53 California opinions name it 4 courts 1934–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 492 ; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 86, 90 (McMillan).) The Supreme Court had signaled its rejection of this distinction in a federal prosecution where it held that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U. S. 227, 243, fn. 6 .) In Apprendi it reaffirmed 2016(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 492 ; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 86, 90 (McMillan).) The Supreme Court had signaled its rejection of this distinction in a federal prosecution where it held that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U. S. 227, 243, fn. 6 .) In Apprendi it reaffirmed | 2 | 2 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2016(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 492 ; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 86, 90 (McMillan).) The Supreme Court had signaled its rejection of this distinction in a federal prosecution where it held that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U. S. 227, 243, fn. 6 .) In Apprendi it reaffirmed 2016(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 492 ; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 86, 90 (McMillan).) The Supreme Court had signaled its rejection of this distinction in a federal prosecution where it held that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U. S. 227, 243, fn. 6 .) In Apprendi it reaffirmed | 2 | 2 |
McMillan v. Pennsylvaniared2 sentences2016(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 492 ; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 86, 90 (McMillan).) The Supreme Court had signaled its rejection of this distinction in a federal prosecution where it held that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U. S. 227, 243, fn. 6 .) In Apprendi it reaffirmed 2016(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 492 ; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 86, 90 (McMillan).) The Supreme Court had signaled its rejection of this distinction in a federal prosecution where it held that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U. S. 227, 243, fn. 6 .) In Apprendi it reaffirmed | 2 | 2 |
Carbone v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1953Carol urges that the evidence was properly excluded for the reasons stated by the trial court and also urges that, regardless of the correctness of those stated grounds, once a ceremonial marriage is established then "in any and all events under those circumstances she is entitled to alimony pendente lite." [1] It may be stated as a general rule that ordinarily if a ceremonial marriage is shown, and if the ceremony is followed by the assumption of marital relations, no further proof of the fact of marriage need be made in preliminary proceedings in order to sustain an award of temporary alimon 1953Carol urges that the evidence was properly excluded for the reasons stated by the trial court and also urges that, regardless of the correctness of those stated grounds, once a ceremonial marriage is established then "in any and all events under those circumstances she is entitled to alimony pendente lite." [1] It may be stated as a general rule that ordinarily if a ceremonial marriage is shown, and if the ceremony is followed by the assumption of marital relations, no further proof of the fact of marriage need be made in preliminary proceedings in order to sustain an award of temporary alimon | 2 | 2 |
Colbert v. Colbertgreen2 sentences1961Fundamentally, as declared in Colbert v. Colbert (1946), 28 Cal.2d 276, 279 [ 169 P.2d 633 ], ‘The existence of the marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the right of the court to order support, costs, and counsel fees pendente lite in an action for divorce or separate maintenance. [Citations.] And the invalidity of the marriage, as is true of any jurisdictional prerequisite, may be shown at any time. ’ And as pointed out in Carbone v. Superior Court (1941), 18 Cal.2d 768, 771-772 [ 117 P.2d 872 , 136 A.L.R,. 1260], ‘Even though the defendant in an action for divorce denies the existen 1953Carol urges that the evidence was properly excluded for the reasons stated by the trial court and also urges that, regardless of the correctness of those stated grounds, once a ceremonial marriage is established then "in any and all events under those circumstances she is entitled to alimony pendente lite." [1] It may be stated as a general rule that ordinarily if a ceremonial marriage is shown, and if the ceremony is followed by the assumption of marital relations, no further proof of the fact of marriage need be made in preliminary proceedings in order to sustain an award of temporary alimon | 2 | 2 |
People v. Salazargreen1 sentence2026(People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424 [“ ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had 16 been aware that it had such discretion” ’ ”].) As such, we discern no error requiring remand. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2026(People v. Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700 [when the trier of fact finds “true the facts supporting a section 12022.53(d) enhancement, and the court determines that the section 12022.53(d) enhancement should be struck or dismissed under section 12022.53(h), the court may, under section 12022.53(j), impose an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c)”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390 [“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing law”].) In addition, the court’s extended analysis discussed above, balancing the trauma su | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Idaho v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eby v. Chaskingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morrissey v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Robersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guarantee Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Elmore v. American Motors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Santiagogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Brisendinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Murchison.green | 1 | 1 |
| Peters v. Kiffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glasser v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2021(Orozco, at pp. 808–809.) 29 The court in Orozco concluded, after an extended analysis of Perkins and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 , that “California courts have uniformly come to the conclusion that Perkins controls when a suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel but later speaks with someone he does not know is an agent of the police. 2021(Orozco, at pp. 808–809.) 29 The court in Orozco concluded, after an extended analysis of Perkins and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 , that “California courts have uniformly come to the conclusion that Perkins controls when a suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel but later speaks with someone he does not know is an agent of the police. | 3 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Plyler
