agency hearing in Connecticut

2007"If a hearing is not statutorily mandated, even if one is gratuitously held, a `contested case' is not created." [11] Dadiskos v. Connecticut Real Estate Commission, 37 Conn.App. 777, 782 , 657 A.2d 717 (1995); see also Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693, 704-705 , 620 A.2d 780 (1993) ("[a]lthough an agency rule, policy or regulation may require a hearing, that hearing will not qualify the proceedings as a contested case unless the agency is statutorily required to determine the legal rights or privileges of the party aggrieved in that proceeding"); Canterbury v. Rocque, 78 Conn.App.

2007"If a hearing is not statutorily mandated, even if one is gratuitously held, a `contested case' is not created." [11] Dadiskos v. Connecticut Real Estate Commission, 37 Conn.App. 777, 782 , 657 A.2d 717 (1995); see also Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693, 704-705 , 620 A.2d 780 (1993) ("[a]lthough an agency rule, policy or regulation may require a hearing, that hearing will not qualify the proceedings as a contested case unless the agency is statutorily required to determine the legal rights or privileges of the party aggrieved in that proceeding"); Canterbury v. Rocque, 78 Conn.App.

2002Branhaven Plaza, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Commission , 251 Conn. 269 , 276 n. 9, 740 A.2d 847 (1999).

2002Branhaven Plaza, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Commission , 251 Conn. 269 , 276 n. 9, 740 A.2d 847 (1999).

2002Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 480-81 , 234 A.2d 825 [1967]; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 40.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzola v. Southern New England Telephone Co., supra, 349.

2002Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 480-81 , 234 A.2d 825 [1967]; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 40.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazzola v. Southern New England Telephone Co., supra, 349.

1994Bogart v. Tucker, 164 Conn. 277 , 281-82 , 320 A.2d 803 (1973). "[T]he statute goes further than merely establishing a presumption in that it definitely places a burden of rebutting it on the defendant.

1994Bogart v. Tucker, 164 Conn. 277 , 281-82 , 320 A.2d 803 (1973). "[T]he statute goes further than merely establishing a presumption in that it definitely places a burden of rebutting it on the defendant.

2021Under this dual pronged analysis, ‘‘the agency inquiry is precedent to and distinct from determining whether [the] agent ‘deliberately elicits’ information.’’ (Emphasis added.) Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 393 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1148 , 119 S. Ct. 2027 , 143 L.

2021Under this dual pronged analysis, ‘‘the agency inquiry is precedent to and distinct from determining whether [the] agent ‘deliberately elicits’ information.’’ (Emphasis added.) Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 393 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1148 , 119 S. Ct. 2027 , 143 L.

2021Matteo v. Brennan, 528 U.S. 824 , 120 S. Ct. 73 , 145 L.

2021Matteo v. Brennan, 528 U.S. 824 , 120 S. Ct. 73 , 145 L.

2021Matteo v. Brennan, 528 U.S. 824 , 120 S. Ct. 73 , 145 L.

2021So you made him generally aware that any contact you had and any information received would go to the [Office of the State’s Attorney]? ‘‘[Weaver]: Yes.’’ 24 Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that custody is relevant to the agency analysis in Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 , 894–95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

2009“When acting in its legislative capacity, a commission has broad discretion and is entitled to take into consideration facts learned through personal knowledge or observation in order to develop responsible planning for the present and future development of the community.” Sowin Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 23 Conn. App. 370, 375 , 580 A.2d 91 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 832 , 583 A.2d 131 (1990).

2009“When acting in its legislative capacity, a commission has broad discretion and is entitled to take into consideration facts learned through personal knowledge or observation in order to develop responsible planning for the present and future development of the community.” Sowin Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 23 Conn. App. 370, 375 , 580 A.2d 91 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 832 , 583 A.2d 131 (1990).

2009“When acting in its legislative capacity, a commission has broad discretion and is entitled to take into consideration facts learned through personal knowledge or observation in order to develop responsible planning for the present and future development of the community.” Sowin Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 23 Conn. App. 370, 375 , 580 A.2d 91 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 832 , 583 A.2d 131 (1990).

2009“When acting in its legislative capacity, a commission has broad discretion and is entitled to take into consideration facts learned through personal knowledge or observation in order to develop responsible planning for the present and future development of the community.” Sowin Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 23 Conn. App. 370, 375 , 580 A.2d 91 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 832 , 583 A.2d 131 (1990).

2009I have taken the time to review my notes from the various public hearings and all of the written submissions, and wanted to put my thoughts [into] writing.” *488 The trial court found that this “memorandum is merely a summary of her opinion based on her personal knowledge and, as such, constitutes a legitimate part of the commission’s deliberations.” General Statutes § 4-181 (b) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a member of a multimember agency may communicate with other members of the agency regarding a matter pending before the agency, and members o

2009I have taken the time to review my notes from the various public hearings and all of the written submissions, and wanted to put my thoughts [into] writing.” *488 The trial court found that this “memorandum is merely a summary of her opinion based on her personal knowledge and, as such, constitutes a legitimate part of the commission’s deliberations.” General Statutes § 4-181 (b) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a member of a multimember agency may communicate with other members of the agency regarding a matter pending before the agency, and members o

2007Furthermore, a hearing that is constitutionally required, yet not explicitly mandated by the General Statutes, is not a hearing “required by state statute,” as contemplated by § 4-166 (2) so as to give rise to a “contested case.” 6 See Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196, 203 , 477 A.2d 129 (1984).

