extended rule in Michigan

2018“Error requiring reversal may only be predicated on the trial court’s actions and not upon alleged error to which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 210 ; 670 NW2d 675 (2003).

2018“Error requiring reversal may only be predicated on the trial court’s actions and not upon alleged error to which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 210 ; 670 NW2d 675 (2003).

2017In addition, in Froling v Carpenter, 203 Mich App 368 ; 512 NW2d 6 (1994), this Court extended the doctrine to “communications made by a public official in furtherance of an official duty during proceedings of subordinate legislative and quasi-legislative bodies.” Kefgen, 241 Mich App at 618 , citing Froling, 203 Mich App at 368 (emphasis added).

2017In addition, in Froling v Carpenter, 203 Mich App 368 ; 512 NW2d 6 (1994), this Court extended the doctrine to “communications made by a public official in furtherance of an official duty during proceedings of subordinate legislative and quasi-legislative bodies.” Kefgen, 241 Mich App at 618 , citing Froling, 203 Mich App at 368 (emphasis added).

2015The Court extended the rule of Apprendi to facts that increase “mandatory minimum” sentences because “there is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the [mandatory] minimum. . . .” Id. at_; 133 S Ct at 2163 .

2015The Court extended the rule of Apprendi to facts that increase “mandatory minimum” sentences because “there is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the [mandatory] minimum. . . .” Id. at_; 133 S Ct at 2163 .

2004Subsequently, this Court refused to extend the doctrine to cases involving products liability actions seeking damages for personal injury, see Asher v Exxon Co, USA, 200 Mich App 635, 639-641 ; 504 NW2d 728 (1993), and in Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass’n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 341 ; 568 NW2d 847 (1997), the Court declined to extend the doctrine to negligence claims.

2004Subsequently, this Court refused to extend the doctrine to cases involving products liability actions seeking damages for personal injury, see Asher v Exxon Co, USA, 200 Mich App 635, 639-641 ; 504 NW2d 728 (1993), and in Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass’n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 341 ; 568 NW2d 847 (1997), the Court declined to extend the doctrine to negligence claims.

2004In Sumner, supra at 510 , the Supreme Court extended the doctrine to cases involving civil rights claims, and this Court extended the doctrine to claims of nuisance in Moore v City of Pontiac, 143 Mich App 610, 614 ; 372 NW2d 627 (1985).

2004In Sumner, supra at 510 , the Supreme Court extended the doctrine to cases involving civil rights claims, and this Court extended the doctrine to claims of nuisance in Moore v City of Pontiac, 143 Mich App 610, 614 ; 372 NW2d 627 (1985).

2004In Sumner, supra at 510 , the Supreme Court extended the doctrine to cases involving civil rights claims, and this Court extended the doctrine to claims of nuisance in Moore v City of Pontiac, 143 Mich App 610, 614 ; 372 NW2d 627 (1985).

2004Subsequently, this Court refused to extend the doctrine to cases involving products liability actions seeking damages for personal injury, see Asher v Exxon Co, USA, 200 Mich App 635, 639-641 ; 504 NW2d 728 (1993), and in Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass’n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 341 ; 568 NW2d 847 (1997), the Court declined to extend the doctrine to negligence claims.

2004Subsequently, this Court refused to extend the doctrine to cases involving products liability actions seeking damages for personal injury, see Asher v Exxon Co, USA, 200 Mich App 635, 639-641 ; 504 NW2d 728 (1993), and in Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass’n v Douglas Co, 224 Mich App 335, 341 ; 568 NW2d 847 (1997), the Court declined to extend the doctrine to negligence claims.

2002Id. at 270-288 .

2001In In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 592 ; 528 NW2d 799 (1995), this Court extended the doctrine of anticipatory neglect “to guarantee the protection of a child who is not yet bom, i.e., because of the past conduct of another person, there is good reason to fear that the second child, when bom, will also be neglected or abused.” The current version of the statute requires petitioner to commence proceedings against parents who in the past have had their parental rights terminated, voluntarily or otherwise. 1 The Legislature therefore effectively codified the doctrine of anticipatory neglect and t

2001In In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 592 ; 528 NW2d 799 (1995), this Court extended the doctrine of anticipatory neglect “to guarantee the protection of a child who is not yet bom, i.e., because of the past conduct of another person, there is good reason to fear that the second child, when bom, will also be neglected or abused.” The current version of the statute requires petitioner to commence proceedings against parents who in the past have had their parental rights terminated, voluntarily or otherwise. 1 The Legislature therefore effectively codified the doctrine of anticipatory neglect and t

1996In People v Mann, 49 Mich App 454, 463 ; 212 NW2d 282 (1973), a case relied heavily upon by the prosecutor, this Court extended this waiver rule, without explanation, to a case wherein the defendant claimed that he was denied due process because the petit jury array may have excluded an allegedly substantial class of the community.