green
2 sentences2021That was the holding of Guilmette, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541 and Plyler [(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535 , 544–545].” (Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 .) Ray acknowledges Orozco, Guilmette and Plyler but goes on to contend that the “Perkins operation” in this case violated one of the main underpinnings of the Miranda warning—“to act as a check against coercive police activity.” Orozco provides an apt answer to this contention: “Lastly, defendant argues that the police engaged in a ‘persistent, underhanded attempt . . . to obtain a confession’ by blatantly disregarding his repeate 2021That was the holding of Guilmette, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541 and Plyler [(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535 , 544–545].” (Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 .) Ray acknowledges Orozco, Guilmette and Plyler but goes on to contend that the “Perkins operation” in this case violated one of the main underpinnings of the Miranda warning—“to act as a check against coercive police activity.” Orozco provides an apt answer to this contention: “Lastly, defendant argues that the police engaged in a ‘persistent, underhanded attempt . . . to obtain a confession’ by blatantly disregarding his repeate | 3 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Guilmette
green
2 sentences2021That was the holding of Guilmette, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541 and Plyler [(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535 , 544–545].” (Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 .) Ray acknowledges Orozco, Guilmette and Plyler but goes on to contend that the “Perkins operation” in this case violated one of the main underpinnings of the Miranda warning—“to act as a check against coercive police activity.” Orozco provides an apt answer to this contention: “Lastly, defendant argues that the police engaged in a ‘persistent, underhanded attempt . . . to obtain a confession’ by blatantly disregarding his repeate 2021That was the holding of Guilmette, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541 and Plyler [(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535 , 544–545].” (Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 .) Ray acknowledges Orozco, Guilmette and Plyler but goes on to contend that the “Perkins operation” in this case violated one of the main underpinnings of the Miranda warning—“to act as a check against coercive police activity.” Orozco provides an apt answer to this contention: “Lastly, defendant argues that the police engaged in a ‘persistent, underhanded attempt . . . to obtain a confession’ by blatantly disregarding his repeate | 3 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Orozco
green
2 sentences2021That was the holding of Guilmette, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541 and Plyler [(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535 , 544–545].” (Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 .) Ray acknowledges Orozco, Guilmette and Plyler but goes on to contend that the “Perkins operation” in this case violated one of the main underpinnings of the Miranda warning—“to act as a check against coercive police activity.” Orozco provides an apt answer to this contention: “Lastly, defendant argues that the police engaged in a ‘persistent, underhanded attempt . . . to obtain a confession’ by blatantly disregarding his repeate 2021That was the holding of Guilmette, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541 and Plyler [(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535 , 544–545].” (Orozco, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 .) Ray acknowledges Orozco, Guilmette and Plyler but goes on to contend that the “Perkins operation” in this case violated one of the main underpinnings of the Miranda warning—“to act as a check against coercive police activity.” Orozco provides an apt answer to this contention: “Lastly, defendant argues that the police engaged in a ‘persistent, underhanded attempt . . . to obtain a confession’ by blatantly disregarding his repeate | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywood
green
2 sentences2017"While some conclusions may require an extended analysis to justify them, others are so simple they are almost self-explanatory." ( Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywood (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1745 , 1754, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 .) The challenged statement is in the latter category, and the self-explanatory designs adequately demonstrate that retaining the 9080 Building would preclude construction of, at least, the Gateway Building. *1039 The Conservancy challenges the EIR's use of estimates in calculating the reduction in usable square footage. 2017"While some conclusions may require an extended analysis to justify them, others are so simple they are almost self-explanatory." ( Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West Hollywood (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1745 , 1754, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 308 .) The challenged statement is in the latter category, and the self-explanatory designs adequately demonstrate that retaining the 9080 Building would preclude construction of, at least, the Gateway Building. *1039 The Conservancy challenges the EIR's use of estimates in calculating the reduction in usable square footage. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Alleyne v. United States
green
2 sentences2016(Alleyne v. United States (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [ 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 ], overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545 .) At its core Apprendi is concerned with the trial of facts that are constitutionally indistinguishable from elements of the crime. 2016(Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. _ [ 186 L.Ed.2d 314 , 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 ], overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ].) At its core Apprendi is concerned with the trial of facts that are constitutionally indistinguishable from elements of the crime. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Harris v. United States
red
