agency rule in Oregon

2018See ORS 183.482(8)(b) (stating that the court shall remand an agency order if it "finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be: (A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; [or] (B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency"); Gordon v. Board of Parole , 343 Or. 618 , 633-34, 175 P.3d 461 (2007) (explaining that the reasoning underlying the substantial reason requirement "applies equally to [judicial] review of agency orders under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B)").

2018See ORS 183.482(8)(b) (stating that the court shall remand an agency order if it "finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be: (A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; [or] (B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency"); Gordon v. Board of Parole , 343 Or. 618 , 633-34, 175 P.3d 461 (2007) (explaining that the reasoning underlying the substantial reason requirement "applies equally to [judicial] review of agency orders under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B)").

1995In Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223 , 621 P2d 547 (1980), the Supreme Court said that the analysis of the validity of an agency rule that construes a statute depends on which of three categories of statutory terms is involved: “1.) Terms of precise meaning, whether of common or technical'parlance, requiring only factfinding by the agency and judicial review for substantial evidence; “2.) Inexact terms which require agency interpretation and judicial review for consistency with legislative policy; and “3.) Terms of delegation which require legislative policy determin

1995In Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223 , 621 P2d 547 (1980), the Supreme Court said that the analysis of the validity of an agency rule that construes a statute depends on which of three categories of statutory terms is involved: “1.) Terms of precise meaning, whether of common or technical'parlance, requiring only factfinding by the agency and judicial review for substantial evidence; “2.) Inexact terms which require agency interpretation and judicial review for consistency with legislative policy; and “3.) Terms of delegation which require legislative policy determin

2025Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), we will remand an order to an agency if we conclude that an agency’s exercise Cite as 344 Or App 470 (2025) 481 of discretion is “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an offi- cially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency[.]” In reviewing an order for consistency, we review “to determine if the [agency’s] findings, reasoning, and conclusions demon- strate that it acted in a rational, fair, and principled manner in deciding” petitioners’ case.

2025Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), we will remand an order to an agency if we conclude that an agency’s exercise Cite as 344 Or App 470 (2025) 481 of discretion is “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an offi- cially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency[.]” In reviewing an order for consistency, we review “to determine if the [agency’s] findings, reasoning, and conclusions demon- strate that it acted in a rational, fair, and principled manner in deciding” petitioners’ case.

2023Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc., 2021 Ark App 330, 2021 WL 4186665 (Ark App 2021) (addressing a claim where the state denied coverage of Exondys for a patient based on an agency rule that “[a]ll services must be medically necessary,” the court stated without engaging in statutory construction that “[p]rior authorization is a time-limited, administrative process for ensuring that a doctor has prescribed the covered out- patient drug for a medically accepted indication”). 10 As explained above, since July 2020, the PA Criteria have included in this criterion “or ha

2023Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc., 2021 Ark App 330, 2021 WL 4186665 (Ark App 2021) (addressing a claim where the state denied coverage of Exondys for a patient based on an agency rule that “[a]ll services must be medically necessary,” the court stated without engaging in statutory construction that “[p]rior authorization is a time-limited, administrative process for ensuring that a doctor has prescribed the covered out- patient drug for a medically accepted indication”). 10 As explained above, since July 2020, the PA Criteria have included in this criterion “or ha

2010See Friends S055722, 346 Or. at 375, 213 P.3d 1164 (internal quotation marks omitted); Friends A125031, 215 Or.App. at 568 , 171 P.3d 942 .

2010See Friends S055722, 346 Or. at 375, 213 P.3d 1164 (internal quotation marks omitted); Friends A125031, 215 Or.App. at 568 , 171 P.3d 942 .

