during plea in Washington

2023State v. Stowe, 71 Wn.

2000State v. Osborne, 102 Wash.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984); State v. Stowe, 71 Wash.App. 182, 186 , 858 P.2d 267 (1993).

2000State v. Osborne, 102 Wash.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984); State v. Stowe, 71 Wash.App. 182, 186 , 858 P.2d 267 (1993).

2000State v. Osborne, 102 Wash.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984); State v. Stowe, 71 Wash.App. 182, 186 , 858 P.2d 267 (1993).

2011Restraint of LaChapelle, 153 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (holding that "[u]nder the current [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW], no offender has a vested right in the definition of criminal history in effect when a previous crime was committed"); Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 191 , 86 P.3d 139 (noting that the 2002 legislature intended to include previously washed out convictions in current offender score calculations). ¶ 6 During plea negotiations, the State and Robinson both appeared to have calculated Robinson's existing offender score by simply adding his murder conviction to hi

2011Restraint of LaChapelle, 153 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (holding that “[u]nder the current [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW], no offender has a vested right in the definition of criminal history in effect when a previous crime was committed”); Varga, 151 Wn.2d at 191 (noting that the 2002 legislature intended to include previously washed-out convictions in current offender score calculations). ¶6 During plea negotiations, the State and Robinson both appeared to have calculated Robinson’s existing offender score by simply adding his murder conviction to his 1994 score of zer

2011Restraint of LaChapelle, 153 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (holding that "[u]nder the current [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW], no offender has a vested right in the definition of criminal history in effect when a previous crime was committed"); Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 191 , 86 P.3d 139 (noting that the 2002 legislature intended to include previously washed out convictions in current offender score calculations). ¶ 6 During plea negotiations, the State and Robinson both appeared to have calculated Robinson's existing offender score by simply adding his murder conviction to hi

2011Restraint of LaChapelle, 153 Wn.2d 1, 12 , 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (holding that “[u]nder the current [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW], no offender has a vested right in the definition of criminal history in effect when a previous crime was committed”); Varga, 151 Wn.2d at 191 (noting that the 2002 legislature intended to include previously washed-out convictions in current offender score calculations). ¶6 During plea negotiations, the State and Robinson both appeared to have calculated Robinson’s existing offender score by simply adding his murder conviction to his 1994 score of zer

2026Zhao agreed and entered an Alford/Newton 2 plea to the amended charges. 2 “An Alford/Newton plea allows a defendant to plead guilty in order to take advantage of a plea bargain even if he or she is unable or unwilling to admit guilt.” State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d at 197-98 . 5 No. 40518-4-III State v. Stewart-Toliver The trial court accepted the plea after finding there was a factual basis for the original charges.

2014During the State' s rebuttal, the prosecutor said, In regards to the unwitting possession defense, that defense is just simply not credible.... [ I] n regards to on a more probable than not basis whether he had knowledge, for you to find that on a more probable than not basis he did not know 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2014During the State' s rebuttal, the prosecutor said, In regards to the unwitting possession defense, that defense is just simply not credible.... [ I] n regards to on a more probable than not basis whether he had knowledge, for you to find that on a more probable than not basis he did not know 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2011Restraint of LaChapelle, 153 Wash.2d 1, 12 , 100 P.3d 805 (2004) (holding that "[u]nder the current [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW], no offender has a vested right in the definition of criminal history in effect when a previous crime was committed"); Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 191 , 86 P.3d 139 (noting that the 2002 legislature intended to include previously washed out convictions in current offender score calculations). ¶ 6 During plea negotiations, the State and Robinson both appeared to have calculated Robinson's existing offender score by simply adding his murder conviction to hi

1993State v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 99 , 684 P.2d 683 (1984) (quoting State v. Cameron, 30 Wn.

1961In response to questions presented by this court, the defendants’ counsel candidly and forthrightly admitted the following, pursuant to his duty as an officer of the court: (1) After the note was executed, the Obdes commenced an action against the Schlemeyers to recover damages for the fraudulent concealment of the termite infestation in the apartment house; (2) in that action, judgment has been entered in favor of the Obdes against the Schlemeyers for such damages, which was affirmed on appeal (Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wn. (2d) 449, 353 P. (2d) 672 (1960), noted in 36 Wash. L.