means test in District of Columbia

2022See, e.g., Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1321 (D.C. 1991) (en banc) (“[A]s has been often observed, drugs and weapons go together.”).

2014See Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a Brady violation where ―the prosecution withheld evidence that would have allowed defense counsel the means to test [the police officer‘s] credibility‖ where the admissibility of Mr. Nuckols‘s confession ―hinged upon proof‖ that he initiated the interview).6 5 The courts in Smith and Gamez-Orduno ultimately rejected the Brady claims in those cases on grounds that the suppressed information was not ―material‖ to the outcome of the hearing.

2014See Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (10th Cir.2000) (finding a Brady violation where “the prosecution withheld evidence that would have allowed defense counsel the means to test [the police officer’s] credibility” where the admissibility of Mr. Nuckols’s confession “hinged upon proof’ that he initiated the interview). 6 We agree that the suppression of material information can violate due process under Brady if it affects the success of a defendant’s pretrial suppression motion.

2014We have described as “eminently sensible” a broad formulation of the government’s Brady obligation that would reach the kind of evidence “that would suggest to any prosecutor that the defense would want to know about it,” Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d at 1110 (quoting Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.2001)); see also Mackabee, 29 A.3d at 962 (D.C. 2011), and a rule prohibiting the government from suppressing favorable informa-tibn material to a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing would impose little if any additional burden on prosecutors and police beyond the obligations that co

2014We have described as “eminently sensible” a broad formulation of the government’s Brady obligation that would reach the kind of evidence “that would suggest to any prosecutor that the defense would want to know about it,” Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d at 1110 (quoting Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.2001)); see also Mackabee, 29 A.3d at 962 (D.C. 2011), and a rule prohibiting the government from suppressing favorable informa-tibn material to a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing would impose little if any additional burden on prosecutors and police beyond the obligations that co

2013See Clement v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Servs., 629 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C.1993) (“A fundamental principle of litigation that has been stressed in a variety of contexts is the importance of finality.”).

2005Id. at 79 (citing Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001)) (in turn citing (Rocky) Brown v. United States, 683 A.2d 118, 124 (D.C.1996)).

2005Id. at 79 (citing Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001)) (in turn citing (Rocky) Brown v. United States, 683 A.2d 118, 124 (D.C.1996)).

2004See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ; see also Baxter, 640 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted).

2004See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ; see also Baxter, 640 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted).

2004See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 ; see also Baxter, 640 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted).

1999D.C. 380, 385, 463 F.2d 783, 788 (1971). 7 Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.