1986To the extent that the meaning of "urban uses" is ambiguous in the light of the goals and other definitions, we would review any interpretations by LCDC of that term in this case only to determine if they "express a new policy or standard varying in substance from the existing policy and standards of Goal 14," 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, supra, 299 Or. at 369 , 703 P.2d 207 ; ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) (court shall remand agency order if exercise of discretion is "[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsiste

1986To the extent that the meaning of "urban uses" is ambiguous in the light of the goals and other definitions, we would review any interpretations by LCDC of that term in this case only to determine if they "express a new policy or standard varying in substance from the existing policy and standards of Goal 14," 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, supra, 299 Or. at 369 , 703 P.2d 207 ; ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B) (court shall remand agency order if exercise of discretion is "[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsiste

2023OAR 137-003-0572(1) is clear that “[d]epositions may not be taken in contested cases without agency authorization.” Additionally, any peti- tion for an order to take a deposition of a witness “shall * * * Cite as 327 Or App 603 (2023) 613 explain why no other means of obtaining the witness’s tes- timony for the hearing is adequate.” OAR 137-003-0572(2).

2022The court noted that Smith followed an agency analysis and looked at whether the officers were involved to a suffi- cient extent such that the informant “could be described as having acted ‘at the behest’ of the state.” Id. at 54 (quoting Smith, 310 Or at 15 ).

2022Cite as 323 Or App 151 (2022) 165 As noted, in this docket, the PUC reviewed all of Qwest’s telecommunications rates pursuant to the tradi- tional regulatory method under Oregon law that focused on whether Qwest’s rates as a whole met its overall revenue requirement.

2020Cite as 367 Or 258 (2020) 283 The present case is different; it is no “common variety of administrative contest.” In McKean-Coffman, the claim- ant challenged the application of an established agency rule based on the agency’s understanding of the related statute.

2019Instead, the applicable rule at the time-cited by both parties among their primary points of law-focused on whether a private party search had either been conducted in collusion with *197 police officers or had been marked by actual officer involvement: "Private persons may search the premises of another without constitutional restraint unless there is police collusion or the police participate in the search in any manner ." See Appellant's Opening Brief at 14, State v. Purvis , 249 Or. 404 , 438 P.2d 1002 (1968) (setting out controlling propositions of law); Respondent's Brief at 2, State v.

2019Instead, the applicable rule at the time-cited by both parties among their primary points of law-focused on whether a private party search had either been conducted in collusion with *197 police officers or had been marked by actual officer involvement: "Private persons may search the premises of another without constitutional restraint unless there is police collusion or the police participate in the search in any manner ." See Appellant's Opening Brief at 14, State v. Purvis , 249 Or. 404 , 438 P.2d 1002 (1968) (setting out controlling propositions of law); Respondent's Brief at 2, State v.

2016Or Laws 1991, ch 312, § 1. 4 The amendment was designed to overrule Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78, 80 , 810 P2d 1318 , withdrawn on recons, 108 Or App 230 , 814 P2d 558 (1991), which held that the then-existing version of ORS 656.386 did not authorize attorney fees short of an agency hearing.

2016Or Laws 1991, ch 312, § 1. 4 The amendment was designed to overrule Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78, 80 , 810 P2d 1318 , withdrawn on recons, 108 Or App 230 , 814 P2d 558 (1991), which held that the then-existing version of ORS 656.386 did not authorize attorney fees short of an agency hearing.

2016Or Laws 1991, ch 312, § 1. 4 The amendment was designed to overrule Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78, 80 , 810 P2d 1318 , withdrawn on recons, 108 Or App 230 , 814 P2d 558 (1991), which held that the then-existing version of ORS 656.386 did not authorize attorney fees short of an agency hearing.

2016Or Laws 1991, ch 312, § 1. 4 The amendment was designed to overrule Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78, 80 , 810 P2d 1318 , withdrawn on recons, 108 Or App 230 , 814 P2d 558 (1991), which held that the then-existing version of ORS 656.386 did not authorize attorney fees short of an agency hearing.

2016In United States v. Jarrett, 338 F3d 339 (4th Cir 2003), for example, the court examined whether a computer hacker who turned over evidence of child pornography to federal authorities had acted on behalf of the government.

2015Co., 269 Or 549 , 525 P2d 1003 (1974), and Allstate Ins. v. State Farm Ins., 67 Or App 623 , 679 P2d 879 (1984), establish a rule different from the one set out in DeJonge and ABCD Vision.