2 sentences2016(Alleyne v. United States (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [ 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 ], overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545 .) At its core Apprendi is concerned with the trial of facts that are constitutionally indistinguishable from elements of the crime. 2016(Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. _ [ 186 L.Ed.2d 314 , 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 ], overruling Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ].) At its core Apprendi is concerned with the trial of facts that are constitutionally indistinguishable from elements of the crime. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Foothill Federal Credit Union v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026An extended analysis of this proposition is not necessary because “the litigation privilege bars a privacy cause of action whether labeled as based on common law, statute, or Constitution.” (Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 962 .) 13 In Foothill, the plaintiffs asserted claims of IIED and invasion of privacy against a bank whose response to a subpoena for records included personal financial documents that had not been requested. ( Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 635–636.) The Court of Appeal held that this production was a communicative act protected by the litigation privilege even t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jacob B. v. County of Shasta
green
1 sentence2026An extended analysis of this proposition is not necessary because “the litigation privilege bars a privacy cause of action whether labeled as based on common law, statute, or Constitution.” (Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 962 .) 13 In Foothill, the plaintiffs asserted claims of IIED and invasion of privacy against a bank whose response to a subpoena for records included personal financial documents that had not been requested. ( Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 635–636.) The Court of Appeal held that this production was a communicative act protected by the litigation privilege even t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence2025XIII, § 19.) The California Supreme Court has, to some extent, already answered this question, construing this constitutional provision in an extended analysis, with unambiguous language addressing the dispositive point.6 In ITT a unanimous high court announced: article XIII, section 19 “specifies that public utility property, after it has been placed on the local tax rolls,” must “be levied on at the same rate as locally assessed property.” (ITT, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 870 .) “[I]nstead of being subject to a special gross 6 In preparing this dissent, I noticed that the sentence you’ve just re | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Villatoro
green
2 sentences2024The extended analysis of the issue by Villatoro aside ( Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1159–1167), Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) requires us to approve of the use of propensity evidence when it comes to sexual offenses. “[I]n a sex offense case, as here, the Legislature has made the careful determination that evidence the defendant committed one or more sex offenses may be properly considered pursuant to [Evidence Code] section 1108.” (Villatoro, at p. 1165.) Given that the propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute among the general public, evidence that 2024(Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1164 .) The court retains the power to exclude such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 if it finds that it poses a substantial danger of undue prejudice. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2021(See Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 782 .) Its long history “virtually precludes us from finding it impermissibly vague at this late date.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 534 ; People v. Bamba (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1122 .) That the assault law has required continued clarification does not make it unconstitutionally vague. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wright
green
1 sentence2021(Stats. 1850, ch. 99, § 49, p. 234.)” (People v. Wright (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 714 .) Although Weith engages in an extended analysis tracing the evolution of the assault law, discussing cases ranging as far back as 1856, the assault statute has remained unchanged since its inception. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Bamba
green
1 sentence2021(See Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 782 .) Its long history “virtually precludes us from finding it impermissibly vague at this late date.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 534 ; People v. Bamba (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1122 .) That the assault law has required continued clarification does not make it unconstitutionally vague. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2021(See Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 782 .) Its long history “virtually precludes us from finding it impermissibly vague at this late date.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 534 ; People v. Bamba (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1122 .) That the assault law has required continued clarification does not make it unconstitutionally vague. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Preservation Action Council v. City of San Jose
green
2 sentences2017It relies on Preservation Action , supra , 141 Cal.App.4th 1336 , 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 . 2017It relies on Preservation Action , supra , 141 Cal.App.4th 1336 , 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans
green
2 sentences2017According to the high court, " 'piecemeal' litigation" of claims the parties have agreed to arbitrate and claims they have not agreed to arbitrate is consistent with the FAA. ( Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213 , 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238 , 84 L.Ed.2d 158 .) In Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at page 1088, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 , this court extended this principle to piecemeal litigation of "arbitrable and inarbitrable remedies derived from the same statutory claim." We therefore reject Citibank's assertion that " post- arbitration judicial or other procedures" to resol 2017According to the high court, " 'piecemeal' litigation" of claims the parties have agreed to arbitrate and claims they have not agreed to arbitrate is consistent with the FAA. ( Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213 , 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238 , 84 L.Ed.2d 158 .) In Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at page 1088, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 , this court extended this principle to piecemeal litigation of "arbitrable and inarbitrable remedies derived from the same statutory claim." We therefore reject Citibank's assertion that " post- arbitration judicial or other procedures" to resol | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2017DISCUSSION In People v. Rodriguez , the California Supreme Court held that under section 1170.1, subdivision (f), when a crime qualifies as a violent felony solely because the defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of that felony, the personal use can support either a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) or a violent-felony gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), but not both. 7 ( People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501 , 509, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 213 P.3d 647 ( Rodriguez ).) In Le , the court extended the rule to serious-felony gang enhancements (subd. (b)(1)(B)). 