means defense in Connecticut

1994A motion to strike is the means to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading; it admits all facts well-pleaded but does not admit legal conclusions, Mingachos v. CBS Inc. , 196 Conn. 91 , 108 (1985).

1993A motion to strike is a means by which to challenge the legal sufficiency of a pleading Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 109 (1985).

2001While a motion to strike is generally the proper means to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint; Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270-71 , 709 A.2d 558 (1999); the standards governing motions for summary judgment are applicable here because Sheehan has submitted a motion for summary judgment instead of a motion to strike.

2001While a motion to strike is generally the proper means to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint; Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270-71 , 709 A.2d 558 (1999); the standards governing motions for summary judgment are applicable here because Sheehan has submitted a motion for summary judgment instead of a motion to strike.

1991Krasnow v. Krasnow, 140 Conn. 254 , 262 (1953); see Graham v. Graham, 25 Conn. App. 41 , 50-51 (1991).

1983The fact that there is no statute providing for an allowance in a divorce action is not decisive.” Krasnow v. Krasnow, 140 Conn. 254, 262 , 99 A.2d 104 (1953).

1948McGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150 , 153 ; State ex rel.

1948McGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150, 153 ; State ex rel.

2010IX, § 1; Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 535 , 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (“[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge . . . being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws ... to encourage schools and the means of instruction,” and “[t]he Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Neb.

2010IX, § 1; Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 535 , 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (“[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge . . . being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws ... to encourage schools and the means of instruction,” and “[t]he Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), quoting Neb.

2002During the hearing the said Defendant cited the case of Appuzzo v. Hoer, 125 Conn. 196 , 202-3 (1939).

2001See Practice Book § 10-31 (a)(1), Tomlinson v. Board of Education , 226 Conn. 704 , 717-18 (1993); Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co. , 192 Conn. 591 , 595 (1984).

1994On the other hand in deciding these motions facts alleged in the complaint are to be construed in a way that is most favorable to the non movant, here the plaintiff, Drazen v. Drazen , 180 Conn. 572 , 575 (1980). 1.

1993Practice 143; Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682 , 686 , 490 A.2d 509 (1985).

1993Practice 143; Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682 , 686 , 490 A.2d 509 (1985).

1992The motion to quash is not a means by which to test the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in a return or the answer to the return.” In Carr , our Supreme Court noted that “this constitutional issue was neither raised at the trial level nor briefed on appeal.” State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 475 , 374 A.2d 1107 (1977).

1992The motion to quash is not a means by which to test the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in a return or the answer to the return.” In Carr , our Supreme Court noted that “this constitutional issue was neither raised at the trial level nor briefed on appeal.” State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 475 , 374 A.2d 1107 (1977).

1964For a discussion of motions to quash and their limited function, see Jepsen v. Toni Co., 20 Conn. Sup. 287, 289 .

1953McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 32 , 218 P.2d 929 ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 465 , 187 N.W. 227 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 856 , 106 N.W. 993 ; Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 686 , 687 (St.

1953McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 32 , 218 P.2d 929 ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 465 , 187 N.W. 227 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 856 , 106 N.W. 993 ; Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 686 , 687 (St.

1953McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 32 , 218 P.2d 929 ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 465 , 187 N.W. 227 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 856 , 106 N.W. 993 ; Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 686 , 687 (St.

1953McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 32 , 218 P.2d 929 ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 465 , 187 N.W. 227 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 856 , 106 N.W. 993 ; Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 686 , 687 (St.

1953McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 32 , 218 P.2d 929 ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 465 , 187 N.W. 227 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 856 , 106 N.W. 993 ; Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 686 , 687 (St.

1953McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 32 , 218 P.2d 929 ; Spratt v. Spratt, 151 Minn. 458, 465 , 187 N.W. 227 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 856 , 106 N.W. 993 ; Crooks v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 686 , 687 (St.

1930Error is assigned in the failure to charge, as requested, that a person of a profession “which involves and implies a reasonable amount of technical skill, knowledge, and probity is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that he has discharged his duty, whether legal or moral, until the contrary is shown.” We have *488 held this rule to be available to the plaintiff in actions by physicians and attorneys to recover for professional services (Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 440 , 135 Atl. 570 ; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 464 , 30 Atl. 165 ), but we do not deem it applicable, at least to i

1930Error is assigned in the failure to charge, as requested, that a person of a profession “which involves and implies a reasonable amount of technical skill, knowledge, and probity is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that he has discharged his duty, whether legal or moral, until the contrary is shown.” We have *488 held this rule to be available to the plaintiff in actions by physicians and attorneys to recover for professional services (Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 440 , 135 Atl. 570 ; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 464 , 30 Atl. 165 ), but we do not deem it applicable, at least to i

1930Error is assigned in the failure to charge, as requested, that a person of a profession “which involves and implies a reasonable amount of technical skill, knowledge, and probity is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that he has discharged his duty, whether legal or moral, until the contrary is shown.” We have *488 held this rule to be available to the plaintiff in actions by physicians and attorneys to recover for professional services (Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 440 , 135 Atl. 570 ; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 464 , 30 Atl. 165 ), but we do not deem it applicable, at least to i

1930Error is assigned in the failure to charge, as requested, that a person of a profession “which involves and implies a reasonable amount of technical skill, knowledge, and probity is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that he has discharged his duty, whether legal or moral, until the contrary is shown.” We have *488 held this rule to be available to the plaintiff in actions by physicians and attorneys to recover for professional services (Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 440 , 135 Atl. 570 ; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 464 , 30 Atl. 165 ), but we do not deem it applicable, at least to i