agency motion in California

2025(See People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [“We . . . abide by . . . a ‘ “cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more” ’ ”].) We must therefore remand for limited proceedings to determine ICWA compliance.

2024(See People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [“We . . . abide by . . . a ‘ “cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more” ’ ”].) Accordingly, we remand the matter for further ICWA compliance and for the juvenile court to enter an ICWA finding based on the Agency’s demonstration of inquiry and notice. 11 DISPOSITION The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally affirmed subject only to full compliance with the ICWA as described in this opinion.

2024(In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 704-705, 709 .) Because the juvenile court did not make a finding on the subject, we have no ICWA findings and orders to review and any remarks we would make on the adequacy of the Agency’s inquiry and notice would be advisory.

2024(In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 704-705, 709 .) Because the juvenile court did not make a finding on the subject as to either child, we 11 have no ICWA findings and orders to review and any remarks we would make on the adequacy of the Agency’s inquiry and notice would be nothing more than advisory.

2014(Ibid.; see In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547-1548 [appeal in juvenile dependency matter should 6 In his opposition to the Agency's motion, father does not contest the Agency's assertion that the February 18, 2014 order terminating his parental rights is final. 8 not be dismissed as moot when doing so forecloses parent from challenging the jurisdictional findings].) However, we grant the Agency's motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of father's second claim on appeal that the court erroneously granted the Agency's petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to su

2013DISCUSSION I Motion to Dismiss Preliminarily, we dispose of the Agency’s motion to dismiss the appeals as moot since on September 5, 2012, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over Marquis. 4 “ ‘As a general rule, “an appeal presenting only abstract or academic questions is subject to dismissal as moot.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] However, where a judgment dismissing the dependency action is challenged on appeal the case ‘is not moot if the purported error is of such magnitude as to infect the outcome of [subsequent proceedings] or where the alleged defect undermines the juvenil

2025This is because of the different corresponding statutory presumptions (see §§ 1245.250, subds. (a), (c).) When the property sought to be taken is within the public entity’s jurisdictional boundaries, a RON has a conclusive effect as to the three public necessity elements unless “‘its adoption or contents were influenced or affected by gross abuse of discretion by the governing body.’” (Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v. Izant (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 141, 148-149 (Izant).) This may be shown by “a lack of substantial evidence supporting the [RON]” or by showing that “at the time of the agen

2025This is because of the different corresponding statutory presumptions (see §§ 1245.250, subds. (a), (c).) When the property sought to be taken is within the public entity’s jurisdictional boundaries, a RON has a conclusive effect as to the three public necessity elements unless “‘its adoption or contents were influenced or affected by gross abuse of discretion by the governing body.’” (Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v. Izant (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 141, 148-149 (Izant).) This may be shown by “a lack of substantial evidence supporting the [RON]” or by showing that “at the time of the agen

2022(See, e.g., In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [absent exceptional circumstances, appellate court should not consider postjudgment evidence]; In re Heather B. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 12 11, 13 [appeal reviews correctness of judgment or order as of time of its rendition upon record of matters which were before juvenile court for its consideration].) “Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court. [Citations.] Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial

2007Code, §§ 452 , subd. (d), 459, subds. (a), (c); see also Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495 , 505 , fn. 6 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 787 , 115 P.3d 68 ].) 11 Because we consider the minute order not as a basis to reverse, but to show that events occurring during the appeal render Amber's contention as to Christina moot, taking judicial notice here is not prohibited by Zeth S., supra , 31 Cal.4th 396 .

2014A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (Id. at p._, fn. 20 [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20 ].) The court also noted that it had “not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary.” (Bauman II, supra, 571 U.S. at p. _ [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 759 ].) In this regard, it was critical of the agency test applied by the Ninth Circuit in Bauman I , stating, “The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on its observation that MBUSA’s services were ‘import

2014A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (Id. at p._, fn. 20 [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20 ].) The court also noted that it had “not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary.” (Bauman II, supra, 571 U.S. at p. _ [ 134 S.Ct. at p. 759 ].) In this regard, it was critical of the agency test applied by the Ninth Circuit in Bauman I , stating, “The Ninth Circuit’s agency finding rested primarily on its observation that MBUSA’s services were ‘import

2024IV Agency “The agency exception is another exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 .) “The exception applies, and a defendant may enforce the arbitration agreement, ‘when a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement. . . .’ ” (Ibid., quoting Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614 .) Soltero’s complaint does not allege that Precise acted as an agent of Real Time or vice versa.

