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14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2025To that end, the writ has profound historical importance as a means to challenge various forms of unjust detention. ¶18 In Colorado, a court 's authority "to hear habeas corpus petitions derives from constitutional and statutory grants of authority." Jones , ¶ 9 , 443 P.3d at 59 . 2025To that end, the writ has profound historical importance as a means to challenge various forms of unjust detention. 13 ¶18 In Colorado, a court's authority "to hear habeas corpus petitions derives from constitutional and statutory grants of authority." Jones, ¶ 9, 443 P.3d at 59. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Weinreichgreen1 sentence2020This means the error must “so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. Weinreich, 119 P.3d 1073, 1078 (Colo. 2005).5 In the jury instruction context, “the defendant must ‘demonstrate not only that the instruction affected a substantial right, but also that the record reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to his conviction.’” Miller, 113 P.3d at 750 (quoting Garcia, 28 P.3d at 344 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rincongreen2 sentences2015This means that an error must be so clear-cut that a trial judge should have been able to avoid it without benefit of objection, People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31, ¶ 39 , 307 P.3d 1124 , and that it must be "seriously prejudicial," that is, it must have so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the defendant's conviction, Ujaama, 148; see also Hagos, I 14. ¶ 49 We perceive no such error here. ¶ 50 CRE 701 provides that a lay witness's "testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) r 2015To determine if an opinion is based on "spe-clalized knowledge," courts consider whether (1) ordinary citizens can be expected to have known of the information or have had the experiences that form the basis of the opinion and (2) the opinion resulted "from 'a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life' or 'a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field." Id. at 988 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Doylegreen1 sentence2004See United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 535 (2d Cir.1997)(“reasonable doubt standard is the means by which the presumption of innocence is implemented”); cf. People v. Aragon, 665 P.2d 137 (Colo.App.1982)(concluding that absence of instruction on presumption of innocence was plain error). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kaisergreen1 sentence2002This means that the waiver must be made "with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); see also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1998); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maygreen1 sentence2002This means that the waiver must be made "with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); see also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1998); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jordangreen1 sentence2002This means that the waiver must be made "with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); see also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1998); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jiminezgreen1 sentence2002This means that the waiver must be made "with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); see also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1998); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1998). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen1 sentence2001Unlike the truly anonymous tips in Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L., where the corroboration of predictive information was considered important as a means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility, about which nothing could be known, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1875 ; White, 496 U.S. at 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ; see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998); People v. George, 914 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.1996); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990), the caller in this case provided significant information about both his or her veracity and basis of knowledge. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Georgegreen1 sentence2001Unlike the truly anonymous tips in Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L., where the corroboration of predictive information was considered important as a means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility, about which nothing could be known, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1875 ; White, 496 U.S. at 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ; see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998); People v. George, 914 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.1996); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990), the caller in this case provided significant information about both his or her veracity and basis of knowledge. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Salazargreen1 sentence2001Unlike the truly anonymous tips in Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L., where the corroboration of predictive information was considered important as a means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility, about which nothing could be known, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1875 ; White, 496 U.S. at 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ; see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998); People v. George, 914 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.1996); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990), the caller in this case provided significant information about both his or her veracity and basis of knowledge. | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. JLgreen1 sentence2001Unlike the truly anonymous tips in Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L., where the corroboration of predictive information was considered important as a means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility, about which nothing could be known, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1875 ; White, 496 U.S. at 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ; see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998); People v. George, 914 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.1996); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990), the caller in this case provided significant information about both his or her veracity and basis of knowledge. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences1999See People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986, 990 (Colo.1988); People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 552 , 595 P.2d 228, 230 (1979). 1999See People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986, 990 (Colo.1988); People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 552 , 595 P.2d 228, 230 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rowerdinkgreen1 sentence1999See People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986, 990 (Colo.1988); People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 552 , 595 P.2d 228, 230 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Capra v. Millergreen2 sentences1985See Capra v. Miller, 161 Colo. 448 , 422 P.2d 636 (1967) (only judicial relief available to an accused in extradition proceedings is that of habeas corpus). 1985See Capra v. Miller, 161 Colo. 448 , 422 P.2d 636 (1967) (only judicial relief available to an accused in extradition proceedings is that of habeas corpus). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sportsman's Quikstop I, Ltd. v. DiDonato
