agency hearing in District of Columbia

1984Where the conduct of an agency hearing is challenged and procedural rules have not been adopted by the agency, we review the hearing to determine if it was conducted in conformance with "well established rules of procedure generally applicable to agency adjudications.” Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 413 A.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted).

1984Where the conduct of an agency hearing is challenged and procedural rules have not been adopted by the agency, we review the hearing to determine if it was conducted in conformance with "well established rules of procedure generally applicable to agency adjudications." Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 413 A.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted).

1977APA, which accords every party to an agency hearing a right “to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts” [citing D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1509(b)], It is well settled that unless the persons who supply the answers to questionnaires are available for cross-examination by the adverse party, such documents do not meet the requirements of “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence” . . . . [General Railway Signal Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 354 A.2d 529, 532 (1976), citing Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., 119 U.S.App.D

1976See Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Company, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 122 , 337 F.2d 518 (1964).

2025Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 188; see also Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 277 (noting that a statute’s “grant of discretionary authority” to an agency to hold a hearing does not satisfy the contested case requirement).

2025Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 188; see also Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 277 (noting that a statute’s “grant of discretionary authority” to an agency to hold a hearing does not satisfy the contested case requirement).

2020While the federal circuit court decisions interpreting the junk fax provisions of the TCPA do not mention this provision, at least one state court decision has relied on it to find that an agency analysis is appropriate for assessing (…continued) 40 This conclusion is consistent with the proposition that “[f]ederal statutory tort actions, such as those authorized under the TCPA, typically are construed to incorporate federal common law agency principles of vicarious liability where, as here, the language of the statute permits such a construction and doing so would advance statutory purposes.”

2020While the federal circuit court decisions interpreting the junk fax provisions of the TCPA do not mention this provision, at least one state court decision has relied on it to find that an agency analysis is appropriate for assessing (…continued) 40 This conclusion is consistent with the proposition that “[f]ederal statutory tort actions, such as those authorized under the TCPA, typically are construed to incorporate federal common law agency principles of vicarious liability where, as here, the language of the statute permits such a construction and doing so would advance statutory purposes.”

2020While the federal circuit court decisions interpreting the junk fax provisions of the TCPA do not mention this provision, at least one state court decision has relied on it to find that an agency analysis is appropriate for assessing (…continued) 40 This conclusion is consistent with the proposition that “[f]ederal statutory tort actions, such as those authorized under the TCPA, typically are construed to incorporate federal common law agency principles of vicarious liability where, as here, the language of the statute permits such a construction and doing so would advance statutory purposes.”

2020Cf. Clark, 816 F.3d at 938 (“While the [trial] court appeared hesitant to label this an agency theory,” “[w]e recognize this for what it is: an agency analysis.”).

2020Cf. Clark, 816 F.3d at 938 (“While the [trial] court appeared hesitant to label this an agency theory,” “[w]e recognize this for what it is: an agency analysis.”).

2013Such a rule is referred to as an interpretive’ [or interpretative] rule.” Andrews v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 991 A.2d 763, 770 (D.C.2010) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

2013Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 743 A.2d 1208, 1212 (D.C.1999) (upholding an agency rule adopted in an adjudication that “represents a procedural clarification that is consistent with the statutory thirty day filing requirement set forth in [D.C.Code] § 36-322(b)(2)”).

2011Mead Data Central, Inc., 566 F.2d at 261 (footnotes omitted). .The District’s argument that the exempt information in the requested documents cannot reasonably be segregated focuses almost exclusively on the trial board files.

2010See, e.g., id. at 705 (reversing where the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion was based on a misapprehension of fact); Mexicano, 806 A.2d at 205 (holding that the hearing examiner rejected the treating physician’s opinion for insufficiently persuasive reasons); Clark v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 772 A.2d 198, 204 (D.C.2001) (setting aside administrative decision because the hearing officer failed to give adequate consideration to the deposition testimony of a treating physician); Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 7

2010See, e.g., id. at 705 (reversing where the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion was based on a misapprehension of fact); Mexicano, 806 A.2d at 205 (holding that the hearing examiner rejected the treating physician’s opinion for insufficiently persuasive reasons); Clark v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 772 A.2d 198, 204 (D.C.2001) (setting aside administrative decision because the hearing officer failed to give adequate consideration to the deposition testimony of a treating physician); Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 7

2010See, e.g., id. at 705 (reversing where the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion was based on a misapprehension of fact); Mexicano, 806 A.2d at 205 (holding that the hearing examiner rejected the treating physician’s opinion for insufficiently persuasive reasons); Clark v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 772 A.2d 198, 204 (D.C.2001) (setting aside administrative decision because the hearing officer failed to give adequate consideration to the deposition testimony of a treating physician); Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 7

2010See, e.g., id. at 705 (reversing where the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion was based on a misapprehension of fact); Mexicano, 806 A.2d at 205 (holding that the hearing examiner rejected the treating physician’s opinion for insufficiently persuasive reasons); Clark v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 772 A.2d 198, 204 (D.C.2001) (setting aside administrative decision because the hearing officer failed to give adequate consideration to the deposition testimony of a treating physician); Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 7

2009See Tolu *200 Tolu v. District of Columbia, 906 A.2d 265, 267 (D.C.2006).

2009Id. at 872 (emphasis added).

2009Id. at 872 (emphasis added).

2007Hosp. v. Bowen, 261 U.S.App.D.C. 262, 270 , 821 F.2d 750 , 758 (1987) (“The effect of invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.”).

2007Hosp. v. Bowen, 261 U.S.App.D.C. 262, 270 , 821 F.2d 750 , 758 (1987) (“The effect of invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.”).

2003See Spartin v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 584 A.2d 564, 572-73 (D.C.1990) (when agency fails to make *873 finding on material contested issue, court cannot fill gap by making its own determination from the record).