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78 California opinions name it 4 courts 1880–2025 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fryhaatgreen2 sentences2023(People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 977, 981 (Fryhaat).) And, while there is no custody requirement for a motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea under section 1016.5, such a motion may only be brought by a diligent movant on the ground that the court failed to provide an admonition regarding the possible immigration consequence of the plea. (§ 1016.5, subd. (b); People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 204 ; People v. Totari (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 1206–1207; Fryhaat, at p. 981.) According to its legislative history, section 1473.7 “ ‘fill[ed] a gap in 2023(See People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301 , 309, 311 [applying § 1473.7 to a plea made 15 years earlier]; People v. Ruiz (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061 , 1066 [the 2018 amendments “made it easier to retroactively challenge 11 convictions based on the ground that the defendant was not properly advised of the immigration consequences”]; see also People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 976 [applying § 1473.7 to a plea made 17 years earlier and stating, “[a]s explained in the report of the Senate Committee on Public Safety when considering the bill that became former [§] 1473.7 [citation | 3 | 4 |
Holman v. Altana Pharma US, Inc.green2 sentences2018As the Holman court recognized, "[t]he Legislature has not included a means test as an element of determining awards generally under ... section 998, and imposing such a requirement would alter the settlement incentives provided by [that section]." ( Holman , supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 284, fn. 30 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) The First District court suggested the means test may best be applied to FEHA cases alone ( Holman , at p. 284, fn. 30, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 ), but there is nothing in Section 998 itself to suggest it is appropriate to treat FEHA litigation as a special case. ( Maintain Our 2018As the Holman court recognized, "[t]he Legislature has not included a means test as an element of determining awards generally under ... section 998, and imposing such a requirement would alter the settlement incentives provided by [that section]." ( Holman , supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 284, fn. 30 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) The First District court suggested the means test may best be applied to FEHA cases alone ( Holman , at p. 284, fn. 30, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 ), but there is nothing in Section 998 itself to suggest it is appropriate to treat FEHA litigation as a special case. ( Maintain Our | 3 | 3 |
Rogers v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002The opinion then applied the rule adopted in Rogers v. Superior Court (1955) 46 Cal.2d 3, 7 , 291 P.2d 929 , which held that prohibition is an appropriate means to test the validity of an indictment or information when it is challenged on the ground that the defendant was indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. 2002The opinion then applied the rule adopted in Rogers v. Superior Court (1955) 46 Cal.2d 3, 7 , 291 P.2d 929 , which held that prohibition is an appropriate means to test the validity of an indictment or information when it is challenged on the ground that the defendant was indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. | 2 | 3 |
In Re Robbinsgreen2 sentences2013The Supreme Court also has long recognized “habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that ‘was not created for the purpose of defeating or embarrassing justice, but to promote it’ [citation] . . . .” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 777-778 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ].) Indeed, habeas corpus is not a proper remedy where other adequate remedies exist, such as an appeal or other available procedures for challenging the confinement. ( Gandolfo, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 898-899.) In Gandolfo, the Supreme Court held a habeas corpus petition was not an appropriate means to challenge an 2013The Supreme Court also has long recognized “habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that ‘was not created for the purpose of defeating or embarrassing justice, but to promote it’ [citation] . . . .” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 777-778 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ].) Indeed, habeas corpus is not a proper remedy where other adequate remedies exist, such as an appeal or other available procedures for challenging the confinement. ( Gandolfo, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 898-899.) In Gandolfo, the Supreme Court held a habeas corpus petition was not an appropriate means to challenge an | 1 | 2 |
Whitlock v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1955Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of jurisdiction ( Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630, 637 [ 284 P.2d 9 ]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 463 [ 171 P.2d 8 ]), and it is an appropriate means to test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution when the validity of an indictment or information is challenged on the ground that the defendant has been indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. ( Greenberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323 ; Whitlock v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App.2d 1955Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of jurisdiction ( Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630, 637 [ 284 P.2d 9 ]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 463 [ 171 P.2d 8 ]), and it is an appropriate means to test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution when the validity of an indictment or information is challenged on the ground that the defendant has been indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. ( Greenberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323 ; Whitlock v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App.2d | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1955Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of jurisdiction ( Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630, 637 [ 284 P.2d 9 ]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 463 [ 171 P.2d 8 ]), and it is an appropriate means to test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution when the validity of an indictment or information is challenged on the ground that the defendant has been indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. ( Greenberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323 ; Whitlock v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App.2d 1955Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of jurisdiction ( Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630, 637 [ 284 P.2d 9 ]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 463 [ 171 P.2d 8 ]), and it is an appropriate means to test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution when the validity of an indictment or information is challenged on the ground that the defendant has been indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. ( Greenberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323 ; Whitlock v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App.2d | 1 | 2 |
Woosley v. State of Californiagreen1 sentence2025XIII, § 32); see also Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 785, fn. 20 (“Government Code section 11350 . . . is strictly construed in tax cases and may not be used to prevent the state from collecting taxes”). 16 23-701 rule that declaratory relief is sometimes unavailable where there is an adequate alternative remedy—here, challenging the regulation through a refund suit. 103 And even where a section 11350 claim is available, section 11350(d) typically limits the record on judicial review to the materials before the agency during the rulemaking. 104 Given these constraints, we | 1 | 1 |
| Barrett v. Dawsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Murillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mejiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Camachogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Turlock Golf & County Club v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cooks v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hawkins v. Packgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Briggs v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth Memorial, Inc. v. Telophase Society of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jazayeri v. Maogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Costa v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doyle v. Fenstergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Albertsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re SBred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ansellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Streetergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Rosenkrantzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc.red | 1 | 1 |
| Prudential Home Mortg. Co. v. Superior Court of Orange Cty.green | 1 | 1 |
| Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Enterprise-Laredo Associates v. Hachar's, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dillongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maintain Our Desert Environment v. Town of Apple Valley
green
2 sentences2018As the Holman court recognized, "[t]he Legislature has not included a means test as an element of determining awards generally under ... section 998, and imposing such a requirement would alter the settlement incentives provided by [that section]." ( Holman , supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 284, fn. 30 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) The First District court suggested the means test may best be applied to FEHA cases alone ( Holman , at p. 284, fn. 30, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 ), but there is nothing in Section 998 itself to suggest it is appropriate to treat FEHA litigation as a special case. ( Maintain Our 2018As the Holman court recognized, "[t]he Legislature has not included a means test as an element of determining awards generally under ... section 998, and imposing such a requirement would alter the settlement incentives provided by [that section]." ( Holman , supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 284, fn. 30 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) The First District court suggested the means test may best be applied to FEHA cases alone ( Holman , at p. 284, fn. 30, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 ), but there is nothing in Section 998 itself to suggest it is appropriate to treat FEHA litigation as a special case. ( Maintain Our | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Greenberg v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1955(Greenberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323 ; Whitlock v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.App.2d 26, 30 [ 217 P.2d 158 ]; Jackson v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [ 219 P.2d 879 ]; Hall v. Superior Court, 120 Cal.App.2d 844, 850 [ 262 P.2d 351 ]; Pen. 1955Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of jurisdiction ( Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630, 637 [ 284 P.2d 9 ]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 463 [ 171 P.2d 8 ]), and it is an appropriate means to test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution when the validity of an indictment or information is challenged on the ground that the defendant has been indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. ( Greenberg v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323 ; Whitlock v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App.2d | 3 | 1950–1955 |
Grant v. Burr
green
