during defense in Ohio

2015The judge then inquired of appellant, “you’re telling me now that you had absolutely no interest in exploring what the State had proposed in terms of potentially reducing the charges that you are facing?” Appellant replied, “Yes, sir.” The court asked appellant again, “you have absolutely no interest in interacting with the prosecutor’s office in terms of accepting any potentially less serious charge, correct?” Appellant replied, “No, sir.” {¶ 119} “During plea negotiations defendants are ‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’” (Citation omitted.) Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S

2015The judge then inquired of appellant, “you’re telling me now that you had absolutely no interest in exploring what the State had proposed in terms of potentially reducing the charges that you are facing?” Appellant replied, “Yes, sir.” The court asked appellant again, “you have absolutely no interest in interacting with the prosecutor’s office in terms of accepting any potentially less serious charge, correct?” Appellant replied, “No, sir.” {¶ 119} “During plea negotiations defendants are ‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’” (Citation omitted.) Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S

2024Id. {¶64} Finally, Parents failed to raise any reasonable-efforts argument before the trial court during the hearing on permanent custody.

2024Gwynne at ¶ 40 (“the appellate court could have requested this missing piece of the record, it was not required to do so” (Emphasis sic.)); State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816 , 149 N.E.3d 122 , ¶ 17 -18 (4th Dist.) (“PSI reports are part of the appellate record and when they are missing from the record and necessary for our review, we will sua sponte acquire them from the clerk.”).

2023Darke No. 2021-CA-16, 2022-Ohio-3079, ¶ 18 . -37- A. Court Disturbance {¶ 100} During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Stiver on July 28, 2022, three individuals in the gallery either were asked to leave or were escorted out of the courtroom by deputies.

2008State v. Garn (Feb. 21, 2003), Richland App. No. 02CA45, citing Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 . "[T]he test of Brady materiality is whether there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Franklin , Montgomery App. No. 19140, 2002-Ohio-6193 , citing State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 187 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , 2002-Ohio-2128 . {¶ 48} During defense cross-examination of the State's chemist in the case sub judice, it was disclosed that after an original State Fi

2008State v. Garn (Feb. 21, 2003), Richland App. No. 02CA45, citing Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 . "[T]he test of Brady materiality is whether there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Franklin , Montgomery App. No. 19140, 2002-Ohio-6193 , citing State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 187 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , 2002-Ohio-2128 . {¶ 48} During defense cross-examination of the State's chemist in the case sub judice, it was disclosed that after an original State Fi

2008State v. Garn (Feb. 21, 2003), Richland App. No. 02CA45, citing Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 . "[T]he test of Brady materiality is whether there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Franklin , Montgomery App. No. 19140, 2002-Ohio-6193 , citing State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 187 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , 2002-Ohio-2128 . {¶ 48} During defense cross-examination of the State's chemist in the case sub judice, it was disclosed that after an original State Fi

2008Abuse of discretion means "more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or *Page 6 unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 219 , 5 OBR 481 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶ 11} As the first ground for withdrawing his guilty plea, appellant argues that he was coerced into pleading guilty by comments made by the trial court during the hearing held for the purpose of considering appellant's complaints about his trial counsel.

2008Abuse of discretion means "more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or *Page 6 unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 219 , 5 OBR 481 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶ 11} As the first ground for withdrawing his guilty plea, appellant argues that he was coerced into pleading guilty by comments made by the trial court during the hearing held for the purpose of considering appellant's complaints about his trial counsel.

2008State v. Garn (Feb. 21, 2003), Richland App. No. 02CA45, citing Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 . "[T]he test of Brady materiality is whether there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Franklin , Montgomery App. No. 19140, 2002-Ohio-6193 , citing State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 187 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , 2002-Ohio-2128 . {¶ 48} During defense cross-examination of the State's chemist in the case sub judice, it was disclosed that after an original State Fi

2008State v. Garn (Feb. 21, 2003), Richland App. No. 02CA45, citing Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786 , 92 S.Ct. 2562 , 33 L.Ed.2d 706 . "[T]he test of Brady materiality is whether there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Franklin , Montgomery App. No. 19140, 2002-Ohio-6193 , citing State v. LaMar (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 181 , 187 , 767 N.E.2d 166 , 2002-Ohio-2128 . {¶ 48} During defense cross-examination of the State's chemist in the case sub judice, it was disclosed that after an original State Fi

2003Our review of the record has failed to disclose any deficient performance by trial counsel, much less resulting prejudice as defined by Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 . {¶ 15} Defendant raises two issues for our review in his pro se brief.

2003State v. Pruitt (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 50 , 58 ; See, also, State v. Boyd (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 790 . {¶ 12} In the instant case, Detective Danzy testified that the marijuana was in plain view when he discovered it in appellant's vehicle, stating: {¶ 13} "It was located to the right of the driver seat, behind it on the floor, in plain view." {¶ 14} During defense counsel's cross examination of Detective Danzy, the location of the marijuana was again discussed as follows: {¶ 15} "Q.

2003Therefore, Wolinetz's continued representation of appellee was consistent with DR-5-102(B), which permits an attorney to represent a client even though he learns he may be called as a witness by the opposition "until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client." DR-5-102(B); Jackson v. Bellomy (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 341 , 348-349 . {¶ 15} It is the burden of the party moving for disqualification of an attorney to demonstrate that the proposed testimony may be prejudicial to that attorney's client and that disqualification is necessary.

1998Furthermore, in In re Covin (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 139 , 141 , in referring to an earlier version of the statute, the court stated: "R.C. 2151.414 (A) lists numerous determinations to be made by the lower court during a hearing upon a motion for permanent custody.

1987The court also stated: “You are not permitted to change the law, nor to apply your own concepts of what you think the law should be, nor are you to disregard the law in order to avoid an unpleasant decision.” The following testimony reveals that the jurors were properly excused for cause in accordance with R.C. 2945.25(C) and Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510 , 46 O.O. 2d 368. 1.