during defendant in New York

2015During defendant’s plea allocution, County Court merely mentioned that, if defendant were to enter a guilty plea, he would be “giving up [his] right to remain silent.” The court further failed to ascertain that defendant had discussed with his attorney the trial-related rights he was waiving or the constitutional consequences of a guilty plea (see People v Mones, 130 AD3d at 1245-1246; People v Klinger 129 AD3d at 1117 ; People v Vences, 125 AD3d at 1051 ).

2015During defendant’s plea allocution, County Court merely mentioned that, if defendant were to enter a guilty plea, he would be “giving up [his] right to remain silent.” The court further failed to ascertain that defendant had discussed with his attorney the trial-related rights he was waiving or the constitutional consequences of a guilty plea (see People v Mones, 130 AD3d at 1245-1246; People v Klinger 129 AD3d at 1117 ; People v Vences, 125 AD3d at 1051 ).

2026That officer also testified that he spoke with witnesses on scene who indicated that the shooter was "possibly Hispanic."</p> <p>"Based upon our review, we find that, when construing <span>[*3]</span>the evidence in the light most favorable to the People as we must, a rational person could conclude that the shooter's identity was sufficiently proven to be defendant" (<i>People v Grady</i>, 233 AD3d at 1371-1372 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; <i>see People v Alexander</i>, 231 AD3d at 1312; <i>People v Peasley</i>, 208 AD3d 1466, 1467 [3d Dept 2022], <i>lv denied</i> 39 NY3d 1

2026Consent may be either express or implied (<i>see Michallow</i>, 201 AD2d at 916 ).</p> <p>Here, although we agree with defendant that there was no express consent and no manifest necessity for a mistrial inasmuch as the court could have stricken defendant's offending testimony and issued a curative instruction (<i>see People v Ferguson</i>, 115 AD2d 215 , 216 [4th Dept 1985], <i>affd</i> 67 NY2d 383 [1986]; <i>see generally Matter of Romero v Justices of Supreme Ct.</i>,<i> Queens County</i>, 237 AD2d 292, 293 [2d Dept 1997], <i>lv denied</i> 89 NY2d 817 [1997]), we nevertheless conclude that

2025Here, the court's limitation, which was made after first inquiring about how much more time counsel needed to complete summation and then, after warning counsel to "start wrapping [*2]up," was a sound exercise of discretion ( see People v Love , 244 AD2d 431, 431 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 876 [1997] ; People v Brown, 136 AD2d at 16-17).

2025During defense counsel's summation, the court inquired "is 10 more minutes sufficient time, or do you need more?" Counsel requested a "little more." Subsequently, the court stated "counsel please start wrapping up" and later stated "Counsel, five minutes." Defense counsel then completed summation. </p> <p>Here, the court's limitation, which was made after first inquiring about how much more time counsel needed to complete summation and then, after warning counsel to "start wrapping [*2]up," was a sound exercise of discretion (<i>see People v Love</i>, 244 AD2d 431, 431 [1997], <i>lv denied </i

2025Here, the court's limitation, which was made after first inquiring about how much more time counsel needed to complete summation and then, after warning counsel to "start wrapping [*2]up," was a sound exercise of discretion ( see People v Love , 244 AD2d 431, 431 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 876 [1997] ; People v Brown, 136 AD2d at 16-17).

2025During defense counsel's summation, the court inquired "is 10 more minutes sufficient time, or do you need more?" Counsel requested a "little more." Subsequently, the court stated "counsel please start wrapping up" and later stated "Counsel, five minutes." Defense counsel then completed summation. </p> <p>Here, the court's limitation, which was made after first inquiring about how much more time counsel needed to complete summation and then, after warning counsel to "start wrapping [*2]up," was a sound exercise of discretion (<i>see People v Love</i>, 244 AD2d 431, 431 [1997], <i>lv denied </i

2025During defense counsel's summation, the court inquired "is 10 more minutes sufficient time, or do you need more?" Counsel requested a "little more." Subsequently, the court stated "counsel please start wrapping up" and later stated "Counsel, five minutes." Defense counsel then completed summation. </p> <p>Here, the court's limitation, which was made after first inquiring about how much more time counsel needed to complete summation and then, after warning counsel to "start wrapping [*2]up," was a sound exercise of discretion (<i>see People v Love</i>, 244 AD2d 431, 431 [1997], <i>lv denied </i

2025See Bukowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 356 ; see e.g.

2024CPL 30.30 is a statute that was intended "to address delays occasioned by prosecutorial inaction" ( McKenna , 76 NY2d 59, 63 [1990]).

