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11 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1906–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daker v. Raygreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Daker v. Ray, 275 Ga. 205, 206 (563 SE2d 429) (2002) (rejecting the writ of mandamus as a means to challenge a conviction and sentence as void and identifying habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy under the circumstances); Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002) (rejecting untimely motion to withdraw guilty plea and noting that the only means available to challenge the convicted defendant’s guilty plea was habeas corpus). 2022See, e.g., Daker v. Ray, 275 Ga. 205, 206 (563 SE2d 429) (2002) (rejecting the writ of mandamus as a means to challenge a conviction and sentence as void and identifying habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy under the circumstances); Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002) (rejecting untimely motion to withdraw guilty plea and noting that the only means available to challenge the convicted defendant’s guilty plea was habeas corpus). | 1 | 1 |
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Burgessgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Burgess, 282 Ga. 433, 436 ( 651 SE2d 36 ) (2007) (holding that exhaustion was not *788 required where the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the state Medicaid plan itself and no statute or rule authorized an administrative procedure for reviewing such facial challenges); Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 237 ( 304 SE2d 708 ) (1983) (same where the plaintiff challenged the assessment of county inspection fees and no county ordinance or state law provided a means to challenge the imposition of such fees). 2016See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Burgess, 282 Ga. 433, 436 ( 651 SE2d 36 ) (2007) (holding that exhaustion was not *788 required where the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the state Medicaid plan itself and no statute or rule authorized an administrative procedure for reviewing such facial challenges); Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 237 ( 304 SE2d 708 ) (1983) (same where the plaintiff challenged the assessment of county inspection fees and no county ordinance or state law provided a means to challenge the imposition of such fees). | 1 | 1 |
Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'ngreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Burgess, 282 Ga. 433, 436 ( 651 SE2d 36 ) (2007) (holding that exhaustion was not *788 required where the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the state Medicaid plan itself and no statute or rule authorized an administrative procedure for reviewing such facial challenges); Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 237 ( 304 SE2d 708 ) (1983) (same where the plaintiff challenged the assessment of county inspection fees and no county ordinance or state law provided a means to challenge the imposition of such fees). 2016See, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Burgess, 282 Ga. 433, 436 ( 651 SE2d 36 ) (2007) (holding that exhaustion was not *788 required where the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the state Medicaid plan itself and no statute or rule authorized an administrative procedure for reviewing such facial challenges); Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 237 ( 304 SE2d 708 ) (1983) (same where the plaintiff challenged the assessment of county inspection fees and no county ordinance or state law provided a means to challenge the imposition of such fees). | 1 | 1 |
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982The most authoritative formulation of the "same evidence" test is found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932): "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." What this means is that a violation of two distinct statutory provisions constitutes two offenses where each statutory provision contains an element which the oth 1982The most authoritative formulation of the “same evidence” test is found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932): “The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” What this means is that a violation of two distinct statutory provisions constitutes two offenses where each statutory provision contains an element which the oth | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Vitalegreen2 sentences1982The most authoritative formulation of the "same evidence" test is found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932): "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." What this means is that a violation of two distinct statutory provisions constitutes two offenses where each statutory provision contains an element which the oth 1982The most authoritative formulation of the “same evidence” test is found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932): “The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” What this means is that a violation of two distinct statutory provisions constitutes two offenses where each statutory provision contains an element which the oth | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
BANK SOUTH MORTGAGE, INC. v. Starr
green
2 sentences2013Id. at 19-20 . 2013Id. at 19-20 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Sprayberry v. Merk
green
2 sentences1924Civil Code (1910), § 2976; Sprayberry v. Merk, 30 Ga. 81 ( 76 Am. 1906Sprayberry v. Merck, 30 Ga. 81 . | 2 | 1906–1924 |
Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee
green
2 sentences2024At the time, the law had become uncertain as to the proper means to challenge a zoning decision due to certain language in Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 ( 807 SE2d 876 ) (2017), which arguably required such actions to be brought by certiorari as appeals of quasi-judicial decisions, rather than as declaratory actions challenging legislative decisions. 2024At the time, the law had become uncertain as to the proper means to challenge a zoning decision due to certain language in Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 ( 807 SE2d 876 ) (2017), which arguably required such actions to be brought by certiorari as appeals of quasi-judicial decisions, rather than as declaratory actions challenging legislative decisions. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2022See, e.g., Daker v. Ray, 275 Ga. 205, 206 (563 SE2d 429) (2002) (rejecting the writ of mandamus as a means to challenge a conviction and sentence as void and identifying habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy under the circumstances); Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002) (rejecting untimely motion to withdraw guilty plea and noting that the only means available to challenge the convicted defendant’s guilty plea was habeas corpus). 2022See, e.g., Daker v. Ray, 275 Ga. 205, 206 (563 SE2d 429) (2002) (rejecting the writ of mandamus as a means to challenge a conviction and sentence as void and identifying habeas corpus as the exclusive remedy under the circumstances); Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002) (rejecting untimely motion to withdraw guilty plea and noting that the only means available to challenge the convicted defendant’s guilty plea was habeas corpus). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bullock v. Winter