2017DISCUSSION In People v. Rodriguez , the California Supreme Court held that under section 1170.1, subdivision (f), when a crime qualifies as a violent felony solely because the defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of that felony, the personal use can support either a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) or a violent-felony gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), but not both. 7 ( People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501 , 509, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 213 P.3d 647 ( Rodriguez ).) In Le , the court extended the rule to serious-felony gang enhancements (subd. (b)(1)(B)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd
green
2 sentences2017According to the high court, " 'piecemeal' litigation" of claims the parties have agreed to arbitrate and claims they have not agreed to arbitrate is consistent with the FAA. ( Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213 , 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238 , 84 L.Ed.2d 158 .) In Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at page 1088, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 , this court extended this principle to piecemeal litigation of "arbitrable and inarbitrable remedies derived from the same statutory claim." We therefore reject Citibank's assertion that " post- arbitration judicial or other procedures" to resol 2017According to the high court, " 'piecemeal' litigation" of claims the parties have agreed to arbitrate and claims they have not agreed to arbitrate is consistent with the FAA. ( Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213 , 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238 , 84 L.Ed.2d 158 .) In Broughton , supra , 21 Cal.4th at page 1088, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 , this court extended this principle to piecemeal litigation of "arbitrable and inarbitrable remedies derived from the same statutory claim." We therefore reject Citibank's assertion that " post- arbitration judicial or other procedures" to resol | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Le
green
2 sentences2017DISCUSSION In People v. Rodriguez , the California Supreme Court held that under section 1170.1, subdivision (f), when a crime qualifies as a violent felony solely because the defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of that felony, the personal use can support either a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) or a violent-felony gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), but not both. 7 ( People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501 , 509, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 213 P.3d 647 ( Rodriguez ).) In Le , the court extended the rule to serious-felony gang enhancements (subd. (b)(1)(B)). 2017DISCUSSION In People v. Rodriguez , the California Supreme Court held that under section 1170.1, subdivision (f), when a crime qualifies as a violent felony solely because the defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of that felony, the personal use can support either a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) or a violent-felony gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), but not both. 7 ( People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501 , 509, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 213 P.3d 647 ( Rodriguez ).) In Le , the court extended the rule to serious-felony gang enhancements (subd. (b)(1)(B)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Ritchie
green
2 sentences2015Supp. 5.) In People v. Ritchie (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 455 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 773 ] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], this court extended that rule to drivers arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of a drug. 2015Supp. 5.) In People v. Ritchie (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 455 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 773 ] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two], this court extended that rule to drivers arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of a drug. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Rivas
green
1 sentence2014He cannot “ ‘ “show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ‘a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility’ [citation] [and so] the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” ’ ” (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 455-456.) Finally, we address defendant’s due process claim. “ ‘[F]undamental fairness [is] the touchstone of due process’ [citation] and so a due process violation is usually established when the state proceeds in a manner that renders a trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Riv | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Pearson
green
1 sentence2014He cannot “ ‘ “show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ‘a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility’ [citation] [and so] the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” ’ ” (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 455-456.) Finally, we address defendant’s due process claim. “ ‘[F]undamental fairness [is] the touchstone of due process’ [citation] and so a due process violation is usually established when the state proceeds in a manner that renders a trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v. Riv | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Campbell v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Riley v. Johnson green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig and Curtis green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Albright v. City of South San Francisco green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| City of Roseville v. Tulley green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Ohio v. Roberts red | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| McNeil v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Simpson v. Cenarrusa green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Barlotti v. Lyons green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Kring v. Missouri red | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| United States v. Barry L. Knipp (91-5312), and Vernon L. Hamilton (91-5452) green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| United States v. Ronald C. Brechtel and Phillip H. Gattuso green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Hudson v. Palmer green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Fox v. Abrams green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.