during defendant in Oregon

2024Although plaintiff did not cite Palmer in the 318 Rivera v. Perlo Construction, LLC Gordineer relied on a related but separate doc- trine—that the workers’ compensation system has “exclu- sive jurisdiction” over “matters concerning a claim.” See 100 Or App at 105-06 .

2024Although plaintiff did not cite Palmer in the 318 Rivera v. Perlo Construction, LLC Gordineer relied on a related but separate doc- trine—that the workers’ compensation system has “exclu- sive jurisdiction” over “matters concerning a claim.” See 100 Or App at 105-06 .

2024During defendant’s trial, R explained that she spoke to each guest prior to their stay because “it’s our family home and that’s the way I do 1 ORS 164.125(1)(b) provides that a person commits theft of services if: “Having control over the disposition of labor or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another, the person uses or diverts to the use of the person or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities with intent to derive for the person or the third person a commercial benefit to which the person or the third person is not entitled.” Cite as 331 Or App 69

2024During defendant’s trial, R explained that she spoke to each guest prior to their stay because “it’s our family home and that’s the way I do 1 ORS 164.125(1)(b) provides that a person commits theft of services if: “Having control over the disposition of labor or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another, the person uses or diverts to the use of the person or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities with intent to derive for the person or the third person a commercial benefit to which the person or the third person is not entitled.” Cite as 331 Or App 69

2017All petitioner had to do was to speak to the court during his hearing on the first petition.” Id. at 311-12 .

1986He had immediate access to the judge by merely raising his voice. * * *” 244 Or at 311 . *525 The court’s reasoning is applicable here and, regardless of whether we agree that it is reasonable to put such a heavy burden on a petitioner, we are bound by it.

2012In State v. Ayles, 348 Or 622, 631-32 , 237 P3d 805 (2010), the court addressed a similar issue: “During defendant’s unlawful seizure, defendant was not free to leave.

2012In State v. Ayles, 348 Or 622, 631-32 , 237 P3d 805 (2010), the court addressed a similar issue: “During defendant’s unlawful seizure, defendant was not free to leave.

2024In response, defendant did not make an argument as to why the injuries to plaintiffs were not foreseeable— instead, defendant merely reiterated its view that “foreseeability * * * simply does not apply.” But, even if the issue of foreseeability was preserved at trial, consider- ing the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this is not such a “concatena- tion of highly unusual circumstances,” Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or 58, 94 , 377 P3d 492 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted), that it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to decide the issue of foreseeability.

2024In response, defendant did not make an argument as to why the injuries to plaintiffs were not foreseeable— instead, defendant merely reiterated its view that “foreseeability * * * simply does not apply.” But, even if the issue of foreseeability was preserved at trial, consider- ing the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this is not such a “concatena- tion of highly unusual circumstances,” Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or 58, 94 , 377 P3d 492 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted), that it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to decide the issue of foreseeability.

2023Cite as 325 Or App 267 (2023) 271 touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.” During defendant’s incarceration, but before his trial, he called M’s mother from the jail.

2022Cite as 319 Or App 659 (2022) 671 301, 323, 350 P3d 188 (2015) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

2022In response, defendant argued that the hospi- tal’s disclosure of defendant’s blood was a “severe intrusion on privacy”: “Hanging around a hospital near a person, and while there are rules out there that I guess permit hospital per- sonnel to basically ignore HIPAA requirements and dis- close confidential medical information to law enforcement, I think the Court should consider that those rules are a severe intrusion on privacy, with, you know, the govern- ment motive there and the public safety, but they are an intrusion and, therefore, having the officer in such prox- imate—in such proximity

2022At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that it could return a nonunanimous verdict, to which defendant did Cite as 323 Or App 234 (2022) 239 not object.

2022Cite as 319 Or App 659 (2022) 671 301, 323, 350 P3d 188 (2015) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

2021During defendant’s Cite as 315 Or App 112 (2021) 115 deposition, G’s attorneys confronted him about the forged prenuptial agreement.

2020“Reasonable expectation of privacy con- cerning the intimate area” means “that the person intended to protect the intimate area from being seen and has not exposed the intimate area to public view.” ORS 163.700 (2)(f).1 1 “Public view” is defined in ORS 163.700(2)(e) to mean “that an area can be readily seen and that a person within the area can be distinguished by normal unaided vision when viewed from a public place as defined in ORS 161.015.” Cite as 307 Or App 540 (2020) 543 During defendant’s trial, at the end of the state’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal.

2020During defendant’s bench trial, Smith testified that “[defendant] told me he’d been there [at the Pond] every night for the last week-and-a-half, two weeks.” Defendant testified that he was “allowed to park from * * * dawn ‘til [sic] mid- night at Walmart,” and that he began parking at the Pond because he “had nowhere else to park between midnight and 5:00 a.m.” Cite as 307 Or App 552 (2020) 555 After closing arguments, the trial court extensively discussed with both parties how it should understand the term “change of residence” in ORS 163A.040(1)(d).

2020Those closing arguments may be construed as a Cite as 307 Or App 552 (2020) 559 Turning to defendant’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred by revoking his proba- tion based on an unlawful conviction.

2020During defendant’s sentencing, the trial court merged the two first-degree burglary guilty verdicts into the attempted aggravated murder conviction, but did not merge the assault guilty verdicts, determining that there was a “sufficient pause in the criminal conduct to afford the Defendant time to reflect or renounce what she was doing.” 430 State v. Hopkins enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully * * * in or upon prem- ises.” Thus, at “its essence, burglary comprises three ele- ments: (1) unlawfully entering or remaining in or upon; (2) a building; and (3) with the intent to commit a crime there

2020ORS 164.205(3)(a) provides that to “enter or remain unlawfully” means “[t]o enter or remain in or upon the premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.” In Felt, the defendant was convicted of burglary after he (1) entered his former girlfriend’s apartment with her permission in order to use her telephone, (2) then, after she refused his request for a kiss and he kissed her anyway, she pushed him away, and (3) he subsequently assaulted her. 108 Or App at 732 .

2019Curry County Circuit Court 15CR48691; A163609 451 P3d 1022 During defendant’s closing argument in his trial for driving under the influ- ence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010(4), the trial court sustained the state’s objec- tion to defendant’s mischaracterization of the evidence, then offered a clarifying instruction to the jury.

2017Defendant objected to the testimony, arguing that it was “an inadmissible prior bad act.” The court stated that the evidence appeared to be admissible for the nonpropen-sity purpose of proving defendant’s sexual predisposition for the victim, under State v. McKay, 309 Or 305, 308 , 787 P2d 479 (1990), but the court invited the parties to conduct additional research and raise the issue later.

2017Defendant objected to the testimony, arguing that it was “an inadmissible prior bad act.” The court stated that the evidence appeared to be admissible for the nonpropen-sity purpose of proving defendant’s sexual predisposition for the victim, under State v. McKay, 309 Or 305, 308 , 787 P2d 479 (1990), but the court invited the parties to conduct additional research and raise the issue later.

1992But, in State v. Tucker, 252 Or. 597, 602 , 451 P.2d 471 (1969), this court explained: "The words `such other time' in ORS 135.610 establish a discretion in the trial court to permit the filing of a demurrer at times other than arraignment.

1992But, in State v. Tucker, 252 Or. 597, 602 , 451 P.2d 471 (1969), this court explained: "The words `such other time' in ORS 135.610 establish a discretion in the trial court to permit the filing of a demurrer at times other than arraignment.