extended analysis in New Jersey

1998In Cogdell, supra, the Court extended the doctrine to require the mandatory joinder of all parties “who have a material interest in the controversy.” 116 N.J. at 26 , 560 A.2d 1169 .

1998In Cogdell, supra, the Court extended the doctrine to require the mandatory joinder of all parties “who have a material interest in the controversy.” 116 N.J. at 26 , 560 A.2d 1169 .

1997Co., 741 F.Supp. 298, 301 (D.Mass.1990), aff'd, 933 F. 2d 66 (1st Cir.1991) ], as the principal location of the insured risk, and assign section 193 significance to that state; or “because the risk at issue here was to some degree transient, a more extended analysis pursuant to § 6(2) is appropriate to determine whether, apart from or in addition to § 193 significance, [New Jersey] or [Pennsylvania] has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.” A Johnson & Co., supra, 741 F.Supp. at 301 .

1996Co., 741 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D.Mass. 1990), aff'd, 933 F. 2d 66 (1st Cir.1991)).

2024A-0366-22 25 Our Supreme Court has noted "[t]here are three principal liability sections in the Act": N.J.S.A. 59:2-2, incorporating the doctrine of respondeat superior; N.J.S.A. 59:2-3, addressing discretionary activities and including "both immunity and liability provisions"; and N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, providing liability for dangerous conditions of public property, Rochinsky, 110 N.J. at 409 -10 — although there are certainly others tucked throughout the Act, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 (establishing liability for failure to provide emergency signals on a street or highway); N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(a), (b

2020In Brennan, which was decided after the trial court's decision, it was held that "before an extended analysis of the Doe factors is required, a custodian [of records] must present a colorable claim that public access to the records requested would invade a person's objectively reasonable expectation of privacy." 233 N.J. at 342 .

2017Id. at 143 . 10 While Judge Andresini provides insight with respect to application of entrepreneurial profit and depreciation when valuing a nursing facility, the parties’ stipulation obviated the need for the court to engage in an extended analysis of which approach to value would be most credible in that case.

2013The Court extended this principle in Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 442 , 771 A.2d 1194 (2001), to cases involving “an intentional violation of a fiduciary duty arising as a result of the attorney-client relationship.” The defendant in Packard-Bamberger served as both corporate director and legal counsel to the corporation. 167 N.J. at 442, 771 A.2d 1194 .

2013The Court extended this principle in Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 442 , 771 A.2d 1194 (2001), to cases involving “an intentional violation of a fiduciary duty arising as a result of the attorney-client relationship.” The defendant in Packard-Bamberger served as both corporate director and legal counsel to the corporation. 167 N.J. at 442, 771 A.2d 1194 .

2011Co., 72 N.J. 63, 70-71 , 367 A.2d 864 (1976) (explaining that “Rova did not eliminate ‘bad faith’ as one of the factors to be proven where an action is instituted by an insured against his insurer based on its refusal to settle[, ... n]or did [it] adopt a rule making the insurer automatically liable to the insured for the over the limit judgment[, ... ] concluding] that it is unnecessary ... to embrace such an extended rule and such a rule has never been adopted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). *565 Although Rova Farms was decided almost forty years ago, this appeal presents

2011Co., 72 N.J. 63, 70-71 , 367 A.2d 864 (1976) (explaining that “Rova did not eliminate ‘bad faith’ as one of the factors to be proven where an action is instituted by an insured against his insurer based on its refusal to settle[, ... n]or did [it] adopt a rule making the insurer automatically liable to the insured for the over the limit judgment[, ... ] concluding] that it is unnecessary ... to embrace such an extended rule and such a rule has never been adopted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). *565 Although Rova Farms was decided almost forty years ago, this appeal presents

2011In State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 , 985 A. 2d 1251 (2010), the Court extended the rule of appellate deference to trial court sentencing discretion to the explanation delivered at sentencing in support of the selected sentence.

2011In State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 , 985 A. 2d 1251 (2010), the Court extended the rule of appellate deference to trial court sentencing discretion to the explanation delivered at sentencing in support of the selected sentence.

2001But the cases present a myriad of factual patterns with a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent results, and "little [ ] can be gained from an extended analysis of Supreme Court doctrine until the Court itself draws the lines as the umpire of federalism." Ibid.

1998Cf. Cammarata, supra, 26 N.J. at 412 , 140 A.2d 397 (noting that “the crucial test of’ applicants’ fitness is how they fare “on the job from day to day when suddenly confronted by situations demanding a breadth of resources and diplomacy”).

1998Cf. Cammarata, supra, 26 N.J. at 412 , 140 A.2d 397 (noting that “the crucial test of’ applicants’ fitness is how they fare “on the job from day to day when suddenly confronted by situations demanding a breadth of resources and diplomacy”).

