means bar in Tennessee

2022Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372 , 418 S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

2022Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372 , 418 S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

2023App. Bd. July 15, 2016), we addressed the factors to be considered in analyzing whether an injured worker is an 4 employee or an independent contractor for workers’ compensation purposes. 5 After noting the seven statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 102(10)(D)(i), we explained, “[t]hese factors are not absolutes that preclude examination of each work relationship as a whole and are no more than a means of analysis.” Id. at *10 (citing Masiers v. Arrow Transfer & Storage Co., 639 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1982)). 6 We also emphasized that “[w]hile no single factor is

2023App. Bd. July 15, 2016), we addressed the factors to be considered in analyzing whether an injured worker is an 4 employee or an independent contractor for workers’ compensation purposes. 5 After noting the seven statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 102(10)(D)(i), we explained, “[t]hese factors are not absolutes that preclude examination of each work relationship as a whole and are no more than a means of analysis.” Id. at *10 (citing Masiers v. Arrow Transfer & Storage Co., 639 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1982)). 6 We also emphasized that “[w]hile no single factor is

2023However, the statute is defensive only and, thus, “may be utilized by the adverse holder only in the defense of a suit and not as a means to bar use by the rightful owner.” Id.

2022Our Supreme Court has previously explained that “limitations on actions statutes,” like § 28-2-103, “may be utilized by the adverse holder only in the defense of a suit and not as a means to bar use by the rightful owner” and that the provision “protects an adverse holder after a period of seven years but only as to that portion of the land in his actual possession.” See Cumulus Broad., Inc., 226 S.W.3d at 376 .

2023See Cromwell General Contractor Inc. v. Lytle, 439 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tenn. 1969).

1979As summarized by the Court, the factors include: (1) the right to control the conduct of the work, (2) the right of termination, (3) the method of payment between the alleged employer and employee, (4) whether or not the alleged employee furnishes his own helpers, and (5) whether or not the alleged employee furnishes his own tools. 439 S.W.2d at 601 The Court qualified these factors by noting that: These tests are no more than a means of analysis.

2016The Supreme Court has recognized that “limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 456 [ ].

2010See generally Owens v. 6 We note that Defendant Walker’s counter-claim cited only Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2- 103, which “may be utilized by the adverse holder only in the defense of a suit and not as a means to bar use by the rightful owner.” Cumulus, 226 S.W.3d at 376 (citing Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400 , 117 S.W. 500 , 503 (Tenn. 1909)).

2010Additionally, Plaintiffs frame the issue on appeal as whether Defendant Walker’s conduct constitutes adverse possession such that summary judgment was appropriate. -6- Bristol Motor Speedway, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s statement of material facts was not filed until the day before the summary judgment hearing would have justified the trial court in disregarding the plaintiff’s response “on that basis alone.”) (citing Tenn. R.

1988See Rounsaville v. Evatt, 733 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn.1987).