agency rule in Iowa

2018Historically, we have said that an agency rule is "presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves 'a "rational agency" could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.' " Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp ., 648 N.W.2d 109 , 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Milholin v. Vorhies , 320 N.W.2d 552 , 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc) ); see also Brakke , 897 N.W.2d at 533 .

2018Historically, we have said that an agency rule is “presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves ‘a “rational agency” could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.’ ” Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 648 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc)); see also Brakke, 897 N.W.2d at 533 .

2018Historically, we have said that an agency rule is "presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves 'a "rational agency" could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.' " Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp ., 648 N.W.2d 109 , 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Milholin v. Vorhies , 320 N.W.2d 552 , 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc) ); see also Brakke , 897 N.W.2d at 533 .

2018Historically, we have said that an agency rule is “presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves ‘a “rational agency” could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.’ ” Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 648 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc)); see also Brakke, 897 N.W.2d at 533 .

2023Under the second theory, although an employer can be vicariously liable for the actions of its supervisors through an agency analysis where the employer’s liability is premised on the supervisor misusing a position of authority, id. at 573–75 (discussing federal cases distinguishing between liability premised on an employer’s direct negligence and vicarious liability for a supervisor’s actions), the 26 employer can avoid vicarious liability if it can show it “exercised reasonable care” to promptly correct or prevent the harassing behavior and the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the oppor

2023Under the second theory, although an employer can be vicariously liable for the actions of its supervisors through an agency analysis where the employer’s liability is premised on the supervisor misusing a position of authority, id. at 573–75 (discussing federal cases distinguishing between liability premised on an employer’s direct negligence and vicarious liability for a supervisor’s actions), the 26 employer can avoid vicarious liability if it can show it “exercised reasonable care” to promptly correct or prevent the harassing behavior and the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the oppor

2014We have also observed that the de facto officer doctrine “is consistent with the broader rule that presumes the validity of official agency actions.” Allen, 528 N.W.2d at 588 ; see also Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 404 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1987) (“An agency rule is presumed valid and the burden is on the party challenging it to demonstrate that a ‘rational agency’ could not conclude the rule was within the agency’s delegated authority.”).

2014We have also observed that the de facto officer doctrine “is consistent with the broader rule that presumes the validity of official agency actions.” Allen, 528 N.W.2d at 588 ; see also Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 404 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1987) (“An agency rule is presumed valid and the burden is on the party challenging it to demonstrate that a ‘rational agency could not conclude the rule was within the agency’s delegated authority.”).

1993Young Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 276 N.W.2d 377, 383 (Iowa 1979).

1986Young Plumbing Co. v. Iowa, 276 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Iowa 1979).

2018Historically, we have said that an agency rule is "presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves 'a "rational agency" could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.' " Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp ., 648 N.W.2d 109 , 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Milholin v. Vorhies , 320 N.W.2d 552 , 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc) ); see also Brakke , 897 N.W.2d at 533 .

2018Historically, we have said that an agency rule is “presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves ‘a “rational agency” could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.’ ” Meredith Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 648 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc)); see also Brakke, 897 N.W.2d at 533 .

2017Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2292 ; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F. Supp. 2d 336 , 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding because the court applied the negligence standard, “the Faragher defense is inapplicable”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defense did not apply to negligence standard); Lintz v. Am.

2017Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2292 ; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F. Supp. 2d 336 , 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding because the court applied the negligence standard, “the Faragher defense is inapplicable”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defense did not apply to negligence standard); Lintz v. Am.

2017Soc. v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing, 831 N.W.2d 826, 839 (Iowa 2013).

2017Soc. v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing, 831 N.W.2d 826, 839 (Iowa 2013).

2017Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2292 ; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F. Supp. 2d 336 , 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding because the court applied the negligence standard, “the Faragher defense is inapplicable”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defense did not apply to negligence standard); Lintz v. Am.

2017Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2292 ; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F. Supp. 2d 336 , 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding because the court applied the negligence standard, “the Faragher defense is inapplicable”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defense did not apply to negligence standard); Lintz v. Am.

2017Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2292 ; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F. Supp. 2d 336 , 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding because the court applied the negligence standard, “the Faragher defense is inapplicable”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defense did not apply to negligence standard); Lintz v. Am.

2017Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 , 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense “in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 , 118 S. Ct. at 2292 ; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F. Supp. 2d 336 , 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding because the court applied the negligence standard, “the Faragher defense is inapplicable”); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating defense did not apply to negligence standard); Lintz v. Am.