2021“The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it. [Citation.] The exception applies, and a defendant may enforce the arbitration agreement, ‘when a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement.’” (Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 788 .) The agency exception applies here.

2015On page 29, before the start of subsection 3 and as the final paragraph for subsection 2, the following paragraph is added: An agency evaluates potential environmental effects under the fair argument standard, but judicial review “is limited to determining whether the agency applied the standard ‘in [the] manner required by law,’ ” which means the court reviews the record to determine if the agency’s fair argument conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. ( Berkeley, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1115-1116.) 3.

2015The [reviewing] court’s function is to determine whether substantial evidence supports] the agency’s conclusion as to whether the prescribed “fair argument” could be made.’ ” (Berkeley Hillside, at p. 1112.) Thus, the “agency must evaluate potential environmental effects under the fair argument standard, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the agency applied the standard ‘in [the] manner required by law.’ ” (Id. at p. 1116.) In the second alternative for proving the unusual circumstance exception, “a party may establish an unusual circumstance with evidence that *576 the proj

2025(Cohen, at p. 861 [citing RN Solution, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520 , Harris, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 479 ]; see also Keller Construction Co. v. Kashani (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 222, 228 [sole general partner bound to arbitrate under agreement he signed on behalf of his limited partnership because “[t]he general partner is an agent of the limited partnership … and is logically a beneficiary of any agreement entered into on behalf of the partnership”].) Here, the directors do not dispute they were agents of Orthofix based on their positions on the company’s board.

2019(See, e.g., RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1520 (RN Solution) [corporate officer “benefited financially and professionally” from an agreement that included an arbitration provision]; Harris v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 475, 479 (Harris) [arbitration clause in a contract between patients and their health services program bound a doctor who voluntarily accepted patients from the plan].)12 12 These courts distinguish this application of the agency exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may be compelled to

2025(Cohen, at p. 861 [citing RN Solution, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520 , Harris, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 479 ]; see also Keller Construction Co. v. Kashani (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 222, 228 [sole general partner bound to arbitrate under agreement he signed on behalf of his limited partnership because “[t]he general partner is an agent of the limited partnership … and is logically a beneficiary of any agreement entered into on behalf of the partnership”].) Here, the directors do not dispute they were agents of Orthofix based on their positions on the company’s board.

2019(See, e.g., RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1520 (RN Solution) [corporate officer “benefited financially and professionally” from an agreement that included an arbitration provision]; Harris v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 475, 479 (Harris) [arbitration clause in a contract between patients and their health services program bound a doctor who voluntarily accepted patients from the plan].)12 12 These courts distinguish this application of the agency exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may be compelled to

2025This is because of the different corresponding statutory presumptions (see §§ 1245.250, subds. (a), (c).) When the property sought to be taken is within the public entity’s jurisdictional boundaries, a RON has a conclusive effect as to the three public necessity elements unless “‘its adoption or contents were influenced or affected by gross abuse of discretion by the governing body.’” (Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v. Izant (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 141, 148-149 (Izant).) This may be shown by “a lack of substantial evidence supporting the [RON]” or by showing that “at the time of the agen

2025This is because of the different corresponding statutory presumptions (see §§ 1245.250, subds. (a), (c).) When the property sought to be taken is within the public entity’s jurisdictional boundaries, a RON has a conclusive effect as to the three public necessity elements unless “‘its adoption or contents were influenced or affected by gross abuse of discretion by the governing body.’” (Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v. Izant (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 141, 148-149 (Izant).) This may be shown by “a lack of substantial evidence supporting the [RON]” or by showing that “at the time of the agen

2021“The agency exception is another exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it. [Citation.] The exception applies, and a defendant may enforce the arbitration agreement, ‘when a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement . . . .’ ” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 ; see also Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418 [where individual defendants were not signatories to arbitration agreement but were alleged to be acting as agents of signatory, 7 they were “entitled to the benefit of the ar