2 sentences1948“The Statute of Limitations is to be employed as a shield, and not as a sword; as a means of defense, and not as a weapon of attack. ’ ’ (Grant v. Burr, 54 Cal. 298, 300 .) If this action had been brought by the state to collect a tax, assuming a statute of limitations to be applicable, the rights of the parties would be quite different. 1942Plaintiff asserts the well-known doctrine that “The Statute of Limitations is to be employed as a shield, and not as a sword; as a means of defense, and not as a weapon of attack. ’ ’ (Grant v. Burr, (1880) 54 Cal. 298, 300 .) It argues further that by virtue of the statute and seizure of the money it succeeded to title to the money; that whether or not it brought any action to perfect its title is immaterial so far as defendant’s right to recover is concerned; that its right to hold the money continues unabated as does the right of a mortgagee in possession, despite the barring by limitation | 3 | 1889–1948 |
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
green
2 sentences2025SIS contends section 1281.98 is not reasonable nor appropriate as applied in this case because it is “an innocent party and at no point did it attempt to delay . . . arbitration.” However, giving deference to the Legislature’s decision to enact section 1281.98 (Energy Reserves, supra, 459 U.S. at pp. 412–413, 418), the statute is not so unreasonable in relation to its purpose of promoting timely adjudication of employee claims that it fails the appropriate means test, especially since the statute gives employers a 30-day window to pay arbitration fees past the due date for payment (§ 1281.98, 2024(See Barrett v. Dawson, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056 [upholding statute even though it could have been “better tailored” to its purpose].) Giving deference to the Legislature’s decision to enact section 1281.98 (Energy Reserves v. Kansas Power & Light, supra, 459 U.S. at pp. 412–413), the statute is not so unreasonable in relation to its purpose of promoting timely adjudication of employee claims that it fails the appropriate means test, especially since the statute still gives employers a 30-day window to pay arbitration fees past the due date for payment (§ 1281.98, subd. (a)(1)). | 2 | 2024–2025 |
East-West Capital Corp. v. Khourie
green
2 sentences2021(See, e.g., Jazayeri v. Mao, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 314, fn. 23 ; Ford v. Miller Meat Co., supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200 ; Commonwealth Memorial, Inc. v. Telophase Society of America (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 867, 869, fn. 1 ; East-West Capital Corp. v. Khourie (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 553, 556 ; Estate of Pack, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d at p. 77.) As we explained hereinabove, this means our standard of review is the substantial evidence test. 2015(East-West, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at p. 558 .) The court reasoned Code of Civil Procedure section 632 prescribed the exclusive means of waiver. | 2 | 2015–2021 |
In Re Clark
red
2 sentences2021(Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 774 .) Though it is unusual for a petitioner to make the required showing, we have said consideration of such a claim is ordinarily warranted “where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason to believe that the claim might be made” and the claim is “asserted as promptly as reasonably possible.” (Id. at p. 775.) In addition, claims based on a change in the law that is retroactively applicable to final judgments will be considered if promptly asserted and if application of the former rule is shown to have been prejudicial. 2015(In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 765- 767.) DuRoss had the opportunity to challenge his restitution fine by means of the appellate process, and was given additional opportunities to challenge the fine through a seemingly endless succession of habeas petitions. | 2 | 2015–2021 |
People v. Hull
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 268 .) Parties are not permitted to wait until entry of an adverse judgment, as Bauman did here, and then contest the denial of their section 170.6 challenge on appeal. 2001(People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 , 820 P.2d 1036 ].) Similarly, Business and Professions Code section 2337, concerning review of a trial court’s determination regarding revocation or suspension of a medical license, provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, review of the superior court’s decision shall be pursuant to a petition for an extraordinary writ.” Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61 , 995 P.2d 191 ] held Business and Professions Code section 2337, which bars an appeal and makes writ review the sole review, is not uncons | 2 | 2001–2020 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2019(People v. Williams, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 391 .) We agree with the trial court’s ruling that only one conspiracy was charged. 2013(People v. Williams (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 382, 391 .) Here, Cardona's contention is without merit because the demurrer was based on an affirmative defense. | 2 | 2013–2019 |
In Re Jackson W.
green
2 sentences2016(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 ; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings for substantial evidence. 2016(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 ; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings for substantial evidence. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Justice P.
green
2 sentences2016(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 ; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings for substantial evidence. 2016(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 ; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings for substantial evidence. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
In Re PA
green
2 sentences2016(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 ; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings for substantial evidence. 2016(In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 ; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 ; In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 .) We review the ruling on a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings for substantial evidence. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Y.M.
