during plea in Tennessee

2020Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W. 3d 779, 800 (Tenn. 2014); see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”).

2018Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 800 (Tenn. 2014).

2020Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W. 3d 779, 800 (Tenn. 2014); see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”).

2018Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 800 (Tenn. 2014); see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”).

2018However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 ). -6- During plea negotiations, trial counsel has the duty to promptly communicate and explain any plea offers extended by the prosecution.

2014Defense counsel objected to the State’s mention of “procedures.” The argument of counsel “is a valuable privilege that should not be unduly restricted.” Smith v. State, 527 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1975).

2007However, given the seriousness of the allegations, the showing of a factual basis for those claims, and the finality of arbitration even in the face of apparent legal error [citation], the strong policy favoring arbitration is outweighed by the law and facts in support of Plaintiffs’ position.” To judge from remarks made by the trial court during the hearing on the petition to compel, the court appears to have followed the reasoning of Rowland v. Paine Webber Inc., (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 279, 285-286 [ 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 ], that a court must only determine whether “there are any facts supporti

2007However, given the seriousness of the allegations, the showing of a factual basis for those claims, and the finality of arbitration even in the face of apparent legal error [citation], the strong policy favoring arbitration is outweighed by the law and facts in support of Plaintiffs’ position.” To judge from remarks made by the trial court during the hearing on the petition to compel, the court appears to have followed the reasoning of Rowland v. Paine Webber Inc., (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 279, 285-286 [ 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 ], that a court must only determine whether “there are any facts supporti

2002“We cannot review the accuracy of the trial court’s determination as thirteenth juror.” Moss v. Sankey, 54 S.W.3d 296, 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)(quoting Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)).

2002“We cannot review the accuracy of the trial court’s determination as thirteenth juror.” Moss v. Sankey, 54 S.W.3d 296, 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)(quoting Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)).

2001See Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 672 -73 n. 17 (the supreme court affirmed the holding of this Court enunciating the correct standard to be applied by trial courts in determining whether a new trial should be granted upon the basis of newly discovered recanted testimony).

1992During defendants' proof, defendants' counsel tendered defendant Ruby Altizer for cross-examination in order to avoid the effects of the "missing witness rule." See State v. Francis, 669 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tenn. 1984).

1992During defendants’ proof, defendants’ counsel tendered defendant Ruby Altizer for cross-examination in order to avoid the effects of the “missing witness rule.” See State v. Francis, 669 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tenn.1984).