2022CPL§ 30.30 (4) (f) excludes the period of delay when defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court and this provision has been held to exclude from speedy trial consideration adjournments predominantly caused by defense counsel's failure to appear on a scheduled court date, irrespective of the People's lack of readiness (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042 , I 043- t044 (2d Dept 2018], Iv. denied 33 NY3d 949 (2019], reconsid denied 33 NY3d 1032 [2019]; People v Reed, 19 AD3d 312, 318 (1st Dept 2005], Iv. denied 5 NY3d 832 (2005]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706, 706 (2d Dept 2004], Iv.

2022CPL§ 30.30 (4) (f) excludes the period of delay when defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court and this provision has been held to exclude from speedy trial consideration adjournments predominantly caused by defense counsel's failure to appear on a scheduled court date, irrespective of the People's lack of readiness (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042 , I 043- t044 (2d Dept 2018], Iv. denied 33 NY3d 949 (2019], reconsid denied 33 NY3d 1032 [2019]; People v Reed, 19 AD3d 312, 318 (1st Dept 2005], Iv. denied 5 NY3d 832 (2005]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706, 706 (2d Dept 2004], Iv.

2022CPL§ 30.30 (4) (f) excludes the period of delay when defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court and this provision has been held to exclude from speedy trial consideration adjournments predominantly caused by defense counsel's failure to appear on a scheduled court date, irrespective of the People's lack of readiness (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042 , I 043- t044 (2d Dept 2018], Iv. denied 33 NY3d 949 (2019], reconsid denied 33 NY3d 1032 [2019]; People v Reed, 19 AD3d 312, 318 (1st Dept 2005], Iv. denied 5 NY3d 832 (2005]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706, 706 (2d Dept 2004], Iv.

2022CPL§ 30.30 (4) (f) excludes the period of delay when defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court and this provision has been held to exclude from speedy trial consideration adjournments predominantly caused by defense counsel's failure to appear on a scheduled court date, irrespective of the People's lack of readiness (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042 , I 043- t044 (2d Dept 2018], Iv. denied 33 NY3d 949 (2019], reconsid denied 33 NY3d 1032 [2019]; People v Reed, 19 AD3d 312, 318 (1st Dept 2005], Iv. denied 5 NY3d 832 (2005]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706, 706 (2d Dept 2004], Iv.

2022CPL§ 30.30 (4) (f) excludes the period of delay when defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court and this provision has been held to exclude from speedy trial consideration adjournments predominantly caused by defense counsel's failure to appear on a scheduled court date, irrespective of the People's lack of readiness (see People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042 , I 043- t044 (2d Dept 2018], Iv. denied 33 NY3d 949 (2019], reconsid denied 33 NY3d 1032 [2019]; People v Reed, 19 AD3d 312, 318 (1st Dept 2005], Iv. denied 5 NY3d 832 (2005]; People v Clark, 11 AD3d 706, 706 (2d Dept 2004], Iv.

2021Prospective juror number 15 also stated that he would "feel better" if defendant testified, but that he would not hold it against defendant if he did not testify "as long as . . . somebody was fighting for him[.]" As the majority implicitly acknowledges, the statements made by prospective juror number 15 "raise[d] a serious doubt regarding [his] ability to be impartial" ( id. at 1119 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2019This intervening circumstance attenuated the taint of any potentially illegal detention ( See People v Bradford, 15 NY3d 329, 334 [2010]).

2016The record demonstrates that the court specifically found that there existed clear and convincing evidence that the appellant is a person in need of a guardian as defined under section 81.02 (b) of the Mental Hygiene Law, in that she was not able to provide for her personal needs and property management, and, in effect, determined that the appellant could not “adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability” (Mental Hygiene Law § 81.02 [b]; see Matter of Carole L., 136 AD3d 917, 919 [2016]; Matter of Harold W.S. [Mark P. — Lauralyn W.], 134 AD3d 724, 725 [201

2016The record demonstrates that the court specifically found that there existed clear and convincing evidence that the appellant is a person in need of a guardian as defined under section 81.02 (b) of the Mental Hygiene Law, in that she was not able to provide for her personal needs and property management, and, in effect, determined that the appellant could not “adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability” (Mental Hygiene Law § 81.02 [b]; see Matter of Carole L., 136 AD3d 917, 919 [2016]; Matter of Harold W.S. [Mark P. — Lauralyn W.], 134 AD3d 724, 725 [201