1997If the insured wishes such an inspection, however, modem discovery techniques are entirely sufficient to permit it, and the parties may thereby determine the existence of legitimate issues that should properly be brought before the court. [ 624 A.2d at 524-25 .] In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marty’s Express, Inc., 910 F.Supp. 221 (E.D.Pa.1996), decided contemporaneously with Judge Doyne’s decision, the United States District Court was required to decide how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would answer this very question.

1997If the insured wishes such an inspection, however, modem discovery techniques are entirely sufficient to permit it, and the parties may thereby determine the existence of legitimate issues that should properly be brought before the court. [ 624 A.2d at 524-25 .] In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Marty’s Express, Inc., 910 F.Supp. 221 (E.D.Pa.1996), decided contemporaneously with Judge Doyne’s decision, the United States District Court was required to decide how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would answer this very question.

1996Id. at 221 , 661 A. 2d 284 .

1996Id. at 221 , 661 A. 2d 284 .

1994RELEVANT FACTORS In Marshall , the Court extended the factors involved in the precedent-seeking approach beyond the statutory factors to include other "objective criteria rooted in traditional sentencing guidelines." 130 N.J. at 159 , 613 A. 2d 1059 (citing N.J.S.A. 2c:44-1).

1994RELEVANT FACTORS In Marshall , the Court extended the factors involved in the precedent-seeking approach beyond the statutory factors to include other “objective criteria rooted in traditional sentencing guidelines.” 130 N.J. at 159 , 613 A.2d 1059 (citing N.J.S.A. 2c:44-1).

1993We are thus presented with two options: we can arbitrarily choose either the state of generation, see Johnson Matthey, supra, 250 N.J.Super. at 60 , 593 A.2d 367 , or the state of disposal, see A Johnson & Co., supra, 741 F.Supp. at 301 , as the principal location of the insured risk, and assign section 193 significance to that state; or “because the risk at issue here was to some degree transient, a more extended analysis pursuant to § 6(2) is appropriate to determine whether, apart from or in addition to § 193 significance, [New Jersey] or [Pennsylvania] has a more significant relationship t

1993We are thus presented with two options: we can arbitrarily choose either the state of generation, see Johnson Matthey, supra, 250 N.J.Super. at 60 , 593 A.2d 367 , or the state of disposal, see A Johnson & Co., supra, 741 F.Supp. at 301 , as the principal location of the insured risk, and assign section 193 significance to that state; or “because the risk at issue here was to some degree transient, a more extended analysis pursuant to § 6(2) is appropriate to determine whether, apart from or in addition to § 193 significance, [New Jersey] or [Pennsylvania] has a more significant relationship t

1992In Auer v. Sinclair Refining Co., 103 N.J.L. 372, 376 , 137 A. 555 (E. & A.1927), the Court extended the analysis in Depue to cover employees who used their own automobiles for work purposes.

1992In Auer v. Sinclair Refining Co., 103 N.J.L. 372, 376 , 137 A. 555 (E. & A.1927), the Court extended the analysis in Depue to cover employees who used their own automobiles for work purposes.

1992Super. 429 , 400 A. 2d 1227 (App.Div. 1979); the court extended the rule to volunteer firemen.

1988Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

1988Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

1986Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).

1986Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).

1984In our judgment, the nature of the services, the utility of and the need for them, involving as they do, the health and even survival of many people, are so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists and doctors of the rules of strict liability in tort. [ 54 N.J. at 597 .] Thereafter this Court extended immunity to certain nonprofit health care entities that furnished products essential for the public health.

1984Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, supra, 109 N.J.Super. 217 , decided in the following year, held that strict liability did not apply to a hospital that had furnished incompatible, but not defective, blood for a transfusion.

1984Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, supra, 109 N.J.Super. 217 , decided in the following year, held that strict liability did not apply to a hospital that had furnished incompatible, but not defective, blood for a transfusion.

1982Little profit will result from an extended analysis of the extent of a public entity’s burden to plead and prove its affirmative defense of immunity, Ellison v. Housing Authority of South Amboy, 162 N.J.Super. 347 (App.Div.1978), or whether, as has been' suggested in other fields of limited liability, the plaintiff bears the continuing burden of overcoming each and every limitation of a cause of action.

1979The extended inquiry *604 made into the details of [these] crimes was bound to aid materially in disclosing the identity of their common perpetrator. [ 111 Kan. at 146 , 206 P. at 885 ] The manner of the two murders and of the disposal of the victims in the case at the bar is so unusual and distinctive as to mark the crime as having been committed by a single individual.

1979The extended inquiry *604 made into the details of [these] crimes was bound to aid materially in disclosing the identity of their common perpetrator. [ 111 Kan. at 146 , 206 P. at 885 ] The manner of the two murders and of the disposal of the victims in the case at the bar is so unusual and distinctive as to mark the crime as having been committed by a single individual.