extended analysis in Ohio

2005Helms v. American Legion, Inc. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 60 , 213 N.E.2d 734 , syllabus.

1981In the later case of Helms v. American Legion, Inc., (1966), 5 Ohio St. 2d 60 , the court extended the rule to privately owned or occupied properties.

2024In doing so, the court extended the rule announced in Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2007-Ohio-1533 , 863 N.E.2d 1024 , which stated that “[a]n uncounseled conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty for a later conviction if the earlier conviction resulted in a sentence of confinement.” Brooke at ¶ 12.

2024In doing so, the court extended the rule announced in Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2007-Ohio-1533 , 863 N.E.2d 1024 , which stated that “[a]n uncounseled conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty for a later conviction if the earlier conviction resulted in a sentence of confinement.” Brooke at ¶ 12.

2013State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1, ¶23 .

2013State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1, ¶23 .

2010Co. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 209, 212 , 744 N.E.2d 154 , the court extended the exception recognized in Moskovitz to attorney-client communications furthering an insurance company’s lack of good faith in denying coverage, holding such communications to be “unworthy of protection” by the attorney-client privilege.

2010Co. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 209, 212 , 744 N.E.2d 154 , the court extended the exception recognized in Moskovitz to attorney-client communications furthering an insurance company’s lack of good faith in denying coverage, holding such communications to be “unworthy of protection” by the attorney-client privilege.

2006State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64 , 67 . {¶ 28} Accordingly, the standard we must apply is, "in a criminal case, where the record affirmatively shows that a trial court has been fully apprised of the correct law governing a material issue in dispute, and the requesting party has been unsuccessful in obtaining the inclusion of that law in the trial court's charge to the jury, such party does not waive his objections to the court's charge by failing to formally object thereto." Id.

2006State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64 , 67 . {¶ 28} Accordingly, the standard we must apply is, "in a criminal case, where the record affirmatively shows that a trial court has been fully apprised of the correct law governing a material issue in dispute, and the requesting party has been unsuccessful in obtaining the inclusion of that law in the trial court's charge to the jury, such party does not waive his objections to the court's charge by failing to formally object thereto." Id.

1990Adomeit, supra. We have recently provided an extended analysis on this issue in Kasputis v. Blystone (Apr. 20, 1990), Ashtabula App. No. 88-A-1416, unreported.

1990In Hudson v. Palmer (1984), 468 U.S. 517 , the court extended this analysis to alleged intentional deprivations of property without due process of law. “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available.

1990For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 533 .

1987An extended analysis of the fair-and-substantial-relation test as applied to a malpractice statute of repose is contained in Carson v. Maurer (N.H. 1980), 424 A. 2d 825 , and in Kenyon v. Hammer (1984), 142 Ariz. 69 , 688 P. 2d 961 .

1987An extended analysis of the fair-and-substantial-relation test as applied to a malpractice statute of repose is contained in Carson v. Maurer (N.H. 1980), 424 A. 2d 825 , and in Kenyon v. Hammer (1984), 142 Ariz. 69 , 688 P. 2d 961 .

1987An extended analysis of the fair-and-substantial-relation test as applied to a malpractice statute of repose is contained in Carson v. Maurer (N.H. 1980), 424 A. 2d 825 , and in Kenyon v. Hammer (1984), 142 Ariz. 69 , 688 P. 2d 961 .

1957In In re Fortune (1941), 138 Ohio St., 385 , 35 N. E. (2d), 442, the court extended the principle of the Underwood case to include police regulations.

1898Sup.) 31 Atlantic, 1024, it was held: “An action at law may be maintained in this state (New .Tersey) upon a decree for alimony made in New York if the New York court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant.” Precisely the same rule was enunciated in Brisbane v. Dobson, 50 Mo. App., 170 by a court of Missouri, the state in which the judgment herein sued on was rendered.

1898In Blecknell v. Blecknell, 110 Ind., 42 , ( 10 N. E., 414 ) the same court extended the doctrine and held a judgment for alimony to be a debt of record, on which suit may be brought in the same, “or any other court of competent jurisdiction. ” So in the case of Bullock v. Bullock, (N. Y.

1898In Blecknell v. Blecknell, 110 Ind., 42 , ( 10 N. E., 414 ) the same court extended the doctrine and held a judgment for alimony to be a debt of record, on which suit may be brought in the same, “or any other court of competent jurisdiction. ” So in the case of Bullock v. Bullock, (N. Y.