2015Rather, defendants rely upon the boilerplate allegation in the complaint that "each of the defendants [was] acting as the partner, agent, servant, and employee of each of the remaining defendants, and in doing the things alleged herein, was acting within the course and scope of such agency and with the knowledge and consent of the remaining defendants." (Italics omitted.) They contend, based primarily on Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406 , and 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199 (24 Hour Fitness), that this allegation supports application of the agen

2025Code, § 2295.) “ ‘The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.’ ” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “Not every agency relationship, however, will bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.” (Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 .) “[T]he proper inquiry is not only whether there is any sort of preexisting agency relationship with one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement—whether employer-employee, or another form of agency—but also whether that preexisting relationship is of such a nature th

2019And this case does not involve the estoppel exception. 31 p. 198.) The requirements for imposing arbitration on a nonsignatory principal, as opposed to allowing a nonsignatory agent to compel arbitration, however, must be “exacting.” (InterGen N.V. v. Grina, supra, 344 F.3d at p. 148 ; 21 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 57:19, p. 183; see Benasra v. Marciano, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 991 [“[i]t is one thing to permit a nonsignatory to relinquish his right to a jury trial, but quite another to compel him to do so”]; DK Joint Venture 1 v. Weyand (5th Cir. 2011) 649 F.3d 310, 316 [“‘it matter

2024(See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a); Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons Companies, Inc.); In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 456 [“The augmentation procedure cannot be used to bring up matters occurring during the pendency of the appeal because those matters are outside the superior court record.”].) 8 On June 25, 2024, we issued an order requesting that the Agency submit copies of minute orders dated March 18, 2024, April 22, 2024, and April 23, 2024, which presumably were issued in A.C.’s dependency case, and requesting letter b

2022(See, e.g., In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [absent exceptional circumstances, appellate court should not consider postjudgment evidence]; In re Heather B. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 12 11, 13 [appeal reviews correctness of judgment or order as of time of its rendition upon record of matters which were before juvenile court for its consideration].) “Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court. [Citations.] Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial

2024(See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a); Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons Companies, Inc.); In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 456 [“The augmentation procedure cannot be used to bring up matters occurring during the pendency of the appeal because those matters are outside the superior court record.”].) 8 On June 25, 2024, we issued an order requesting that the Agency submit copies of minute orders dated March 18, 2024, April 22, 2024, and April 23, 2024, which presumably were issued in A.C.’s dependency case, and requesting letter b

2022(See, e.g., In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [absent exceptional circumstances, appellate court should not consider postjudgment evidence]; In re Heather B. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 12 11, 13 [appeal reviews correctness of judgment or order as of time of its rendition upon record of matters which were before juvenile court for its consideration].) “Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court. [Citations.] Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial

2025Code, § 2295.) “ ‘The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.’ ” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “Not every agency relationship, however, will bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.” (Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 .) “[T]he proper inquiry is not only whether there is any sort of preexisting agency relationship with one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement—whether employer-employee, or another form of agency—but also whether that preexisting relationship is of such a nature th

2025Code, § 2295.) “ ‘The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.’ ” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “Not every agency relationship, however, will bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.” (Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 .) “[T]he proper inquiry is not only whether there is any sort of preexisting agency relationship with one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement—whether employer-employee, or another form of agency—but also whether that preexisting relationship is of such a nature th

2025(See Garcia v. Expert Staffing West (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 408 , 411 [agency exception did not apply because there was no judicial admission of agency allegations].) Similar to the Kessler defendants in Barsegian, Outlier and Tedesco deny they are agents of K1, yet they assert they are agents of K1 solely for purposes of the motion to compel arbitration. “‘[I]t would be unfair . . .’ to allow a party ‘to invoke agency principles when it is to [that party’s] advantage to do so, but to disavow those same principles when it is not.’” (Barsegian, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 , quoting Thomas v.

2024IV Agency “The agency exception is another exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 788 .) “The exception applies, and a defendant may enforce the arbitration agreement, ‘when a plaintiff alleges a defendant acted as an agent of a party to an arbitration agreement. . . .’ ” (Ibid., quoting Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614 .) Soltero’s complaint does not allege that Precise acted as an agent of Real Time or vice versa.

