extended inquiry in Oregon

2024The court accordingly concluded that: “the reference in ORS 183.484 to the ‘record’ is to the record made before the circuit court and * * * the reference to ‘find- ings of fact’ in ORS 183.484([6]) is to the findings of fact that the circuit court makes based on the evidence in that record when it reverses the agency.” Id. at 647 . offer an extended analysis of that statutory issue; however, we conclude that that issue, which it identified in its opening brief, is appropriately before us. 96 Kasliner v. Dept. of Human Services Norden recognized that it is the parties’ ability to create a reco

2024The court accordingly concluded that: “the reference in ORS 183.484 to the ‘record’ is to the record made before the circuit court and * * * the reference to ‘find- ings of fact’ in ORS 183.484([6]) is to the findings of fact that the circuit court makes based on the evidence in that record when it reverses the agency.” Id. at 647 . offer an extended analysis of that statutory issue; however, we conclude that that issue, which it identified in its opening brief, is appropriately before us. 96 Kasliner v. Dept. of Human Services Norden recognized that it is the parties’ ability to create a reco

2016See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (death penalty for mur- der committed during the course of attempted first-degree sex abuse “would not shock the moral sense of reasonable people”); State v. Teague, 215 Or 609, 611 , 336 P2d 338 (1959) (per curiam) (18-years imprisonment for two separate forgery convictions did not shock the moral sense of reason- able people); Sustar v. County Court of Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921) (six-month jail sentence and $500 fine for possessing alcohol did not “shock the moral sense of all r

2016See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (death penalty for mur- der committed during the course of attempted first-degree sex abuse “would not shock the moral sense of reasonable people”); State v. Teague, 215 Or 609, 611 , 336 P2d 338 (1959) (per curiam) (18-years imprisonment for two separate forgery convictions did not shock the moral sense of reason- able people); Sustar v. County Court of Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921) (six-month jail sentence and $500 fine for possessing alcohol did not “shock the moral sense of all r

2016See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (death penalty for mur- der committed during the course of attempted first-degree sex abuse “would not shock the moral sense of reasonable people”); State v. Teague, 215 Or 609, 611 , 336 P2d 338 (1959) (per curiam) (18-years imprisonment for two separate forgery convictions did not shock the moral sense of reason- able people); Sustar v. County Court of Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921) (six-month jail sentence and $500 fine for possessing alcohol did not “shock the moral sense of all r

2016See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (death penalty for mur- der committed during the course of attempted first-degree sex abuse “would not shock the moral sense of reasonable people”); State v. Teague, 215 Or 609, 611 , 336 P2d 338 (1959) (per curiam) (18-years imprisonment for two separate forgery convictions did not shock the moral sense of reason- able people); Sustar v. County Court of Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921) (six-month jail sentence and $500 fine for possessing alcohol did not “shock the moral sense of all r

2016See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (death penalty for mur- der committed during the course of attempted first-degree sex abuse “would not shock the moral sense of reasonable people”); State v. Teague, 215 Or 609, 611 , 336 P2d 338 (1959) (per curiam) (18-years imprisonment for two separate forgery convictions did not shock the moral sense of reason- able people); Sustar v. County Court of Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921) (six-month jail sentence and $500 fine for possessing alcohol did not “shock the moral sense of all r

2016See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 380 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (death penalty for mur- der committed during the course of attempted first-degree sex abuse “would not shock the moral sense of reasonable people”); State v. Teague, 215 Or 609, 611 , 336 P2d 338 (1959) (per curiam) (18-years imprisonment for two separate forgery convictions did not shock the moral sense of reason- able people); Sustar v. County Court of Marion Co., 101 Or 657, 665 , 201 P 445 (1921) (six-month jail sentence and $500 fine for possessing alcohol did not “shock the moral sense of all r

2008Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 193 Or App 527, 530 , 92 P3d 126 (2004).

2008Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 193 Or App 527, 530 , 92 P3d 126 (2004).

2005In Falk , this court held that a party without the burden of persuasion on an issue cannot raise “the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence on appeal unless he has asserted the legal insufficiency of the evidence in the trial court.” 290 Or at 843 .

1999We further concluded: "[T]he Board's discussion of the preparation demands associated with the social studies position was so cursory as to preclude meaningful judicial review * * *. [N]othing in the Board's extended analysis * * * suggests that the Board actually, specifically considered whether the preparation for the social studies position was of a sort `generally inherent in every working situation.' Much less does the Board's decision explain why it could, or would, have reached such a conclusion." Id. at 143-44 , 920 P.2d 175 . [5] On remand, the Board concluded that claimant's mental d

1999We further concluded: “[T]he Board’s discussion of the preparation demands associated with the social studies position was so cursory as to preclude meaningful judicial review * * *. [N]othing in the Board’s extended analysis * * * suggests that the Board actually, specifically considered whether the preparation for the social studies position was of a sort ‘generally inherent in every working situation.’ Much less does the Board’s decision explain why it could, or would, have reached such a conclusion.” Id. at 143-44 . 5 On remand, the Board concluded that claimant’s mental disorder was not c

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land

1978No purpose would be served by a complete re-examination here. 8 See, e.g., State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., note 1 supra; Scott v. Lattig, 227 US 229, 242-43 , 33 S Ct 242 , 57 L Ed 490 (1913); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 US 70 , 30 S Ct 27 , 54 L Ed 95 (1909); Shively v. Bowlby, note 4 supra. 9 Defendant contends that the United States Supreme Court has so characterized that decision, relying on the following language: "* * * In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324, 338 , 24 L Ed 224 (1877), the Court extended the doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable * * State Land