extended analysis in New York

2022While brief, there was no ambiguity in the court's findings that the impoundment and purported inventory search of the vehicle were valid ( cf. People v Parker , 32 NY3d at 58 ).

2021Our dissenting colleagues reject our analysis as infringing on the People's "due process" rights, and suggest that this Court should have permitted the People an opportunity to submit a supplemental brief on this "closed container" issue ( id. ).

2014In our view, the one factor that warrants a more extended analysis is whether defendant established that the information obtained from the two witnesses could not have been discovered with due diligence before trial. “ ‘[T]he due diligence requirement is measured against the defendant’s available resources and the practicalities of the particular situation’ ” (Tankleff, 49 AD3d at 180 ).

2007People v Walton, 14 AD3d 419, 420 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]).

2006Defendant received a full opportunity to be heard, and his unelaborated complaint simply expressed general disagreement with counsel over trial strategy, which was not good cause upon which to assign new counsel for sentencing, and which did not require a more extended inquiry (see People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822 [1990]).

2003In 1988, this Court extended the rule to police officers, holding that the same policy considerations that barred firefighters from recovery for on-the-job injuries applied with equal force to police officers (see Santangelo, 71 NY2d at 397-398 ).

2001Again, it is this court’s view that no lesser standard for assuring juror impartiality than as set forth in People v Arnold (supra) regarding prospective jurors must be applied in the case of a sitting juror who, during the trial, raises a doubt regarding his or her ability to serve impartially because of prior knowledge or opinion.

2001In addressing the issue of disojualification of a sworn juror, over a defendant’s objection, as “grossly unqualified to serve in the case” under CPL 270.35, the Court of Appeals instructs, in People v Buford ( 69 NY2d 290, 298 ), that this standard is satisfied only “when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict” (citation omitted).

1999In Noerr (supra, 365 US, at 144 ), the Supreme Court held that a lobbying effort conducted by competing railroads for the purpose of obtaining legislation to destroy the competition that the railroads faced from truckers was immune from antitrust scrutiny under the First Amendment because “the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation.” In Pennington {supra), the Court extended the doctrine to protect efforts to influence governmental action through administrative processes, holding that efforts between the United Mine Workers and large coal mine operators to persuade the

1999In Noerr (supra, 365 US, at 144 ), the Supreme Court held that a lobbying effort conducted by competing railroads for the purpose of obtaining legislation to destroy the competition that the railroads faced from truckers was immune from antitrust scrutiny under the First Amendment because “the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation.” In Pennington {supra), the Court extended the doctrine to protect efforts to influence governmental action through administrative processes, holding that efforts between the United Mine Workers and large coal mine operators to persuade the

1997The Hearing Officer called every individual who was identified as a witness to relevant events (see, Matter of Nieves v Coughlin, 157 AD2d 943 ) and thereafter conducted the hearing without a further request by petitioner for additional witnesses.

1994Although, as pointed out by respondent, that case may be distinguished by the absence of a voluntary agreement, in Matter of Canabush v Wancewicz ( 193 AD2d 260 ), this Court extended the analysis of Matter of Ronald FF. v Cindy GG. (supra) to a case where a nonparent’s custody rights arose out of an agreement, applying the rationale that a parent may not stipulate away a child’s right to be reared by its biological parent (Matter of Canabush v Wancewicz, supra, at 262).

1990(Supra, at 838-839; see also, People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327 ; compare, People v McLucas, 15 NY2d 167, 172 [reversing despite lack of objection because "no exception is necessary to preserve for appellate review a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right”].) Here, counsel duly registered an exception which was more than sufficient to alert the trial court that the charge was faulty; thus, it cannot be said here, as the Court of Appeals noted in Autry (supra, at 839 ), that "it is entirely possible that the failure to object represents counsel’s reasonable trial-level determination that a

1990(Supra, at 552.) Subsequently, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v Parker ( 462 US 345, 350 ), the court extended this principle to those putative class members who timely filed individual actions after certification was denied.

1990Even this rationale became attenuated, however, when the court extended the rule to cover charges lodged many months earlier (see, People v Smith, 54 NY2d 954, 955 ).

1983Co. ( 105 Misc 2d 14 ) and find it wanting because of a misplaced emphasis upon the language of the statute.

1983The dissent is most certainly correct when it states that “[u]nder the statute defendant clearly had the right to call the physician member and examine him with a view to showing the possible defects and flaws in the panel’s recommendation.” Bernstein v Bodean ( 53 NY2d 520 ) relied upon by the defendant and the dissent, stands for that proposition but not for the extended doctrine attributed to it, by them.

1983In People u Bartolomeo ( 53 NY2d 225, 229 ), the court extended the principle of Rogers (supra) by holding that “[wjhere to the knowledge of the interrogating officer a suspect being questioned had been arrested by the same law enforcement agency nine days previously on an unrelated charge, state- merits obtained in consequence of the interrogation must be suppressed if in fact the suspect is represented by an attorney with respect to the unrelated charge even though the fact of such representation is unknown to the officer”.

1983In People u Bartolomeo ( 53 NY2d 225, 229 ), the court extended the principle of Rogers (supra) by holding that “[wjhere to the knowledge of the interrogating officer a suspect being questioned had been arrested by the same law enforcement agency nine days previously on an unrelated charge, state- merits obtained in consequence of the interrogation must be suppressed if in fact the suspect is represented by an attorney with respect to the unrelated charge even though the fact of such representation is unknown to the officer”.

1981Indeed, only a few short months ago, this court extended the rule so far as to require a declaration in a case where the complaint contained a pleading defect (Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 378 ).

1979An extended hearing was held before Judge Celli in County Court, after which the Judge ordered the judgment of conviction vacated because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., Monachino’s recantation (CPL 440.10, subd 1, par [g]; and see People v Shilitano, 218 NY 161, 170 ).