or not in conformity with law: Collins v. P. S. C., 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 58 ; Marcus Hook Boro. v

1936To what extent there shall be competition in the intrastate transportation of freight and merchandise by common carrier is largely a matter of policy, which the legislature has committed to the Public Service Commission and the question is, for the most part, an administrative one, that must be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the commission; and its decision, if based on competent and relevant evidence, will not be disturbed by this court unless we are convinced that it is unreasonable or not in conformity with law: Collins v. P. S. C., 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 58 ; Marcus Hook Boro. v

1936To what extent there shall be competition in the intrastate transportation of freight and merchandise by common carrier is largely a matter of policy, which the legislature has committed to the Public Service Commission and the question is, for the most part, an administrative one, that must be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the commission; and its decision, if based on competent and relevant evidence, will not be disturbed by this court unless we are convinced that it is unreasonable or not in conformity with law: Collins v. P. S. C., 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 58 ; Marcus Hook Boro. v

1936To what extent there shall be competition in the intrastate transportation of freight and merchandise by common carrier is largely a matter of policy, which the legislature has committed to the Public Service Commission and the question is, for the most part, an administrative one, that must be left to the sound judgment and discretion of the commission; and its decision, if based on competent and relevant evidence, will not be disturbed by this court unless we are convinced that it is unreasonable or not in conformity with law: Collins v. P. S. C., 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 58 ; Marcus Hook Boro. v