neutral
2 sentences1955It was not the purpose of the law, in creating the right to vouch, to cut off the right of the vouchee to assert any defense which he might have had without it.” The cases of Bullock v. Winter, 10 Ga. 214 , Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300 , Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416 ( 62 S. E. 291 ), Southern Ry. 1955It was not the purpose of the law, in creating the right to vouch, to cut off the right of the vouchee to assert any defense which he might have had without it." The cases of Bullock v. Winter, 10 Ga. 214 , Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300 , Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416 ( 62 S. E. 291 ), Southern Ry. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Lord v. Cannon
neutral
2 sentences1955It was not the purpose of the law, in creating the right to vouch, to cut off the right of the vouchee to assert any defense which he might have had without it.” The cases of Bullock v. Winter, 10 Ga. 214 , Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300 , Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416 ( 62 S. E. 291 ), Southern Ry. 1955It was not the purpose of the law, in creating the right to vouch, to cut off the right of the vouchee to assert any defense which he might have had without it." The cases of Bullock v. Winter, 10 Ga. 214 , Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300 , Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416 ( 62 S. E. 291 ), Southern Ry. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Taylor v. Allen
green
2 sentences1955It was not the purpose of the law, in creating the right to vouch, to cut off the right of the vouchee to assert any defense which he might have had without it." The cases of Bullock v. Winter, 10 Ga. 214 , Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300 , Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416 ( 62 S. E. 291 ), Southern Ry. 1955It was not the purpose of the law, in creating the right to vouch, to cut off the right of the vouchee to assert any defense which he might have had without it." The cases of Bullock v. Winter, 10 Ga. 214 , Lord v. Cannon, 75 Ga. 300 , Taylor v. Allen, 131 Ga. 416 ( 62 S. E. 291 ), Southern Ry. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Daniels v. State
green
2 sentences1942It could have been as well accomplished by the commission of the homicide by one person alone, as by that person acting in conjunction with many; and hence the proof of the conspiracy, the conspiracy itself not being a substantive part of the offense, was not necessary to a conviction of those persons who were shown to have participated in both the criminal design and the criminal act.” In Daniels v. State, 58 Ga. App. 599 (9) ( 199 S. E. 572 ), a case where several persons were jointly indicted for the offense of robbery, this language is used: “The crime is the act prohibited by statute, but 1942It could have been as well accomplished by the commission of the homicide by one person alone, as by that person acting in conjunction with many; and hence the proof of the conspiracy, the conspiracy itself not being a substantive part of the offense, was not necessary to a conviction of those persons who were shown to have participated in both the criminal design and the criminal act.” In Daniels v. State, 58 Ga. App. 599 (9) ( 199 S. E. 572 ), a case where several persons were jointly indicted for the offense of robbery, this language is used: “The crime is the act prohibited by statute, but | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Kean v. Lathrop
green
1 sentence1928Thus, a dismissal of the original bill carries the cross-bill with it when the latter seeks relief by way of defense; but it is otherwise, and relief may still be given upon the cross-bill, where affirmative relief is sought thereby as to collateral matters properly presented in connection with the matters alleged in the bill.” Story’s Equity Pleading, § 399, quoted in Lacher v. Manley, 139 Ga. 802 ( 78 S. E. 188 ), where it was further said: “And where the cross-bill sets up additional facts germane to the subject-matter of the original bill and prays for affirmative relief against the compla | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Harris v. Hines
green
1 sentence1928Thus, a dismissal of the original bill carries the cross-bill with it when the latter seeks relief by way of defense; but it is otherwise, and relief may still be given upon the cross-bill, where affirmative relief is sought thereby as to collateral matters properly presented in connection with the matters alleged in the bill.” Story’s Equity Pleading, § 399, quoted in Lacher v. Manley, 139 Ga. 802 ( 78 S. E. 188 ), where it was further said: “And where the cross-bill sets up additional facts germane to the subject-matter of the original bill and prays for affirmative relief against the compla | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Evans v. Sheldon
neutral
1 sentence1928Thus, a dismissal of the original bill carries the cross-bill with it when the latter seeks relief by way of defense; but it is otherwise, and relief may still be given upon the cross-bill, where affirmative relief is sought thereby as to collateral matters properly presented in connection with the matters alleged in the bill.” Story’s Equity Pleading, § 399, quoted in Lacher v. Manley, 139 Ga. 802 ( 78 S. E. 188 ), where it was further said: “And where the cross-bill sets up additional facts germane to the subject-matter of the original bill and prays for affirmative relief against the compla | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Lacher v. Manley
green
1 sentence1928Thus, a dismissal of the original bill carries the cross-bill with it when the latter seeks relief by way of defense; but it is otherwise, and relief may still be given upon the cross-bill, where affirmative relief is sought thereby as to collateral matters properly presented in connection with the matters alleged in the bill.” Story’s Equity Pleading, § 399, quoted in Lacher v. Manley, 139 Ga. 802 ( 78 S. E. 188 ), where it was further said: “And where the cross-bill sets up additional facts germane to the subject-matter of the original bill and prays for affirmative relief against the compla | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Glawson v. State
green
1 sentence1928Thus, a dismissal of the original bill carries the cross-bill with it when the latter seeks relief by way of defense; but it is otherwise, and relief may still be given upon the cross-bill, where affirmative relief is sought thereby as to collateral matters properly presented in connection with the matters alleged in the bill.” Story’s Equity Pleading, § 399, quoted in Lacher v. Manley, 139 Ga. 802 ( 78 S. E. 188 ), where it was further said: “And where the cross-bill sets up additional facts germane to the subject-matter of the original bill and prays for affirmative relief against the compla | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.