means test in Alabama

2000Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith , Inc. , 604 So.2d 332 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Alexander , 558 So.2d 364 (Ala. 1990)." Id. at 1388.

1993Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. , 604 So.2d 332 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Alexander , 558 So.2d 364 (Ala. 1990).

1999Ex parte Jones, supra.; Ex parte Alexander, supra. For this particular species of mandamus, the petitioner, to prevail, should not be required to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.

1999Ex parte Jones , supra .; Ex parte Alexander , supra .

1990As this Court has stated before, a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to test a trial court’s granting of a motion to arbitrate or the granting of a stay pending arbitration. 2 See Ex parte Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 517 So.2d 614 (Ala.1987), and Ex parte Warrior Basin Gas Co., 512 So.2d 1364 (Ala. 1987).

1990As this Court has stated before, a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to test a trial court's granting of a motion to arbitrate or the granting of a stay pending arbitration. 2 See Ex parte Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc. , 517 So.2d 614 (Ala. 1987), and Ex parte Warrior Basin Gas Co. , 512 So.2d 1364 (Ala. *Page 366 1987).

1990As this Court has stated before, a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to test a trial court’s granting of a motion to arbitrate or the granting of a stay pending arbitration. 2 See Ex parte Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 517 So.2d 614 (Ala.1987), and Ex parte Warrior Basin Gas Co., 512 So.2d 1364 (Ala. 1987).

1990As this Court has stated before, a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to test a trial court's granting of a motion to arbitrate or the granting of a stay pending arbitration. 2 See Ex parte Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc. , 517 So.2d 614 (Ala. 1987), and Ex parte Warrior Basin Gas Co. , 512 So.2d 1364 (Ala. *Page 366 1987).

2003See Otwell v. Bryant , 497 So.2d 111 (Ala. 1986) (fact that defendant doctor's expert witness was insured by the same medical-liability insurer as was the defendant doctor was not a "sufficient connection" to challenge the credibility of the witness and to allow the issue of insurance to be interjected into the case to establish bias) See also Pattillo v. Sanchez , 614 So.2d 443 (Ala. 1993) (trial court properly refused to allow plaintiff to question defendant doctor's expert witnesses regarding their ownership of stock in the insurance company that defended defendant doctor because of the lac

2001Edwards Sons, Inc. v. Clark , 558 So.2d 358 , 360 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis added). "[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to test a trial court's granting of a motion to arbitrate or the granting of a stay pending arbitration." 1 Ex parte Alexander , 558 So.2d 364 , 365 (Ala. 1990).

2001In Morrison Restaurants, Inc. v. Homestead Village of Fairhope, Ltd ., 710 So.2d 905 , 906 (Ala. 1998), this Court stated: "Before we discuss the issues presented by the parties, we first consider whether the trial court's order was reviewable, thereby quickening this Court's jurisdiction.

1999Ex parte Napier , 723 So.2d 49 (Ala. 1998). 2 Greentree, Sanderson, and Nelson argue that the 42-day limit set out in Rule 4, Ala.R.App.P., should be applied to mandamus petitions seeking to overturn a trial court's order compelling arbitration.

1999Ex parte Napier, 723 So.2d 49 (Ala.1998). [2] Greentree, Sanderson, and Nelson argue that the 42-day limit set out in Rule 4, Ala. R.App.

1997Ex parte Phelps, 672 So.2d 790 (Ala.1995). *885 II.

1996Ex parte Blount, 665 So.2d 205 (Ala.1995); Ex parte Kennedy, 656 So.2d 365 (Ala.1995); Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So.2d 921 (Ala.1994).

1996Ex parte Blount, 665 So.2d 205 (Ala.1995); Ex parte Kennedy, 656 So.2d 365 (Ala.1995); Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So.2d 921 (Ala.1994).

1995See Ex parte Alabama Power Co. , 640 So.2d 921 (Ala. 1994); Ex parte Ralston , 519 So.2d 488 (Ala. 1987); Ex parte Finance America Corp. , 507 So.2d 458 (Ala. 1987).

1993In Lopez v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. , 628 So.2d 361 (Ala. 1993), we stated: "Because 'a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to test a trial court's granting of a motion to arbitrate,' Ex parte Alexander , 558 So.2d 364 , 365 (Ala. 1990), we treat Lopez's filing, although it was in the form of an appeal, as a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling arbitration.