1996In People v Mann, 49 Mich App 454, 463 ; 212 NW2d 282 (1973), a case relied heavily upon by the prosecutor, this Court extended this waiver rule, without explanation, to a case wherein the defendant claimed that he was denied due process because the petit jury array may have excluded an allegedly substantial class of the community.

1996Nevertheless, in Weymers v Khera, 210 Mich App 231, 236 ; 533 NW2d 334 (1995), lv gtd 451 Mich 898 (1996), this Court extended the rule of law established in Falcon (in the limited number of still-viable causes of action arising before the effective date of the legislation nullifying Falcon) to situations involving physical harm.

1996Nevertheless, in Weymers v Khera, 210 Mich App 231, 236 ; 533 NW2d 334 (1995), lv gtd 451 Mich 898 (1996), this Court extended the rule of law established in Falcon (in the limited number of still-viable causes of action arising before the effective date of the legislation nullifying Falcon) to situations involving physical harm.

1989This Court, from which Jackson was appealed, held that the defendant’s request for counsel at his arraignment implicated only his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Bladel, supra, p 52 , relying on the holding in Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 298 ; 100 S Ct 1682 ; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980), that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when an accused is in custody and is subjected to interrogation.

1989This Court, from which Jackson was appealed, held that the defendant’s request for counsel at his arraignment implicated only his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Bladel, supra, p 52 , relying on the holding in Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 298 ; 100 S Ct 1682 ; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980), that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when an accused is in custody and is subjected to interrogation.

1985In Schindler v Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F2d 341, 343-344 (CA 7, 1983), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has written an excellent summary of the law concluding with Baldasar: "We commence our analysis with Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109 ; 88 S Ct 258 ; 19 L Ed 2d 319 (1967), in which the Court extended the rule established in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 ; 83 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment applies in all state felony proceedings, 'making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a lawyer o

1985In Schindler v Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F2d 341, 343-344 (CA 7, 1983), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has written an excellent summary of the law concluding with Baldasar: "We commence our analysis with Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109 ; 88 S Ct 258 ; 19 L Ed 2d 319 (1967), in which the Court extended the rule established in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 ; 83 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment applies in all state felony proceedings, 'making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a lawyer o

1985In Schindler v Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F2d 341, 343-344 (CA 7, 1983), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has written an excellent summary of the law concluding with Baldasar: "We commence our analysis with Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109 ; 88 S Ct 258 ; 19 L Ed 2d 319 (1967), in which the Court extended the rule established in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 ; 83 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment applies in all state felony proceedings, 'making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a lawyer o

1985In Schindler v Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F2d 341, 343-344 (CA 7, 1983), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has written an excellent summary of the law concluding with Baldasar: "We commence our analysis with Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109 ; 88 S Ct 258 ; 19 L Ed 2d 319 (1967), in which the Court extended the rule established in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 ; 83 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment applies in all state felony proceedings, 'making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a lawyer o

1982Gaylord v Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich 273, 291-294 ; 144 NW2d 460 (1966); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346 , 380 Mich 554, 563-564 ; 158 NW2d 416 (1968); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295 , 1976 PA 297 , 401 Mich 686, 701-703 ; 259 NW2d 129 (1977).

1982Gaylord v Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich 273, 291-294 ; 144 NW2d 460 (1966); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346 , 380 Mich 554, 563-564 ; 158 NW2d 416 (1968); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295 , 1976 PA 297 , 401 Mich 686, 701-703 ; 259 NW2d 129 (1977).

1982Gaylord v Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich 273, 291-294 ; 144 NW2d 460 (1966); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346 , 380 Mich 554, 563-564 ; 158 NW2d 416 (1968); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295 , 1976 PA 297 , 401 Mich 686, 701-703 ; 259 NW2d 129 (1977).