2015Co., 269 Or 549 , 525 P2d 1003 (1974), and Allstate Ins. v. State Farm Ins., 67 Or App 623 , 679 P2d 879 (1984), establish a rule different from the one set out in DeJonge and ABCD Vision.

2015Co., 269 Or 549 , 525 P2d 1003 (1974), and Allstate Ins. v. State Farm Ins., 67 Or App 623 , 679 P2d 879 (1984), establish a rule different from the one set out in DeJonge and ABCD Vision.

2015Co., 269 Or 549 , 525 P2d 1003 (1974), and Allstate Ins. v. State Farm Ins., 67 Or App 623 , 679 P2d 879 (1984), establish a rule different from the one set out in DeJonge and ABCD Vision.

2014An agency rule “cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit statutory wording so that it has the effect of undermining the legislative intent.” Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 548-49 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (citing Miller v. Employment Division, 290 Or 285, 289 , 620 P2d 1377 (1980)).

2014An agency rule “cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit statutory wording so that it has the effect of undermining the legislative intent.” Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 548-49 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (citing Miller v. Employment Division, 290 Or 285, 289 , 620 P2d 1377 (1980)).

2014An agency rule “cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit statutory wording so that it has the effect of undermining the legislative intent.” Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 548-49 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (citing Miller v. Employment Division, 290 Or 285, 289 , 620 P2d 1377 (1980)).

2014An agency rule “cannot amend, alter, enlarge upon, or limit statutory wording so that it has the effect of undermining the legislative intent.” Garrison v. Dept. of Rev., 345 Or 544, 548-49 , 200 P3d 126 (2008) (citing Miller v. Employment Division, 290 Or 285, 289 , 620 P2d 1377 (1980)).

2014If the court finds that the agency has erroneously inter- preted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action, the court shall: Cite as 356 Or 186 (2014) 195 “(A) Set aside or modify the order; or “(B) Remand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law. “(b) The court shall remand the order to the agency if the court finds the agency’s exercise of discretion to be: “(A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; “(B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency positio

2013The second sentence of ORS 144.335(3) plainly states that our court “may affirm, reverse or remand the order on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482(8)” (Emphasis added.) As we recognized in Castro , given that second sentence, ORS 144.335(3) requires us to review the board’s order for substantial evidence and reason— requirements under ORS 183.482(8). 232 Or App at 82-83 ; see also Martin, 327 Or at 157 (“[T]he requirement of some kind of an explanation connecting the facts of the case (which would include the facts found, if any) and the result reached by an agency is a requirement of O

2013Relying on Drew v. PSRB, 322 Or 491 , 909 P2d 1211 (1996), the court concluded that “the requirement of some kind of an explanation connecting the facts of the case * * * and the result reached by an agency is a requirement of ORS 183.482(8), as that section has been construed authoritatively by this court.” Martin, 327 Or at 157 .

2013Relying on Drew v. PSRB, 322 Or 491 , 909 P2d 1211 (1996), the court concluded that “the requirement of some kind of an explanation connecting the facts of the case * * * and the result reached by an agency is a requirement of ORS 183.482(8), as that section has been construed authoritatively by this court.” Martin, 327 Or at 157 .

2011Like the petitioner’s argument in Labor Ready Northwest, Inc. v. BOLI, 208 Or App 195, 202 , 145 P3d 232 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 473 (2007), petitioner’s argument here is that the agency’s exercise of its discretion in this case was “[o]utside the range of discretion” delegated by statute.

2011Like the petitioner’s argument in Labor Ready Northwest, Inc. v. BOLI, 208 Or App 195, 202 , 145 P3d 232 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 473 (2007), petitioner’s argument here is that the agency’s exercise of its discretion in this case was “[o]utside the range of discretion” delegated by statute.

2010However, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Washburn v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 197 Or App 104 , 104 P3d 609 (2005), two weeks before the hearing in this case, and employer concluded that the reasoning in Washburn foreclosed its fifth affirmative defense.

2010However, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Washburn v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 197 Or App 104 , 104 P3d 609 (2005), two weeks before the hearing in this case, and employer concluded that the reasoning in Washburn foreclosed its fifth affirmative defense.