2025Code, § 2295.) “ ‘The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.’ ” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “Not every agency relationship, however, will bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.” (Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 .) “[T]he proper inquiry is not only whether there is any sort of preexisting agency relationship with one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement—whether employer-employee, or another form of agency—but also whether that preexisting relationship is of such a nature th

2025Code, § 2295.) “ ‘The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.’ ” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “Not every agency relationship, however, will bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.” (Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 .) “[T]he proper inquiry is not only whether there is any sort of preexisting agency relationship with one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement—whether employer-employee, or another form of agency—but also whether that preexisting relationship is of such a nature th

2020(Edwards v. Freeman (1949) 34 Cal.2d 589 .) It is clear from the evidence regarding procedural techniques here that the insurer-employer relationship meets this agency test with regard to the administration of the policy, whereas that between the employer and its employees fails to reflect true agency.

1967(Edwards v. Freeman (1949) 34 Cal.2d 589, 592 [ 212 P.2d 883 ].) It is clear from the evidence regarding procedural techniques here that the insurer-employer relationship meets this agency test with regard to the administration of the policy, whereas that between the employer and its employees fails to reflect true agency.

2014As we have recognized, the representative services doctrine is “a species of agency.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 798 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 ].) As such, the result of its application is that “the contacts of a local agent through which a foreign principal acts may be imputed to that foreign defendant,” thereby conferring general jurisdiction over the foreign defendant under “agency principles.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) While the Bauman II court questioned the formulation and application of the Ninth Circuit’s ag

2014As we have recognized, the representative services doctrine is “a species of agency.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 798 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 ].) As such, the result of its application is that “the contacts of a local agent through which a foreign principal acts may be imputed to that foreign defendant,” thereby conferring general jurisdiction over the foreign defendant under “agency principles.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) While the Bauman II court questioned the formulation and application of the Ninth Circuit’s ag

2025Code, § 2295.) “ ‘The agency exception is [an] exception to the general rule that only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.’ ” (Soltero, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 899.) “Not every agency relationship, however, will bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.” (Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 .) “[T]he proper inquiry is not only whether there is any sort of preexisting agency relationship with one of the signatories to the arbitration agreement—whether employer-employee, or another form of agency—but also whether that preexisting relationship is of such a nature th

2017In Harris , the doctor at issue was not only an employee of the corporation that entered into the arbitration agreement, but also a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. ( Harris, supra , 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 479 , 233 Cal.Rptr. 186 .) Similarly, in RN Solution , the party opposing enforcement of the arbitration agreement in fact signed it in her capacity as the corporation's president and CEO, and had personally "benefited financially and professionally" from it, so she was not only an "agent-employee" of the corporation, but also a third-party beneficiary. ( RN Solution, supra , 165 Cal

2025(See Garcia v. Expert Staffing West (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 408 , 411 [agency exception did not apply because there was no judicial admission of agency allegations].) Similar to the Kessler defendants in Barsegian, Outlier and Tedesco deny they are agents of K1, yet they assert they are agents of K1 solely for purposes of the motion to compel arbitration. “‘[I]t would be unfair . . .’ to allow a party ‘to invoke agency principles when it is to [that party’s] advantage to do so, but to disavow those same principles when it is not.’” (Barsegian, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 , quoting Thomas v.

2025(Barsegian, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 453, fn. 3 .) But those circumstances are not present here.

2021“Ratification is the 17 voluntary election by a person to adopt in some manner as his own an act which was purportedly done on his behalf by another person, the effect of which . . . is to treat the act as if originally authorized by him. [Citations.] [¶] A purported agent’s act may be adopted expressly or it may be adopted by implication based on conduct of the purported principal . . . .” (Rakestraw v. Rodrigues (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73 .) Elajou Investment Group contends Chhatrala ratified the Settlement Agreement by filing claims against it seeking to enforce the portion of the Settlement Ag

2020“Ratification is the voluntary election by a person to adopt in some manner as his own an act which was purportedly done on his behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to some or all persons, is to treat the act as if originally authorized by him. [Citations.]” (Rakestraw v. Rodrigues (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73 (Rakestraw); Civ.