means challenge in New Jersey

2020D’Atria, 242 N.J.

2019D’Atria, 242 N.J.

2019Although the Gregory court acknowledged that there had been no "direct suppression of evidence" by the government, it noted that "there was unquestionably a suppression of the means by which the defense could obtain evidence." Id. at 189 .

2013Presumably the prosecutor, in interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why defense counsel should not have an equal opportunity to determine, through interviews with the witnesses, what they know about the case and what they will testify to. [Id. at 188.] Although no evidence was suppressed, the court found the prosecutor’s advice to the witnesses suppressed “the means by which the defense could obtain evidence.” Id. at 189 .

2009In particular, the Court found “the thorough and efficient education clause ... does not require ‘the legislature to provide the same means of instruction for every child in the state.’ ” Id. at 291 [ 495 A.2d 376 ] (quoting Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509, 512 [31 A 1017] (Sup.Ct.1895)).

1997Before determining that an administrative law judge should consider the evidence at the heart of the controversy, the Court in Abbott I, supra, reviewed the Robinson litigation (I through V) and found three basic themes that emerged from the opinions in those cases: (1) “[t]he thorough and efficient education clause ... does not require the legislature to provide the same means of instruction for every child in the state”; (2) “if the State assumes the cost of providing the constitutionally mandated education, it may ... authorize local government to go further and to tax to that end”; and (3)

1998Observing that the officer’s conduct did not arise from the lawful exercise of police powers in furtherance of his official functions, the court stated that the “legislative goal to the 1986 amendment was to deny a means for the defense of an action or reimbursement when the officer’s infraction or criminal act is a ‘perversion’ of, rather than in furtherance of, his duties.” Id. at 546, 549, 638 A.2d 1377 (citing Bruno, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 473 , 571 A.2d 1003 ).

1998Observing that the officer’s conduct did not arise from the lawful exercise of police powers in furtherance of his official functions, the court stated that the “legislative goal to the 1986 amendment was to deny a means for the defense of an action or reimbursement when the officer’s infraction or criminal act is a ‘perversion’ of, rather than in furtherance of, his duties.” Id. at 546, 549, 638 A.2d 1377 (citing Bruno, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 473 , 571 A.2d 1003 ).

1988In Woodland Private Study Group v. State of N.J., 616 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1985), the validity of such a scheme, in the context of the Spill Act, was examined by a federal district *80 court and found to satisfy due process requirements. [5] The court's analysis in that case, however, failed to fully focus on the significance of the fact that the Act's provision of a means to challenge administrative action is only free of the threat of added punitive damages if done after compliance with such action.

1988In Woodland Private Study Group v. State of N.J., 616 F.Supp. 794 (D.N.J.1985), the validity of such a scheme, in the context of the Spill Act, was examined by a federal district court and found to satisfy due process requirements. 5 The court’s analysis in that case, however, failed to fully focus on the significance of the fact that the Act’s provision of a means to challenge administrative action is only free of the threat of added punitive damages if done after compliance with such action.

2021Ibid.

2010Ford, supra, 240 N.J.Super. at 51 , 572 A. 2d 640 .

2010Ford, supra, 240 N.J.Super. at 51 , 572 A. 2d 640 .

2005Prado v. State of New Jersey, 376 N.J.Super. 231, 235-36 , 870 A.2d 294 (App.Div.2005).

2005Prado v. State of New Jersey, 376 N.J.Super. 231, 235-36 , 870 A.2d 294 (App.Div.2005).

1998Observing that the officer’s conduct did not arise from the lawful exercise of police powers in furtherance of his official functions, the court stated that the “legislative goal to the 1986 amendment was to deny a means for the defense of an action or reimbursement when the officer’s infraction or criminal act is a ‘perversion’ of, rather than in furtherance of, his duties.” Id. at 546, 549, 638 A.2d 1377 (citing Bruno, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 473 , 571 A.2d 1003 ).

1998Observing that the officer's conduct did not arise from the lawful exercise of police powers in furtherance of his official functions, the court stated that the "legislative goal to the 1986 amendment was to deny a means for the defense of an action or reimbursement when the officer's infraction or criminal act is a `perversion' of, rather than in furtherance of, his duties." Id. at 546, 549, 638 A. 2d 1377 (citing Bruno, supra, 239 N.J.

1994However, in either case, the message of the 1986 amendment is clear: the police officer will be entitled to reimbursement or counsel "only where he is charged with an infraction arising from the lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of his official duties." Sparkman, 237 N.J.

1985The thorough and efficient education clause, however, does not require “the legislature to provide the same means of instruction for every child in the state.” Landis, 57 N.J.L. at 512 (quoted in Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 514 ).

1964This means that the rule announced in In re Fitzpatrick, supra , governing the eligibility of those sentenced to consecutive sentences, remains in force when applied to life sentences.

1877The general subject of the jurisdiction of a court or judge, in cases of habeas corpus, will be found fully discussed in the recent case of People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559 , and cases there cited.