green
2 sentences2017For example, "[b]ecause the UAA provides the exclusive means to challenge acts that taint an arbitration decision ... a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment is not a proper vehicle to challenge the merits of the underlying arbitration award." Sportsman's Quikstop I , 32 P.3d at 635 . ¶ 16 Courts emphasize regularly that challenges to arbitration awards are confined to the means and manner specified in the UAA. "[T]he UAA sets out in precise detail the rules that apply to confirmation of an arbitration award and the methods by which a party may request the court to vacate or modify such a 2017For example, "[b]ecause the UAA provides the exclusive means to challenge acts that taint an arbitration decision ... a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment is not a proper vehicle to challenge the merits of the underlying arbitration award." Sportsman's Quikstop I , 32 P.3d at 635 . ¶ 16 Courts emphasize regularly that challenges to arbitration awards are confined to the means and manner specified in the UAA. "[T]he UAA sets out in precise detail the rules that apply to confirmation of an arbitration award and the methods by which a party may request the court to vacate or modify such a | 2 | 2004–2017 |
People v. Pollard
green
2 sentences2015This means that an error must be so clear-cut that a trial judge should have been able to avoid it without benefit of objection, People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31, ¶ 39 , 307 P.3d 1124 , and that it must be "seriously prejudicial," that is, it must have so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the defendant's conviction, Ujaama, 148; see also Hagos, I 14. ¶ 49 We perceive no such error here. ¶ 50 CRE 701 provides that a lay witness's "testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) r 2015This means that an error must be so clear-cut that a trial judge should have been able to avoid it without benefit of objection, People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31, ¶ 39 , 307 P.3d 1124 , and that it must be "seriously prejudicial," that is, it must have so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the defendant's conviction, Ujaama, 148; see also Hagos, I 14. ¶ 49 We perceive no such error here. ¶ 50 CRE 701 provides that a lay witness's "testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) r | 2 | 2015–2015 |
v. Valera-Castillo
green
1 sentence2022People v. Valera-Castillo, 2021 COA 91, ¶ 36 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Garcia
green
1 sentence2020This means the error must “so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. Weinreich, 119 P.3d 1073, 1078 (Colo. 2005).5 In the jury instruction context, “the defendant must ‘demonstrate not only that the instruction affected a substantial right, but also that the record reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to his conviction.’” Miller, 113 P.3d at 750 (quoting Garcia, 28 P.3d at 344 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Miller
green
1 sentence2020This means the error must “so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. Weinreich, 119 P.3d 1073, 1078 (Colo. 2005).5 In the jury instruction context, “the defendant must ‘demonstrate not only that the instruction affected a substantial right, but also that the record reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to his conviction.’” Miller, 113 P.3d at 750 (quoting Garcia, 28 P.3d at 344 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Aragon
neutral
1 sentence2004See United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 535 (2d Cir.1997)(“reasonable doubt standard is the means by which the presumption of innocence is implemented”); cf. People v. Aragon, 665 P.2d 137 (Colo.App.1982)(concluding that absence of instruction on presumption of innocence was plain error). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Colorado v. Spring
green
2 sentences2002This means that the waiver must be made "with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); see also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1998); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1998). 2002This means that the waiver must be made "with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); see also People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo.2001); People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Colo.1995); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1998); People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo.1998). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Alabama v. White
green
2 sentences2001Unlike the truly anonymous tips in Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L., where the corroboration of predictive information was considered important as a means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility, about which nothing could be known, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1875 ; White, 496 U.S. at 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ; see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998); People v. George, 914 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.1996); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990), the caller in this case provided significant information about both his or her veracity and basis of knowledge. 2001Unlike the truly anonymous tips in Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L., where the corroboration of predictive information was considered important as a means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility, about which nothing could be known, see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. 1875 ; White, 496 U.S. at 332 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 ; see also People v. Salazar, 964 P.2d 502, 505 (Colo. 1998); People v. George, 914 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo.1996); People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990), the caller in this case provided significant information about both his or her veracity and basis of knowledge. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Denver, L. & G. R.
green
1 sentence1907Co., 126 Fed. 46 ; Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 275 -279; Henry v. Mining Co., 1 Nev. 620 , 623; Menzel v. Hinton, 132 N. C. 665; Jones on Mortgages (6th ed.) § 1203, and cases cited. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Hayes v. Frey
green
1 sentence1907It is a personal privilege granted to a defendant debtor, which he may waive. (3) That where a party has two remedies for an enforcement of a right, the one he chooses is not barred by the statute of limitations merely because the other, if he had resorted to it, would have been. —25 Cyc. 999, and cases cited; Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 277 ; Hayes v. Frey, supra. It was further held that, while the trust deed is a lien upon the property and an incident to the note to the extent that it becomes extinguished by the payment of the note, nevertheless it is such a lien as may be enforced under the c | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Fievel v. Zuber
green
1 sentence1907Co., 126 Fed. 46 ; Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 275 -279; Henry v. Mining Co., 1 Nev. 620 , 623; Menzel v. Hinton, 132 N. C. 665; Jones on Mortgages (6th ed.) § 1203, and cases cited. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.