green
2 sentences2016(In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 919 ; In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 .) A section 388 petition is an appropriate means to challenge the failure to provide notice as required by law. 2016(In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 919 ; In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 .) A section 388 petition is an appropriate means to challenge the failure to provide notice as required by law. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Brendan O. v. Merced County Human Services Agency
green
2 sentences2016(In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 919 ; In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 .) A section 388 petition is an appropriate means to challenge the failure to provide notice as required by law. 2016(In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 919 ; In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 .) A section 388 petition is an appropriate means to challenge the failure to provide notice as required by law. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
California Slurry Seal Ass'n v. Department of Industrial Relations
green
2 sentences2007(See, e.g., Slurry Seal, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 658-659.) Thus, we decline the union’s invitation to waive application of the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement codified in section 1773.4 in this case. 2007(See, e.g., Slurry Seal, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 658-659, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 38 .) Thus, we decline the union's invitation to waive application of the exhaustion of administrative *684 remedies requirement codified in section 1773.4 in this case. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Gray v. McWilliams
green
2 sentences1916A. 593, 32 Pac. 976 ], where it is said: “In the case of flood waters escaping from natural streams, we view them, it is true, as a common enemy, against which we may protect ourselves without the commission of a wrong; but after all, this decía *576 ration is used in view of the means of defense resorted to rather than in the abstract. 1914A. 593, 32 Pac. 976 ], after a statement that the different conclusions reached in the cases upon the subject of injunction to restrain diversion of flood waters arise by reason of the diversity of facts considered, the learned commissioner who wrote the opinion said: “In the case of flood waters escaping from natural streams, we view them, it is true, as a common enemy, against which we may protect ourselves Without the commission of a wrong; but after all, this declaration is used in view of the means of defense resorted to rather than in the abstract. | 2 | 1914–1916 |
People v. Curiel
green
1 sentence2025As the state high court has explained, “[a]t the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation . . . unless the allegation is refuted by the record.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 .) The petitioner’s allegations are “not refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.” (Ibid.) And in analyzing the record, the trial court “should not make credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974 .) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2025As the state high court has explained, “[a]t the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation . . . unless the allegation is refuted by the record.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 .) The petitioner’s allegations are “not refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.” (Ibid.) And in analyzing the record, the trial court “should not make credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974 .) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Lee
green
1 sentence2025(Ibid.; People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861 , 866–867.) “[U]nless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise,” we presume that the sentencing court considered all relevant factors in the California Rules of Court. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Eckstrom green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2024(Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1126 ; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 .) Thus, in the absence of prejudice, the reviewing court may reject the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without reaching the issue of deficient performance. 2024(Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1126 ; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 .) Thus, in the absence of prejudice, the reviewing court may reject the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without reaching the issue of deficient performance. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Zikorus
green
1 sentence2024Rather, competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem 16 appropriate under the circumstances.”’ (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147-1148 , citing People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 996 , 1002–1003 & People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509 .) This means a defense counsel “is not required to make futile motions or to indulge in idle acts to appear competent.” (People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091-1092 , citing People v. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lower
green
1 sentence2024Rather, competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem 16 appropriate under the circumstances.”’ (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147-1148 , citing People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 996 , 1002–1003 & People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509 .) This means a defense counsel “is not required to make futile motions or to indulge in idle acts to appear competent.” (People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091-1092 , citing People v. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Torrez green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Montoya
green
1 sentence2024Rather, competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem 16 appropriate under the circumstances.”’ (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147-1148 , citing People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 996 , 1002–1003 & People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509 .) This means a defense counsel “is not required to make futile motions or to indulge in idle acts to appear competent.” (People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091-1092 , citing People v. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Turner green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Rodrigues green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Freeman
green
1 sentence2024Rather, competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem 16 appropriate under the circumstances.”’ (People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147-1148 , citing People v. Eckstrom (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 996 , 1002–1003 & People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509 .) This means a defense counsel “is not required to make futile motions or to indulge in idle acts to appear competent.” (People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091-1092 , citing People v. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Rando v. Harris green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Padilla v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Totari green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Vivar green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Aragon green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Sutherland green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| De Castro v. Rowe green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Williams v. FREEDOMCARD, INC. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Harris green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Fink v. Shemtov green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Ford v. Miller Meat Co. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Higgins v. Higgins green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.