2013See GME, 584 N.W.2d at 324–25. “ ‘An agency rule is presumed valid and the party challenging the rule has the burden to demonstrate that a “rational agency” could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.’ ” Id. at 325 (quoting Overton v. State, 493 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Iowa 1992)); see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a) (“[I]n suits for judicial review of agency action . . . [t]he burden of demonstrating . . . the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity.”).

2013See GME, 584 N.W.2d at 324-25 . “ ‘An agency rule is presumed valid and the party challenging the rule has the burden to demonstrate that a “rational agency” could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority.’ ” Id. at 325 (quoting Overton v. State, 493 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Iowa 1992)); see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a) (“[I]n suits for judicial review of agency action ... [t]he burden of demonstrating ... the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity.”).

2008Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Acad., 452 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990).

2008Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Acad., 452 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990).

1988Johnston v. Iowa Real Estate Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Iowa 1984).

1985Johnston v. Iowa Real Estate Commission, 344 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Iowa 1984).

1987Davenport Community School Dist. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 277 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1979); City of Davenport v. PERB, 264 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Iowa 1978).

1983Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (1982); Iowa Auto Dealers Ass’n v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 1981); Hiserote Homes, Inc. v. Riedemann, 277 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1979); Davenport Community School District v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 277 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1979).

2018City of Sioux City v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 666 N.W.2d 587 , 592 (Iowa 2003) ("The fact that this administrative rule has been in effect for eleven years strongly cautions against finding the rule invalid."); City of Marion v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 643 N.W.2d 205 , 208 (Iowa 2002) ("We have recognized that if the meaning of the statute that is subject to administrative implementation is subject to doubt and has been made the object of a rule of long-standing, we should give weight to the administrative interpretation."); accord Smith v. City of Jackson , 544 U.S. 228 , 239, 1

2010In City of Marion , we gave the department’s interpretation of a statute, as set forth in an agency rule, "appropriate deference” under section 17A.19(ll)(c). 643 N.W.2d at 207 .

2018Freeland , 492 N.W.2d at 196 (citing Kleidosty v. Emp't Appeal Bd. , 482 N.W.2d 416 , 416-17 (Iowa 1992) ).

1992See, e.g., Kleidosty v. Employment Appeal Bd., 482 N.W.2d 416, 416-17 (Iowa 1992); Larson v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 474 N.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Iowa 1991).

1987Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 334 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (Iowa 1983) (citing Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982)).

1985“An agency rule is presumed valid and the burden is on the party challenging it to demonstrate that a ‘rational agency’ could not conclude the rule was within the agency’s delegated authority.” Id. at 751-52 .

2018City of Sioux City v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 666 N.W.2d 587 , 592 (Iowa 2003) ("The fact that this administrative rule has been in effect for eleven years strongly cautions against finding the rule invalid."); City of Marion v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 643 N.W.2d 205 , 208 (Iowa 2002) ("We have recognized that if the meaning of the statute that is subject to administrative implementation is subject to doubt and has been made the object of a rule of long-standing, we should give weight to the administrative interpretation."); accord Smith v. City of Jackson , 544 U.S. 228 , 239, 1

2018City of Sioux City v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 666 N.W.2d 587 , 592 (Iowa 2003) ("The fact that this administrative rule has been in effect for eleven years strongly cautions against finding the rule invalid."); City of Marion v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 643 N.W.2d 205 , 208 (Iowa 2002) ("We have recognized that if the meaning of the statute that is subject to administrative implementation is subject to doubt and has been made the object of a rule of long-standing, we should give weight to the administrative interpretation."); accord Smith v. City of Jackson , 544 U.S. 228 , 239, 1

2018City of Sioux City v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 666 N.W.2d 587 , 592 (Iowa 2003) ("The fact that this administrative rule has been in effect for eleven years strongly cautions against finding the rule invalid."); City of Marion v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 643 N.W.2d 205 , 208 (Iowa 2002) ("We have recognized that if the meaning of the statute that is subject to administrative implementation is subject to doubt and has been made the object of a rule of long-standing, we should give weight to the administrative interpretation."); accord Smith v. City of Jackson , 544 U.S. 228 , 239, 1

2018See Ragland , 812 N.W.2d at 658 . 5 We note the record reflects that store 204 did have a class "B" wine permit, but it surrendered that permit, and testimony at the agency hearing indicated the store had no future plans to sell wine in the store.

2017See Lee v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 616 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Iowa 2000) (“The employer bears the burden of proving a claimant is disqualified for benefits because of misconduct.”).