1982Gaylord v Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich 273, 291-294 ; 144 NW2d 460 (1966); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346 , 380 Mich 554, 563-564 ; 158 NW2d 416 (1968); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295 , 1976 PA 297 , 401 Mich 686, 701-703 ; 259 NW2d 129 (1977).

1982Gaylord v Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich 273, 291-294 ; 144 NW2d 460 (1966); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346 , 380 Mich 554, 563-564 ; 158 NW2d 416 (1968); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295 , 1976 PA 297 , 401 Mich 686, 701-703 ; 259 NW2d 129 (1977).

1982Gaylord v Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich 273, 291-294 ; 144 NW2d 460 (1966); Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1966 PA 346 , 380 Mich 554, 563-564 ; 158 NW2d 416 (1968); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 295 , 1976 PA 297 , 401 Mich 686, 701-703 ; 259 NW2d 129 (1977).

1972"The case differs from Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich 584 (1882), where a medical book was produced to contradict a witness who professed to be testifying from it.” The Court thus extended the doctrine of People v Hall which dealt with substantive evidence on direct examination to cases involving cross-examination without any discussion as to whether the reasoning should apply in such situation.

1972"The case differs from Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich 584 (1882), where a medical book was produced to contradict a witness who professed to be testifying from it." The Court thus extended the doctrine of People v Hall which dealt with substantive evidence on direct examination to cases involving cross-examination without any discussion as to whether the reasoning should apply in such situation.

1972The next case dealing with this issue was People v Millard, 53 Mich 63 (1884).

1972The next case dealing with this issue was People v Millard, 53 Mich 63 (1884).

1950It is also the rule that courts will not make restrictions, see Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich 90 , nor have we the right to lift or modify restrictions at the expense of or to the damage of other property holders, see Taylor Avenue Improvement Ass’n v. Detroit Trust Co., supra. Restrictions have been held unenforceable under conditions where the enforcing party is guilty of laches which is more than mere lapse of time, see Harrigan v. Mulcare, 313 Mich 594 ; where there has been an extended violation within the restricted area, amounting to an abandonment, see Smith v. Nickoloff, 283 Mich 188 ;

1950It is also the rule that courts will not make restrictions, see Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich 90 , nor have we the right to lift or modify restrictions at the expense of or to the damage of other property holders, see Taylor Avenue Improvement Ass’n v. Detroit Trust Co., supra. Restrictions have been held unenforceable under conditions where the enforcing party is guilty of laches which is more than mere lapse of time, see Harrigan v. Mulcare, 313 Mich 594 ; where there has been an extended violation within the restricted area, amounting to an abandonment, see Smith v. Nickoloff, 283 Mich 188 ;

1950It is also the rule that courts will not make restrictions, see Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich 90 , nor have we the right to lift or modify restrictions at the expense of or to the damage of other property holders, see Taylor Avenue Improvement Ass’n v. Detroit Trust Co., supra. Restrictions have been held unenforceable under conditions where the enforcing party is guilty of laches which is more than mere lapse of time, see Harrigan v. Mulcare, 313 Mich 594 ; where there has been an extended violation within the restricted area, amounting to an abandonment, see Smith v. Nickoloff, 283 Mich 188 ;

1950It is also the rule that courts will not make restrictions, see Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich 90 , nor have we the right to lift or modify restrictions at the expense of or to the damage of other property holders, see Taylor Avenue Improvement Ass’n v. Detroit Trust Co., supra. Restrictions have been held unenforceable under conditions where the enforcing party is guilty of laches which is more than mere lapse of time, see Harrigan v. Mulcare, 313 Mich 594 ; where there has been an extended violation within the restricted area, amounting to an abandonment, see Smith v. Nickoloff, 283 Mich 188 ;

1950It is also the rule that courts will not make restrictions, see Lemmon v. Wineland, 255 Mich 90 , nor have we the right to lift or modify restrictions at the expense of or to the damage of other property holders, see Taylor Avenue Improvement Ass’n v. Detroit Trust Co., supra. Restrictions have been held unenforceable under conditions where the enforcing party is guilty of laches which is more than mere lapse of time, see Harrigan v. Mulcare, 313 Mich 594 ; where there has been an extended violation within the restricted area, amounting to an abandonment, see Smith v. Nickoloff, 283 Mich 188 ;

1950In Northwestern Home Owners’ Ass’n v. Sheehan, 310 Mich 188 , we held that if the restrictions are of real value to those who seek to enforce them, they should be preserved.