1921The statute was so construed by the Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Palmer, 9 Ala. App. 483 , 64 South. 182 , where the court, speaking through Walker, P. J., said: “The statute (Code, § 3394) upon which the appellee relies, like those passed upon in the decisions above referred to, is one for the protection of creditors against undisclosed claims of third persons to property the possession or apparent ownership of which is in the debtor. * * * It is not less plain that the sole purpose of the requirement of the later statute [Code, § 33S4] as to the contracts it mentions being in writing and r

1921The statute was so construed by the Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Palmer, 9 Ala. App. 483 , 64 South. 182 , where the court, speaking through Walker, P. J., said: “The statute (Code, § 3394) upon which the appellee relies, like those passed upon in the decisions above referred to, is one for the protection of creditors against undisclosed claims of third persons to property the possession or apparent ownership of which is in the debtor. * * * It is not less plain that the sole purpose of the requirement of the later statute [Code, § 33S4] as to the contracts it mentions being in writing and r

1921The statute was so construed by the Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Palmer, 9 Ala. App. 483 , 64 South. 182 , where the court, speaking through Walker, P. J., said: “The statute (Code, § 3394) upon which the appellee relies, like those passed upon in the decisions above referred to, is one for the protection of creditors against undisclosed claims of third persons to property the possession or apparent ownership of which is in the debtor. * * * It is not less plain that the sole purpose of the requirement of the later statute [Code, § 33S4] as to the contracts it mentions being in writing and r

1921The statute was so construed by the Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Palmer, 9 Ala. App. 483 , 64 South. 182 , where the court, speaking through Walker, P. J., said: “The statute (Code, § 3394) upon which the appellee relies, like those passed upon in the decisions above referred to, is one for the protection of creditors against undisclosed claims of third persons to property the possession or apparent ownership of which is in the debtor. * * * It is not less plain that the sole purpose of the requirement of the later statute [Code, § 33S4] as to the contracts it mentions being in writing and r

1921The statute was so construed by the Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Palmer, 9 Ala. App. 483 , 64 South. 182 , where the court, speaking through Walker, P. J., said: “The statute (Code, § 3394) upon which the appellee relies, like those passed upon in the decisions above referred to, is one for the protection of creditors against undisclosed claims of third persons to property the possession or apparent ownership of which is in the debtor. * * * It is not less plain that the sole purpose of the requirement of the later statute [Code, § 33S4] as to the contracts it mentions being in writing and r

1921The statute was so construed by the Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Palmer, 9 Ala. App. 483 , 64 South. 182 , where the court, speaking through Walker, P. J., said: “The statute (Code, § 3394) upon which the appellee relies, like those passed upon in the decisions above referred to, is one for the protection of creditors against undisclosed claims of third persons to property the possession or apparent ownership of which is in the debtor. * * * It is not less plain that the sole purpose of the requirement of the later statute [Code, § 33S4] as to the contracts it mentions being in writing and r

1886Many of the charges asked by defendant, and refused, ignored entirely the duty resting on all, even when in peril, of retreating, or withdrawing from the conflict, if practicable, when the same can be done without increasing the peril, or rendering less available the means of defense.— Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 478 ; Cross v. State, 63 Ala. 40 ; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362 .

1886Many of the charges asked by defendant, and refused, ignored entirely the duty resting on all, even when in peril, of retreating, or withdrawing from the conflict, if practicable, when the same can be done without increasing the peril, or rendering less available the means of defense.— Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 478 ; Cross v. State, 63 Ala. 40 ; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362 .

1886Many of the charges asked by defendant, and refused, ignored entirely the duty resting on all, even when in peril, of retreating, or withdrawing from the conflict, if practicable, when the same can be done without increasing the peril, or rendering less available the means of defense.— Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 478 ; Cross v. State, 63 Ala. 40 ; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362 .

1886Charges 4, 8, 9,10, 11, 17, 22, and 4d, were rightly refused, on this principle.— Tesney v. State, 77 Ala. 33 .

1886Many of the charges asked by defendant, and refused, ignored entirely the duty resting on all, even when in peril, of retreating, or withdrawing from the conflict, if practicable, when the same can be done without increasing the peril, or rendering less available the means of defense.— Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 478 ; Cross v. State, 63 Ala. 40 ; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362 .

1886Many of the charges asked by defendant, and refused, ignored entirely the duty resting on all, even when in peril, of retreating, or withdrawing from the conflict, if practicable, when the same can be done without increasing the peril, or rendering less available the means of defense.— Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 478 ; Cross v. State, 63 Ala. 40 ; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362 .

1881It furnished no excuse for a defendant who intended to provoke, or bring on a difficulty. —Stroud v. The State, 55 Ala. 77; Shorter v. The State, 63 Ala. 129 .