2007Furthermore, a hearing that is constitutionally required, yet not explicitly mandated by the General Statutes, is not a hearing “required by state statute,” as contemplated by § 4-166 (2) so as to give rise to a “contested case.” 6 See Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn. App. 196, 203 , 477 A.2d 129 (1984).

2006Zimmerman cannot be held liable, then neither can the hospital.” The hospital relies on our decision in Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 724 , 735 A.2d 306 (1999), in which we held that, under the joint tortfeasor statute; General Statutes § 52-572e; “the plaintiffs release of an agent’s liability extinguishes the principal’s vicarious liability . . . .” *320 Neither party cites any other authority on this point, but our independent research indicates that our sister states are divided on this issue.

2006Zimmerman cannot be held liable, then neither can the hospital.” The hospital relies on our decision in Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709, 724 , 735 A.2d 306 (1999), in which we held that, under the joint tortfeasor statute; General Statutes § 52-572e; “the plaintiffs release of an agent’s liability extinguishes the principal’s vicarious liability . . . .” *320 Neither party cites any other authority on this point, but our independent research indicates that our sister states are divided on this issue.

2005If the plaintiffs rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right to appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a).” 10 Id., 705; see also, e.g., Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 775 , 826 A.2d 138 (2003) (reviewing appeal options provided by General Statutes § 17a-597 [a] and concluding that “there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the [psychiatric security review board] transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility”); Morel v. Commissioner of Public

2005If the plaintiffs rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right to appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a).” 10 Id., 705; see also, e.g., Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 775 , 826 A.2d 138 (2003) (reviewing appeal options provided by General Statutes § 17a-597 [a] and concluding that “there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the [psychiatric security review board] transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility”); Morel v. Commissioner of Public

2005If the plaintiffs rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right to appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a).” 10 Id., 705; see also, e.g., Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 775 , 826 A.2d 138 (2003) (reviewing appeal options provided by General Statutes § 17a-597 [a] and concluding that “there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the [psychiatric security review board] transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility”); Morel v. Commissioner of Public

2005If the plaintiffs rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right to appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a).” 10 Id., 705; see also, e.g., Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 775 , 826 A.2d 138 (2003) (reviewing appeal options provided by General Statutes § 17a-597 [a] and concluding that “there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the [psychiatric security review board] transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility”); Morel v. Commissioner of Public

2005If the plaintiffs rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right to appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a).” 10 Id., 705; see also, e.g., Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 775 , 826 A.2d 138 (2003) (reviewing appeal options provided by General Statutes § 17a-597 [a] and concluding that “there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the [psychiatric security review board] transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility”); Morel v. Commissioner of Public

2005If the plaintiffs rights or privileges are not ‘statutorily’ required to be determined by the agency, a ‘contested case’ does not exist and a plaintiff would have no right to appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (a).” 10 Id., 705; see also, e.g., Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 775 , 826 A.2d 138 (2003) (reviewing appeal options provided by General Statutes § 17a-597 [a] and concluding that “there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the [psychiatric security review board] transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility”); Morel v. Commissioner of Public

2003McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, 68 Conn. App. 284, 285-86 , 791 A.2d 602 (2002).

2003McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, 68 Conn. App. 284, 285-86 , 791 A.2d 602 (2002).

2003For a contrary point of view, the plaintiff cites Mitchell v. King, 169 Conn. 140 , 363 A.2d 68 (1975).

2003For a contrary point of view, the plaintiff cites Mitchell v. King, 169 Conn. 140 , 363 A.2d 68 (1975).

2003The court likewise has upheld the constitutional validity of a statute containing a standard similar to that contained in § 13b- 103 (b) that empowered an agency to apply the standard of “public convenience and necessity.” See Wilson Point Property Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, 267-68 , 140 A.2d 874 (1958); Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 670-71 , 103 A.2d 535 (1954).

2003The court likewise has upheld the constitutional validity of a statute containing a standard similar to that contained in § 13b- 103 (b) that empowered an agency to apply the standard of “public convenience and necessity.” See Wilson Point Property Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, 267-68 , 140 A.2d 874 (1958); Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 670-71 , 103 A.2d 535 (1954).

2003The court likewise has upheld the constitutional validity of a statute containing a standard similar to that contained in § 13b- 103 (b) that empowered an agency to apply the standard of “public convenience and necessity.” See Wilson Point Property Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, 267-68 , 140 A.2d 874 (1958); Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 670-71 , 103 A.2d 535 (1954).

2003The court likewise has upheld the constitutional validity of a statute containing a standard similar to that contained in § 13b- 103 (b) that empowered an agency to apply the standard of “public convenience and necessity.” See Wilson Point Property Owners Assn. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 145 Conn. 243, 267-68 , 140 A.2d 874 (1958); Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 670-71 , 103 A.2d 535 (1954).